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Abstract
The thesis consists of three chapters of self-contained empirical and theoretical studies.
In Chapter 1, I examine whether the Balassa-Samuelson effect is indeed the reason
behind the behaviour of the currencies of transition economies. So far, in the literature,
transition Economies appear to be subject to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. This implies
that their currencies experience a prolonged appreciation in real terms as their conver-
gence goes on. However, in the current literature, the effects of the capital account have
not been analyzed extensively. In this paper I show that the capital account, rather
than productivity, is a key determinant of the appreciation of the currencies of transition
economies. I find that a long-run relationship exists between the real exchange rate,
productivity, the real interest rate differential and the capital account. Moreover, those
variables are found to cointegrate in a nonlinear fashion according to a smooth transition
autoregressive model. This implies that a multivariate smooth transition error correction
model is the appropriate model to describe their short-run and long-run dynamics.
In Chapter 2, I examine the importance of a real exchange rate target in the monetary
policy of a central bank. I address that question both empirically and theoretically. Using
monthly data I estimate of a structural VAR model for the Eurozone providing evidence
in favour of real exchange rate targeting. I examine this case theoretically using a two-
country DSGE model; I find that when the home central bank includes a real exchange
rate target in its interest rate rule, it achieves lower welfare losses compared to the Taylor
rule. Contrary to similar papers, I compute the optimized coefficients in the interest rate
rules considered. I show that the benefits from real exchange rate targeting at home rise
as persistence in inflation and output increases. In the robustness analysis I show that a
rise in the fraction of backward looking consumers affects negatively the performance of
the real exchange rate targeting rule and positively that of the Taylor rule. Asymmetries
in the degree of rule-of-thumb behavior in consumption have important effects, as regards
the performance of a real exchange rate targeting rule. The performance of both rules is
not sensitive to variations in the degree of backward looking price setting behavior .
In Chapter 3, I show, using both empirical and theoretical analysis, that changes in
monetary policy in one country can have important effects on other economies. My
new empirical evidence shows that changes in the monetary policy behaviour of the
Fed since the start of the Euro, well captured by a Markov-switching Taylor rule, have
had significant effects on the behaviour of inflation and output in the Eurozone even
though ECB’s monetary policy is found to be fairly stable. Using a two-country DSGE
model, I examine this case theoretically; monetary policy in one of the countries (labelled
foreign) switches regimes according to a Markov-switching process and this has non-
negligible effects in the other (home) country. Switching by the foreign central bank
renders commitment to a time invariant interest rate rule suboptimal for the home central
bank. This is because home agents expectations change as foreign monetary policy
vii
changes which affects the dynamics of home inflation and output. Optimal policy in the
home country instead reacts to the regime of the foreign monetary policy and so implies
a time-varying reaction of the home Central Bank. Following this time-varying optimal
policy at home eliminates the effects in the home country of foreign regime shifts, and
also reduces dramatically the effects in the foreign country. Therefore, changes in foreign
monetary regimes should not be neglected in considering monetary policy at home.
viii
INTRODUCTION
In this thesis I focus on exchange rate modelling and the design of optimal monetary policy
for open economies. In the first chapter I examine the behaviour of the real exchange rate in
transition economies. In the second chapter I examine the importance of the real exchange rate in
the conduct of monetary policy. In the third chapter I examine the international effects of regime
switches in monetary policy.
In particular, in Chapter 1 I examine whether the Balassa-Samuelson effect is the main reason
for the appreciation of the currencies in transition economies, or not. The Balassa-Samuelson
effect, originally introduced by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) states that countries that
experience high levels of productivity will have their currencies appreciated and their price levels
higher. A vast empirical literature focusing either on transition or on industrialized economies
supports this perspective. However, there is still a number of researchers that strongly reject it.
The industrial development of the countries under consideration is of great importance once
the Balassa-Samuelson effect is tested. Countries that are close trade partners are unlikely to
validate this effect. In particular Lothian and Taylor (2008) testing for productivity effects on the
real exchange rate between the United States, the United Kingdom and France found that for the
Sterling-dollar exchange rate there is evidence in favour of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. However,
the sterling-franc real exchange is not subject to this effect as the United Kingdom and France
appear to be close trade partners. Nevertheless, testing the validity of these effects in industrialized
economies, one should be careful as any potential effect may either die out very quickly due to
technological diffusion, or it may be the case that productivity explains a part but not the entire
variation of the real exchange rate. Therefore, it becomes clear why in industrial countries only a
small part of the total variation in the real exchange rates is explained by productivity fluctuations.
In this paper I test whether a long-run relationship exists among the real exchange rate, produc-
tivity, the real interest rate differential and the capital account. I find that productivity does not
cause appreciation of the currency in all cases. However, the capital account causes an appreciation
of the currency in almost all cases. More importantly, I show that whether the capital account
will cause an appreciation or not depends on the composition of capital inflows. In particular,
I find that the capital account causes an appreciation of the currency as long as foreign direct
1
investment exceeds portfolio investment. When portfolio investment is the major element of the
capital account, then the latter no longer causes an appreciation of the currency. Therefore, this
paper suggests that the Balassa-Samuelson effect may not be the appropriate explanation of the
behaviour of the currencies in transition economies. Rather, it is the kind of investment that a
transition economy receives the driving force behind the appreciation of its currency.
I show that the real exchange, productivity, the real interest rate differential and the capital
account share a common trend. Notably, I find that they are cointegrated in a nonlinear fashion. In
particular, I show that the residuals from their long-run relationship are subject to nonlinearities.
This implies that standard linear error correction models are no longer valid. Therefore, I make
use of a nonlinear error correction model. The form of this model is determined by the type of
nonlinearity that is found for the cointegrating residuals.
One of the weaknesses of many studies so far is the failure to capture the effect of the fundamen-
tals, apart from productivity, on the the real exchange rate. Clarida and Taylor (2001) and Taylor
and Sarno (2001) used decomposition techniques in order to deal with this problem. Instead, the
approach used here tries to tackle this problem by introducing one of the fundamentals, in the
long-run equation for the real exchange rate. For this reason I allow for the capital account to
be one of the determinants of the real exchange rate. This approach is close to the fundamen-
tal equilibrium exchange rate approach (FEER), which was applied to transition economies by
Amadkov et al. (2002) and Coudert and Couharde (2002). This approach focuses only on the
current account effects. In particular, the divergence between the underlying current account and
the medium-run current account determines whether the exchange rate has been appreciated or
depreciated. However, a weakness of the FEER approach is that productivity fluctuations are
not taken into account. Therefore, I move further the analysis by incorporating both effects (i.e.
productivity and the capital account) in the determination of the real exchange rate.
The effect the capital account may have on the real exchange rate depends on many factors. If a
country’s capital inflows translate into higher domestic consumption then the country faces higher
current account deficits, and its currency is likely to appreciate. In this case there will be a capital
account surplus, further increasing the current account deficit. For transition economies, these
capital inflows can enhance productivity, thereby strengthening further their currencies through
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the Balassa-Samuelson channel. However, any negative effects the inflows may have cannot be
neglected. These can be inflationary pressures, higher current account deficits, rapid monetary
expansion (Calvo et al., 1996, Agenor, 2004, Calvo, 2005).
The way the capital account is likely to affect the real exchange rate cannot be known in
advance. By the balance of payments identity, the capital account is implicitly a proxy for the
current account. The composition of the capital flows determines the way the capital account
affects the real exchange rate. Long term capital flows are the foreign direct investment which
fosters growth, as it is generally taken to be determined by long-term profitability considerations
and often leads to the transfer of state-of-the-art technology (Agenor, 2004). As a result, this
kind of flows are less subject to market sentiment. On the contrary, capital flows focusing on
portfolio investment and short term bank lending (financial products) are a short-run investment
and are subject to any kind of market volatility. Therefore, if the latter sort of investment is the
key determinant of capital flows to a transition economy, then it is likely that productivity is less
strengthened in this country compared to others. In this case, I expect the capital account to have
an overall positive effect on the real exchange rate (i.e. depreciation), and as a result productivity
will matter less in its fluctuations.
In Chapter 2, I examine, both empirically and theoretically, the ability of real exchange rate
targeting in achieving lower inflation and output gap fluctuations. Using monthly data I estimate
of a structural VAR model with short-run restrictions for the Eurozone. I find that when the ECB
reacts contemporaneously to the real exchange rate it controls both inflation and the output gap
better. I examine this case theoretically using a two-country DSGE model. I find that when the
home central bank includes a real exchange rate target in its interest rate rule, it achieves a better
control of inflation and output gap. I compare the performance of a rule with a real exchange rate
target to that of the Taylor rule using a welfare criterion. The latter is derived from a second order
approximation to the agents utility function as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998). Contrary to
similar papers, I compute the optimized coefficients in the interest rate rules considered. Real
exchange rate targeting yields lower welfare losses. Notably, the benefits from real exchange rate
targeting at home rise as persistence in inflation and output increases. In the robustness analysis I
show that a rise in the fraction of backward looking consumers affects negatively the performance
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of the real exchange rate targeting rule and positively that of the Taylor rule. The performance
of both rules, though, is not sensitive to variations in the degree of backward looking price setting
behavior .
In an empirical exercise, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), estimated simple interest rate rules
for the G3 and E3 economies. Their estimates showed that the standard Taylor rule appears
to be a good approximation to the policy rate of the central banks of the countries considered.
In particular, the coefficients on the inflation and the output gap targets seemed to move close
to Taylor’s (1993) suggestion. Interest rate smoothing is proved to be statistically significant.
Extending their analysis through adding more targets, they found that their coefficients were
either very small, or statistically insignificant1.
In a theoretical small open economy model, Svensson (2000) argues that additional targets could
be included in an interest rate rule of an open economy. Those could include variables like the
exchange rate (either real, or nominal), or even foreign variables. On the other hand, McCallum
and Nelson (1999) argue against exchange rate targeting. Their conclusion is that the central
bank should not react to exchange rate movements since the it reacts to it indirectly through its
inflation target. In their model, however, McCallum and Nelson assume perfect exchange rate pass
through. I assume that the pass through is imperfect. In our model, firms set one price for the
Home country and one for the Foreign country for the good they produce. Weerapana (2000), on
the other hand, argues in favor of an exchange rate target. Simulating a two country sticky price
model, he finds that an exchange rate target yields lower welfare losses. However, Weerapana does
not specify whether the central bank achieves a better control of inflation.
Exchange rate targeting is perfectly aligned with the effort of a central bank to keep the exchange
rate within certain bands. In this case Benigno and Benigno (2001) show that a nominal exchange
rate target is welfare improving. Their focus, though, is on different exchange rate regimes and
how their choice affects welfare. My focus is different. I try to explore whether adding a real
exchange rate target in a simple interest rate rule, allows the Central Bank to achieve a better
control of inflation and, at the same time, lower welfare losses. Achieving lower welfare losses does
not necessarily imply lower CPI or PPI inflation variation. The reason is that my two country
1The additional targets considered were the real exchange rate, lagged inflation rate, money supply and the federal funds rate.
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model is very rich in its dynamics. As is shown, welfare is affected not only by the variances of
PPI inflation, the output gap and the real exchange, but also by their covariances. Additionally,
since I introduce endogenous output and inflation persistence, I show that welfare is affected by
the lags of output and inflation.
Benigno and Benigno (2008) show that in exchange rate regimes where the Central Bank reacts
either to the change in the nominal exchange rate or its level, it achieves a better control of the
terms of trade, in terms of volatility. However, they focus only on shocks to the natural terms
of trade without proceeding to an impulse response analysis in the face of monetary policy, real
exchange rate and productivity shocks. Restricting the analysis in only one kind of shock may
be misleading, since the choice of an exchange rate regime may not be sustainable in the face of
alternative policy or real shocks. Additionally, they do not conduct a welfare analysis. Benigno
and Benigno (2001) , however, proceed to the evaluation of the alternative interest rate rules
based on a welfare criterion. Their welfare analysis shows that interest rate rules with a nominal
exchange rate target perform worse than a standard Taylor rule. However, they do not perform a
robustness exercise, in order to test whether the rule is robustly optimal. Their model does not
include endogenous inflation and output persistence and asymmetry, between the two countries,
is considered only in the coefficients of the interest rate rules. I consider alternative kinds of
asymmetries, as far as the structural parameters are concerned. The reason, as I show, is that
asymmetries have important implications for monetary policy.
Leitemo and Soderstrom (2001) find that the inclusion of a real exchange rate target into
the Taylor rule gives only slight improvements in terms of volatility of the important variables
in the economy. They consider a small open economy model with model uncertainty. Altering
parameters in the model, and more importantly, increasing the degree of asymmetries has non-
negligible effects in terms of welfare losses. Leitemo and Soderstrom, like Weerapana (2000) do
not derive the welfare loss from the utility function of households, but they, rather, impose an
ad hoc version of it. Moreover, in this paper the coefficients in the interest rate rule of the home
country are not imposed exogenously, but rather they are the ones that minimize the welfare loss
function. Under this approach I show that the differences in welfare losses can be very large.
In Chapter 3, I build on the same model as in Chapter 2 and I show, both empirically and
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theoretically, that changes in monetary policy in one country have important effects on other
economies. In the empirical analysis, I find that the monetary policy of the US has changed
since the start of the Euro. This change affected the dynamics of inflation and output in the
Eurozone significantly. However, the monetary policy of the ECB is found to be fairly stable.
In the theoretical analysis, I show that changes in the monetary policy of one country (labelled
foreign) have non-negligible effects on the dynamics of the key macroeconomic variables in the
other (home) country. This result is further enhanced as long as the home country does not take
into account changes in foreign monetary policy. However, both economies benefit when the home
central bank reacts optimally to foreign monetary policy regime shifts.
A popular way of modelling regime changes in monetary policy is by assuming that the interest
rate rule coefficients change according to a Markov switching process. Using this approach Davig
and Leeper (2007), Liu et al. (2008, 2009), Farmer et al. (2011) and Bekaert et al. (2011) construct
closed economy DSGE models in order to analyze the effects of regime shifts in monetary policy
on inflation and output.2 These papers conclude that the expectation of a future regime shift in
monetary policy has significant effects on inflation and output today. Those effects can be either
stabilizing or destabilizing depending on what is the expected future policy.
The existing literature on Markov-switching DSGE models, though, is restricted to a closed
economy framework. As a result, so far, the cross country effects of regime shifts in monetary policy
have not been analyzed. Therefore, it is important that we have an open economy framework, so
that to analyze the effects in one country of a change in monetary policy of another country.
The first contribution of the paper is to provide empirical evidence regarding the international
effects of changes in monetary policy. I estimate a SVAR model for the US and the Eurozone using
real time monthly data spanning from 1999 through 2010. The empirical model includes seven
variables, namely inflation, output gap and the nominal interest rate for both the Eurozone and
the US, as well as the real exchange rate. I perform parameter stability tests using the Andrews
sup-Wald test, as in Boivin and Giannoni (2002) and the Andrews-Ploberger test.3 Both tests
find that there have been statistically significant changes in the coefficients in the US interest
2In all of these papers the theoretical analysis is motivated by the empirical estimates about the way monetary policy was conducted
in the US from 1970 until recently.
3I use the Andrews-Ploberger test because of its virtue of identifying the break date.
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rate equation. This implies that there has been a change in the systematic behaviour of the Fed.
However, coefficients in the Eurozone interest rate equation are stable throughout the sample. The
Andrews-Ploberger test identifies the break date in June 2004. Therefore, I split the sample into
two sub-samples, namely before and after that date. The impulse response analysis shows that the
responses of inflation and output gap in the Eurozone are completely different in the two samples.
But what drives the changes in the impulse responses of inflation and output in the Eurozone?
In order to answer that question, I perform a countrefactual analysis in the VAR model. I find
that the main reason for the change in the impulse responses of those variables was the change in
the US monetary policy. I examine also whether changes in the conditions in the Euro area can
account for that. I find that their contribution at causing changes in the impulse responses is tiny.
Given the weakness of the SVAR model in uncovering a Taylor rule, a last step in the empirical
analysis is to explore whether there have been indeed changes in Fed’s contemporaneous reaction
to inflation and output gap fluctuations. For this reason I estimate a Taylor rule for the US whose
coefficients change over time according to a Markov-switching process. The estimated rule findings
validate that the monetary policy of the Fed has changed since the start of the Euro and are in
line with the stability tests from the SVAR model. The rule changes state only once. Notably,
the regime change date is very close to the break date identified by the Andrews-Ploberger test in
the US interest rate equation. Keeping those findings in mind, I proceed to the construction of a
two-country DSGE model.
The theoretical model is similar to that of Benigno and Benigno (2001) and Benigno (2004). I
extend their approach by allowing the coefficients in the foreign interest rate rule only to change
according to a Markov-switching process. The home country instead adopts a time-invariant
Taylor rule with some interest rate smoothing. I show that even though the home monetary policy
is constantly (and with a constant coefficient) hawkish4, home inflation exhibits changes in its
volatility over time. Specifically, if there is a positive probability that foreign monetary policy
will be dovish5 in the future, then not only foreign inflation will be more volatile, but also home
inflation. This is because both home and foreign agents incorporate this probability in their future
4Throughout the paper hawkish refers to the case where the coefficient on inflation in the interest rate rule is greater than one. In
the literature, this implies that the central bank cares a lot about inflation stabilization.
5Throughout the paper dovish refers to the case where the coefficient on inflation in the interest rate rule is less than one. In the
literature, this implies that the central bank is more tolerant of inflation fluctuations.
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inflation expectations.6 The increase in the volatility of home inflation in this case comes from the
home agents expectation of an increasing volatility in the real exchange rate and relative prices.
Therefore, commitment to a regime independent interest rate rule proves not to be enough to
stabilize the home economy.
Hence, as a next step, I examine the optimal policy of the home country. I solve the optimal
policy problem of the home central bank conditional on foreign monetary policy switching regimes
over time. I extend Soderlind’s (1998) algorithm for solving optimal policy problems in linear
rational expectations models to a Markov-switching framework. I show that a time invariant
interest rate rule is suboptimal for the home country. The home central bank must be always
hawkish. How much hawkish the home central bank should be, depends on the regime which
the foreign monetary policy lies in. More specifically, I find that as the probability that the
foreign central bank becomes dovish rises, the home central bank should increase the coefficient
on inflation further. The opposite holds as the probability that the foreign central bank becomes
hawkish increases. The intuition behind this result is that when home agents expect that foreign
monetary policy will become dovish, they anticipate an increase in the volatility of home inflation.
Hence, the home central bank must react in such a way so that to offset this effect on home agents
expectations. And this, as I show, is achieved by increasing the coefficient on home inflation in the
home interest rate rule. Additionally, the coefficient on output gap must increase as well, as the
foreign monetary policy becomes dovish. This means that when the foreign country changes its
policy, then the home must adjust (change) its policy appropriately. Regime switching monetary
policy proves to be Pareto superior for the home country. More importantly, I show that when the
home central bank reacts optimally to changes in foreign monetary policy, the effects of changes
in the latter are eliminated in the home country, and reduced dramatically in the foreign.
6Throughout the paper I assume that the probability of a regime switch is the same for both home and foreign agents.
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Chapter 1: Asymmetries, productivity and capital account effects in
the determination of the Real Exchange rate: The case of Transition
Economies
Konstantinos Mavromatis
Abstract
Transition Economies appear to be subject to the Balassa-Samuelson effect in many
studies. This implies that their currencies experience a prolonged appreciation in real
terms as their convergence goes on. However, in the current literature, the effects of the
capital account have not been analyzed extensively. In this paper I show that the capital
account, rather than productivity, is a key determinant of the appreciation of the curren-
cies of transition economies. I find that a long-run relationship exists between the real
exchange rate, productivity, the real interest rate differential and the capital account.
Moreover, those variables are found to cointegrate in a nonlinear fashion according to a
smooth transition autoregressive model. This implies that a multivariate smooth tran-
sition error correction model is the appropriate model to describe their short-run and
long-run dynamics.
Keywords: Balassa-Samuelson effect, capital account, nonlinear error correction
JEL Classification: E52, F42.
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1 Introduction
The Balassa-Samuelson effect, originally introduced by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964)
states that countries that experience high levels of productivity will have their currencies appreci-
ated and their price levels higher. A vast empirical literature focusing either on transition or on
industrialized economies supports this perspective. However, there is still a number of researchers
that strongly reject it.
The industrial development of the countries under consideration is of great importance once
the Balassa-Samuelson effect is tested. Countries that are close trade partners are unlikely to
validate this effect. In particular Lothian and Taylor (2008) testing for productivity effects on the
real exchange rate between the United States, the United Kingdom and France found that for the
Sterling-dollar exchange rate there is evidence in favour of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. However,
the sterling-franc real exchange is not subject to this effect as the United Kingdom and France
appear to be close trade partners. Nevertheless, testing the validity of these effects in industrialized
economies, one should be careful as any potential effect may either die out very quickly due to
technological diffusion, or it may be the case that productivity explains a part but not the entire
variation of the real exchange rate. Therefore, it becomes clear why in industrial countries only a
small part of the total variation in the real exchange rates is explained by productivity fluctuations.
The analysis of the productivity effects in transition economies has attracted much research as
these economies were on their path towards their accession to the EU until recently. Taylor and
Sarno (2001) analyzing a sample of nine Transition Economies, found that productivity explains
a very significant part of the fluctuations in the real exchange rate. Additionally, Halpern and
Wyplosz (1997) using the dollar wage and panel data techniques found significant evidence in
favour of the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
In this paper I test whether a long-run relationship exists among the real exchange rate, produc-
tivity, the real interest rate differential and the capital account. I find that productivity does not
cause appreciation of the currency in all cases. However, the capital account causes an appreciation
of the currency in almost all cases. More importantly, I show that whether the capital account
will cause an appreciation or not depends on the composition of capital inflows. In particular,
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I find that the capital account causes an appreciation of the currency as long as foreign direct
investment exceeds portfolio investment. When portfolio investment is the major element of the
capital account, then the latter no longer causes an appreciation of the currency. Therefore, this
paper suggests that the Balassa-Samuelson effect may not be the appropriate explanation of the
behaviour of the currencies in transition economies. Rather, it is the kind of investment that a
transition economy receives the driving force behind the appreciation of its currency.
I show that the real exchange, produc5ivity, the real interest rate differential and the capital
account share a common trend. Notably, I find that they are cointegrated in a nonlinear fashion. In
particular, I show that the residuals from their long-run relationship are subject to nonlinearities.
This implies that standard linear error correction models are no longer valid. Therefore, I make
use of a nonlinear error correction model. The form of this model is determined by the type of
nonlinearity that is found for the cointegrating residuals.
The econometric analysis of the exchange rates in transition economies can be hard due to
statistical problems. A first problem is that the time period available is very short, as the procedure
of transition for these countries started in the early to mid ’90s, and it would be inappropriate to
include observations when these economies were still planned economies. A second problem relates
to the fact that since these economies were in transition, this implies that their economic variables
approached a long term equilibrium schedule instead of fluctuating around it (Fernandez, Osbat
and Schnatz, 2007). Apart from these problems one should take into account what is the right
model to describe the behaviour of the real exchange rate. The PPP-Puzzle was the starting point
towards rejecting typical models that failed to capture the way the real exchange rate adjusts. In
particular, the PPP-Puzzle put the question about how can one reconcile the enormous short-term
volatility of real exchange rates with the extremely slow rate at which shocks appear to die out
(Rogoff, 1996). Until then, the existing models based on real shocks could not account for the
short-term exchange rate volatility. After this problem was officially stated, a vast literature came
out as far as the econometric modeling of the real exchange rate is concerned. A number of authors
(Lothian and Taylor, 1997, Taylor and Sarno, 1998, Michael, Nobay and Peel, 1997, Bec, Salem
and MacDonald, 2006, Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997, Sercu, Uppal and Van Hulle, 1995, Lothian
and Taylor, 1996) suggested that the most appropriate way to deal with these problems was to
11
model the real exchange rate in a nonlinear fashion. The focus turned on the effect transactions
costs have on the adjustment of the exchange rate. Reestimating the half-lives and the response
functions, they showed that there was increasing evidence of the nonlinear behaviour of the real
exchange rate, as the speed of adjustment turned out to be higher, the larger the shock.
One of the weaknesses of many studies so far is the failure to capture the effect of the fundamen-
tals, apart from productivity, on the the real exchange rate. Clarida and Taylor (2001) and Taylor
and Sarno (2001) used decomposition techniques in order to deal with this problem. Instead, the
approach used here tries to tackle this problem by introducing one of the fundamentals, in the
long-run equation for the real exchange rate. For this reason I allow for the capital account to
be one of the determinants of the real exchange rate. This approach is close to the fundamen-
tal equilibrium exchange rate approach (FEER), which was applied to transition economies by
Amadkov et al. (2002) and Coudert and Couharde (2002). This approach focuses only on the
current account effects. In particular, the divergence between the underlying current account and
the medium-run current account determines whether the exchange rate has been appreciated or
depreciated. However, a weakness of the FEER approach is that productivity fluctuations are
not taken into account. Therefore, I move further the analysis by incorporating both effects (i.e.
productivity and the capital account) in the determination of the real exchange rate.
The effect the capital account may have on the real exchange rate depends on many factors. If a
country’s capital inflows translate into higher domestic consumption then the country faces higher
current account deficits, and its currency is likely to appreciate. In this case there will be a capital
account surplus, further increasing the current account deficit. For transition economies, these
capital inflows can enhance productivity, thereby strengthening further their currencies through
the Balassa-Samuelson channel. However, any negative effects the inflows may have cannot be
neglected. These can be inflationary pressures, higher current account deficits, rapid monetary
expansion (Calvo et al., 1996, Agenor, 2004, Calvo, 2005).
The way the capital account is likely to affect the real exchange rate cannot be known in
advance. By the balance of payments identity, the capital account is implicitly a proxy for the
current account. The composition of the capital flows determines the way the capital account
affects the real exchange rate. Long term capital flows are the foreign direct investment which
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fosters growth, as it is generally taken to be determined by long-term profitability considerations
and often leads to the transfer of state-of-the-art technology (Agenor, 2004). As a result, this
kind of flows are less subject to market sentiment. On the contrary, capital flows focusing on
portfolio investment and short term bank lending (financial products) are a short-run investment
and are subject to any kind of market volatility. Therefore, if the latter sort of investment is the
key determinant of capital flows to a transition economy, then it is likely that productivity is less
strengthened in this country compared to others. In this case, I expect the capital account to have
an overall positive effect on the real exchange rate (i.e. depreciation), and as a result productivity
will matter less in its fluctuations.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I describe the environment in transition economies
and construct an index that shows the composition of the capital account of each country. This
index allows me to explore the key determinant of the capital account of each country. In section
3, I present the dataset. In section 4, I present the econometric strategy. In section 5, I show the
empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The environment in Transition Economies
Transition economies are characterized by high levels of productivity and, hence, their currencies
are subject to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. In the literature, researchers assume that there are
two sectors, that of tradables and that of the nontradables. The increase in productivity takes
place in the tradables sector. As tradables are considered only goods that are exported. A rise in
productivity causes a rise in wages in the tradables sector. As a result, as wages remain unchanged
in the nontradables, there will be a rise in the price of nontradables. Assuming PPP holds in the
tradables sector, this will cause a rise in the price level, and consequently an appreciation of the
domestic currency. Taking the CPI as the price level to test for the Balassa-Samuelson effect is not
always the appropriate measure for the actual effects of productivity. The reason is that the CPI
for some economies may include services (which are nontradables) to a high proportion, biasing
thus the conclusions. It may be the case that even highly industrialized economies have a CPI
where services weigh highly. Therefore, other measures for the price levels may be used. I tackle
this problem by using the producer price index, excluding construction.
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Before the start of the procedure of their convergence, the currencies of these economies ex-
perience depreciation, which sometimes may be very abrupt. After their depreciation, the real
exchange rate falls (i.e. appreciation). This is because of the fact that increased labour mobil-
ity is observed towards the more productive sectors, as inefficient production units shut down.
Moreover, this appreciation of the real exchange rate is further supported by the inflows of direct
investment. As productivity levels tend to converge to those of the industrialized countries, the
rates of appreciation of the currencies seem to slow down. An example is the Slovenian Tolar. It
experienced a very strong depreciation until 1994. After that period the currency was appreciating
until 1998. From 1998 on the currency appears to be more stabilized. Apparently, this is because
the country joined the common currency. As a result, the overshooting behaviour of the real ex-
change rate seems to well describe the behaviour of the currencies of economies in transition. The
real exchange rate is modeled as follows:
q = e+ p ∗ −p (1)
where q denotes the real exchange rate, e the nominal exchange rate, defined as the domestic
price of the foreign currency, p∗ the foreign (German) price level and p the domestic price level.
Since, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the channels through which the real exchange rate
is determined by productivity, the real interest rate differential and the capital account, I proceed
further to the main economic relationship to be analyzed. Its form is given by the following
equation:
qt = a1yt + a2(r − r∗)t + a3CAt (2)
where yt denotes productivity, (r − r∗)t denotes the real interest rate differential. r is the
real interest rate and r* the foreign (German) interest rate and CAt denotes the capital account.
One could expect the coefficient on productivity to be negative for the reasons explained above.
However, this is not always the case, as I am showing later. The sign of the coefficient on the
capital account, however, depends on the kind of investment each economy receives, as it will
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be shown below. Consequently, what matters is the composition of the flows of capital into the
transition economies. In order to be able to determine the composition of the capital inflows,
I create an index given by the ratio of foreign direct investment to portfolio investment in the
reporting economy. Foreign direct investment fosters productivity, while portfolio investment does
not. The index is the following:
g = FDI
PI
(3)
where FDI denotes the foreign direct investment (inflows) and PI the net portfolio investment
(inflows). Transition economies have large current account deficits (capital account surpluses). As
I show later countries with a high g − ratio have their capital account surpluses with an overall
(i.e. a3CAt) negative effect on the real exchange rate (i.e. appreciation), whereas countries with
a low g − ratio have their capital account surpluses with an overall positive effect on their real
exchange rate (i.e. depreciation). The reason for this is that a rise in portfolio investment causes a
rise in their capital account surplus, leaving productivity unaffected. As portfolio investment rises,
the current account deficit is further increased (by the balance of payments identity). As a result,
given the fact that for countries with a low g − ratio a positive coefficient on the capital account
is found, the overall effect (i.e. a3CAt) of the capital account on the exchange rate will be positive
(i.e. depreciation). However, as foreign direct investment enhances productivity, it alleviates the
negative effects caused by the rise in the capital account surplus. Since for the countries with a
high g− ratio a negative coefficient on the capital account is found, the overall effect (i.e. a3CAt)
of the capital account on the real exchange rate will be negative (i.e. appreciation). The g− ratio
of each country is shown in figure 1 below. For all the countries the ratio is well above one in
almost all periods of the sample. The only exception is Slovenia where the ratio is marginally
above one initially, but then it fluctuates constantly below one. Finally, the g−ratio for the Czech
Republic is below one until 1998, but rises abruptly and fluctuates constantly above one from 1998
through 2005. Therefore, from the graphs it seems that all the countries but Slovenia had foreign
direct investment being the major component of their capital accounts. Not surprisingly, as I show
later, only for Slovenia the coefficient on the capital account in the long-run relationship is found
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to be positive.
Figure 1: g − ratios
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3 The Data
Monthly data were gathered from the IMF, international financial statistics, the OECD, Main
Economic Indicators, Eurostat. The end of period nominal exchange rate of the currency of
each country against the German Mark is used. The 10 year government bond rate is used as
the nominal interest rate, while producer price indexes are used as a proxy for the price levels.
Industrial production, excluding construction, over the number of people employed in industry is
used as a proxy for productivity. The countries for which data are collected are the Czech Republic,
Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland and Latvia. The sample spans form M10 1993 to
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M12 2005 for the Czech Republic, M12 1993 to M12 2005 for Lithuania, M02 1994 to M12 2005
for Slovak Republic, M10 1992 to M12 2005 for Slovenia, M10 1993 to M12 2005 for Hungary, M03
1992 to M12 2005 for Poland and M02 1996 to M12 2005 for Latvia.
4 Econometric Modeling Strategy
4.1 Cointegration and the modeling of nonlinearities.
The first step of my empirical strategy is to test whether equation (2) constitutes a long-run
relationship among the four variables considered. For this reason I apply the Johansen test for
cointegration. The latter will show whether the variables have an error correction representation.
If cointegration is found, the next step is to test for nonlinearities in the cointegrating residuals.
If this is case, then the cointegrating residuals will adjust in a nonlinear fashion following deviations
from the long-run relationship (2). More importantly, the larger the deviations from equation (2),
the faster the cointegrating residuals will adjust towards the long-run equilibrium.1
The procedure for the detection of nonlinearities in the cointegrating residuals ut is the one
suggested by Terasvirta (1994). The null hypothesis of linearity is tested against the alternative of
a stationary LSTAR or ESTAR model. Adjustment in the LSTAR model is asymmetric, whereas
it is symmetric in the ESTAR. The two models receive the following form:
ut = c0 + c1ut−1 + (c
′
0 + c
′
1ut−1)(1− exp(−kE(ut−d − cE)2)) + e1t (4)
ut = c0 + c1ut−1 + (c
′
0 + c
′
1ut−1)(1 + exp(−kL(ut−d − cL)))−1 + e2t (5)
where (1 + exp(−kL(ut−d)))−1 and (1− exp(−kE(ut−d)2)) is the transition function in the LSTAR
and the ESTAR model respectively. It captures the nonlinear behaviour of the cointegrating
residuals and describes the nonlinear adjustment. The economic interpretation, however, of the
transition function is very important and different depending on whether it is an exponential or
a logistic one. The exponential transition function describes symmetric behaviour either around
1Taylor and Sarno (2001) and Lothian and Taylor (2008) testing for productivity effects on the real exchange rate in transition
economies showed that the adjustment is nonlinear and symmetric.
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a long-run equilibrium or outside the thresholds. When it receives a zero value, then it depicts a
middle regime, where the series lies within the thresholds and is well described by a nonstation-
ary autoregressive model. When the threshold variable is different than the threshold, then the
transition function takes values different from zero, and the model receives a nonlinear form.
The logistic transition function describes an asymmetric behavior. The transition function, in
this case, takes values close to zero when the transition variable is close enough to the threshold .
However, when the transition function receives values close to one when the transition variable lies
far away from the threshold. In this paper the threshold variable is the cointegrating residuals.
The transition parameters kE and kL, respectively, describe the speed at which each of the
cointegrating residuals switch between the two regimes.
A reparameterization of models (4) and (5) yields the following
∆ut = w0 + w1ut−1 + (w
′
0 + w
′
1ut−1)(1− exp(−kE(ut−d − cE)2)) + e2t (6)
∆ut = w0 + w1ut−1 + (w
′
0 + w
′
1ut−1)(1 + exp(−kL(ut−d − cL)))−1 + e2t (7)
The above reparameterization is used when testing the power of the unit root tests when the true
data generating process is the ESTAR or the LSTAR model.
4.2 Testing for nonlinearities
Testing for linearity against the alternative of either an ESTAR or LSTAR stationary model could
be a test of kE = 0 or kL = 0. However, as noted by Davies (1987), Hansen(1996), Hansen(1997),
Luukonen,Saikkonen and Terasvirta(1988) and Terasvirta(1994), such a test has very low power.
The reason is that the problem of nonidentifiability arises. In particular, such a test would imply
that the parameters b′0 , b
′
1 and
∑q−1
j=1 b
′
j could not be identified under the null. Similarly, a joint
test of statistical significance of the parameters mentioned above would mean that the transition
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parameter kL would not be identified either. Researchers, however, have tackled this problem by
suggesting Taylor approximations of the transition function.2 The third order Taylor approxima-
tion of the transition function of the LSTAR model (F = (1 + exp(−kL(ut−d − cL)))−1) around
zero is given as follows:
T3 = g1(z) + g3(z) (8)
where z = −kL(ut−d − cL), g1(z) = ϑFϑz|z=0 and g3(z) = (1/6)
ϑ3F
ϑz3|z=0
, as in Terasvirta (1994).
I then substitute equation (8) into the LSTAR model (7), and end up to the following model:
ut = b0 + b1ut−1 + (b
′
0 + b
′
1ut−1)T3 + e2t (9)
In order to derive an LM type test for linearity, as in Terasvirta (1994), we conclude to the following
auxiliary regression:
eˆ2t = β1z
′
1t + β2ut−1ut−d + β3ut−1u2t−d + β4ut−1u3t−d (10)
where β1 is a (p+ 1)× 1 vector of coefficients, z1t = (1, ut, . . . , ut−p) .
The test for linearity against nonlinearity consists of a test described below:
HL : β2 = β3 = β4 = 0
Apart from its LM version, the above test may performed as an F test. After rejecting the
null hypothesis at the above test, one can move further towards testing whether an ESTAR or an
LSTAR is the appropriate model. To carry out such a procedure, one must go through a sequence
of tests described below:
2A third order Taylor expansion seems to be the best approximation since the transition function of the LSTAR model has a single
inflection point and the third order Taylor expansion has a single inflection point itself (Escribano and Jorda, 2001). On the other hand
the transition function of an ESTAR model has two inflection points. As a result, a higher order Taylor approximation is needed to best
fit the transition function. As I am showing later, the LSTAR model was found to be the correct one for all countries but the Czech
Republic. Hence, I present here the Taylor approximation of the logistic transition function only.
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H01 : β4 = 0
H02 : β3 = 0 | β4 = 0
H03 : β2 = 0 | β4 = β3 = 0
The above sequence of tests can be performed as an LM test. However, theLM test can be
also performed using its F version. The true significance level of the test may then be reasonably
close to its nominal value, whereas the power may often be higher than that of the asymptotic
χ2 test (Terasvirta, 1994 and Harvey, 1990). The delay parameter d for each country was derived
according to the procedure suggested by Terasvirta (1994). That is, the linearity test was carried
out for 16 values of the delay parameter (d = 1, ..., 16). The value of d, which is finally chosen, is
that corresponding to the linearity test with the lowest p− value. I then proceeded by performing
the sequence of tests described above (H01, H02, H03) for the parameters of equation (9). According
to the procedure suggested by Terasvirta, the ESTAR model is the appropriate one, if and only if
the p− value from the H02 test is the lowest among the three tests.
4.3 Multivariate Smooth Transition Modeling
Given a nonlinear behaviour in the cointegrating errors, a VECM is no longer valid to model
the joint dynamics of the variables. For this reason a nonlinear version of the VECM is a better
approximation. In this paper I will make use of a multivariate smooth transition error correction
model.3 For simplicity I will assume that the variables under consideration share a common
nonlinearity. The latter is determined by the appropriate model (e.g. ESTAR or LSTAR) to be
specified for the cointegrating residuals, which will be the transition variable.
3A significant empirical work has been done the last ten years macroeconometrics using multivariate smooth transition models.
Camacho (2004), Van Dijk (1999) and Anderson and Vahid (1998) used MSTR models to model business cycles, arbitrage activity and
stock price dynamics. They also performed Monte Carlo experiments for the size and the power of the linearity tests in a multivariate
setting. Kavkler et al. (2007) using smooth transition vector error-correction models for the real exchange rate tried to test PPP for
the Slovenian Tolar and the Czech Kruna against the Franch franc, the German Mark and the Italian Lira.
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4.3.1 Smooth Transition Equilibrium Correction Models
The equilibrium correction model receives the following form:
∆xt = B0 +Bi(L)∆xt−p + pi1,1ut−1 + (Γ0 + Γi(L)∆xt−p + pi2,1ut−1)G(ut−d; k, c) + ωit (11)
where Bi(L) = Bi,1 + . . .+Bi,pLp−1 and Γi(L) = Γi,1 + . . .+Γi,pLp−1 i = 1, 2, 3, 4 is a (4× (p−1))
matrix, ωit is a (4× 1) vector of equation specific errors and ∆x = (∆ft,∆yt,∆(r − r∗)t,∆CAt).
G(ut−d; k, c) is the transition function. Its form, exponential or logistic, is determined by the type
of nonlinearity that will be found for the cointegrating residuals.4
Van Dijk (1999) specifies a more parsimonious nonlinear error correction model, where the
differenced lags of the variables do not enter the model as regressors. However, in our specification
we allow for those lags into the regression, since they may capture the short run dynamics of the
the dependent variable, especially during very small deviations from the long run equilibrium.
4.3.2 System and equation specific tests
I perform system and equation specific linearity tests. This allows me to explore whether the
nonlinear error correction model is indeed a correct specification. Moreover, linearity tests will show
whether each variable in the model reacts nonlinearly to deviations from the long-run relationship
(2). In this case the speed of adjustment is higher, the larger the deviations from the long-run
equilibrium. The auxiliary model receives the following form:
∆xt = A0,0 + A0(L)∆xt−p + A1(L)∆xt−put−d + A2(L)∆xt−pu2t−d + A3(L)∆xt−pu3t−d + ηt (12)
where Ai(L) = Ai,1 + . . .+Ai,pLp−1, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, is a (4 × (p− 1)) matrix and ηt is a combined
error consisting of the errors from the initial smooth transition error correction model and the
4The number of lags in this model is determined according to AIC and BIC information criteria. Note, however, that it is important
to keep the model as parsimonious as possible, given the difficulty of achieving convergence.
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errors from the Taylor expansion. The normality assumption is needed if the specification tests
are derived as Lagrange Multiplier tests. The test for linearity has a null where the coefficients of
the nonlinear elements are equal to zero, that is H0 : Ai = 0, i = 1, 2, 3. The LM statistic will
have an asymptotic χ2 distribution with 12p degrees of freedom.5 I denote the system linearity
test as LM ′0. However, as Kavkler et. al (2007) observes, the system linearity test rejects the null
of linearity when in at least one auxiliary regression linearity is rejected. Therefore, the system
linearity test may be misleading. They suggest that it is better if one looks at the individual
regression LM test to draw secure results. As a result, it may be the case that the system linearity
test rejects the null more frequently than the nominal significance level. This means that a greater
power of the system linearity test may be due to the fact that its size exceeds the nominal one,
and, thus, the power is distorted.
The residuals of the multivariate smooth transition model are also be subjected to some diag-
nostic tests, so that to be able to evaluate the estimated model. Eitrheim and Terasvirta (1996)
provided tests for no serial correlation6, parameter constancy and no remaining nonlinearity for
univariate models. However, these tests can be easily generalized into a multivariate setting as in
Anderson and Vahid (1998). Tsay (1996) derived a test for neglected nonlinearities in univariate
nonlinear time series models, which also can be easily generalized into a multivariate framework.
5 Empirical Results
As a first step, stationarity tests7 were performed for each of the four variables, namely the real
exchange rate qt the real interest rate differential (rt − r∗t ), the proxy for productivity yt and
the capital account CAt. The results suggest that all four variables are integrated of the same
order and, hence, I can proceed to test for the existence of a common trend among them. The
5Van Dijk (1999) considering the general case with k variables notes that the LM statistic will have an asymptotic χ2 distribution
with 3pk2 degrees of freedom.
6In particular, an LM test was perfrormed in an autoregressive series of residuals given by:
ηt = J(L)ηt + ξt, ξt ∼ N [0,Ω] (13)
where ηt = (ηdft, ηdyt, ηd(i−i∗)t, ηdCAt), J(L) = (J1L+ · · ·+JpL) is a (4× 4) matrix polynomial in the lag operator L and ξt is serially
uncorrelated. The test for serial correlation in the residuals is a test of H0 : J1 = · · · = Jp = 0, and can be performed as an LM test.
7The results for the unit root tests are presented in appendix B.
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cointegration results are illustrated at table 1.
Table 1: Cointegration Results
Panel A: Cointegration Test Statistics
D-F test P-P test Johansen:lmax(ltrace) (r= 0 vs r=1) Johansen:lmax (r=1 vs r=2) KPSS
Czech Republic -1.89476 -2.19917 41.9160* (53.33) 13.9422 0.193
Lithuania -1.28379 -4.02824* 33.418** (86.22) 30.3204* 0.659
Slovak Republic -2.80348 -6.11011* 69.254* (114.02) 17.7785 0.138
Slovenia -0.47987 -0.52102 53.9523* (80.05) 11.4872 0.508
Hungary -2.21785 -2.57816 79.897* (110.18) 4.8731 0.279
Poland -2.51272 -5.19596* 53.8157* (102.3) 9.6525 0.258
Latvia -2.69280*** -3.39467** 29.41*** (56.02) 15.3050 0.079
Panel B: Estimated cointegrating vectors
yt (r − r∗)t CAt
Czech Republic -1.963 -0.137 -0.079
Lithuania 0.651 0.407 -0.016
Slovak Republic 1.561 0.169 -1.190
Slovenia 0.123 - 0.017
Hungary 1.637 0.119 -0.890
Poland -0.516 -0.169 -0.066
Latvia -0.726 0.237 -0.329
Notes:Panel A:***Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 1%. For the Johansen test with an
intercept in the ECM, the critical values for the lmax test statistics, for H0 : r = 0 vs r = 1, are 25.52 for the
1%, 20.97 for the 5% and 18.6 for the 10% significance level respectively. For the ltrace the 1% critical value
is 35.65, the 5% critical value is 29.68 and the 10% critical value is 26.79 respectively (Johansen and Juselius,
1990). For the KPSS test the 10 %, 5% and 1% critical values are 0.347, 0.463 and 0.739 respectively. Panel
B:Maximum Likelihood estimates. The cointegrating vectors are derived from the from the Johansen procedu-
dure and normalized in order to receive the parameter values corresponding to equation (2).
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The coefficient on the proxy for productivity yt is found to be negative only for the Czech
Republic, Poland and Latvia. Assuming that this is a good approximation to productivity, this
implies that currencies of those three countries are subject to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. On
the other hand the coefficient on productivity is positive for Lithuania, the Slovak Republic, Slove-
nia and Hungary. Therefore, the Balassa-Samuleson effect does not seem to be present in these
countries.
As far as the effect of the capital account is concerned, its coefficient is negative for all countries,
but Slovenia. This is the country with the lowest g − ratio. The reason why the g − ratio is low
for Slovenia may be the fact that its capital market was getting more integrated than that of the
other countries over that period. For the Czech Republic, Poland and Latvia a negative coefficient
on the capital account, accompanied with a capital account surplus generates a negative total
effect (i.e. a3CAt) on the real exchange rate (i.e. appreciation). Therefore, as real exchange rate
appreciation is the equilibrium behaviour of the exchange rate of these economies, it follows that
the currencies of the economies where the coefficient on the capital account is negative, will have
two sources of appreciation (i.e. productivity and the current account deficit or the capital account
surplus). On the other hand, since the coefficient on the capital account is positive for Slovenia,
this implies that the total effect of the capital account surplus (i.e. a3CAt) will be positive (i.e.
depreciation).
The real interest rate differential has a positive effect for all countries considered, but the Czech
Republic, Poland and Latvia. As Slovenia was about to join the Eurozone in December 2006, its
capital market was getting more integrated. The ratio of the domestic to the German real interest
rate for Slovenia was almost unity during the two year period before the country’s accession to the
Eurozone. In the period before 2004, the Slovenian real interest rate ratio was greater than one,
and hence, the capital account surplus was rising faster.
As a next step I proceed to test for potential STAR nonlinearity in the cointegrating residuals,
following the procedure described in section 4.2. The results of the tests and the delay parameters
for each country are presented at table 2 below. The LSTAR model was found to be the appropriate
one for all the countries but the Czech Republic, where an ESTAR model was found as the
appropriate. Therefore, for those countries where the LSTAR was found to be the correct way
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to model nonlinearity, an asymmetric adjustment towards the long-run relationship is implied.
Following Terasvirta Rule, the null of linearity was rejected in all cases. An ESTAR or an LSTAR
model for the cointegrating residuals for each country was then estimated. The results are presented
at table 3.
In the estimated STAR models the standard errors and the t-ratios should be treated with
caution, especially when one looks at the transition parameters kE and kL. If the significance
of the transition parameter is tested, new standard errors must be computed. Under the null
the autoregressive parameter in the linear part of the STAR model (i.e. b′1) is not identified,
and the series follows a random walk (or a near-random walk), since it lies within the middle
regime. Therefore, new standard errors were computed for the transition parameter through
Monte-Carlo simulation. 10000 samples of T observations8 were generated, assuming that the true
data generating process is the ESTAR or the LSTAR model, depending on which of the two was
found to be the appropriate from the sequence of tests.
The number of lags in the STAR model could be based upon the standard AIC or BIC criteria.
However, since nonlinearities exist, it is better to look at the partial autocorrelation functions.
In particular, Granger and Terasvirta (1993) and Terasvirta (1994) suggest the PACF as a way
of choosing the order of autocorrelation, p, than an information criterion. A general to specific
procedure was followed, in addition to PACF. I keep on excluding lags until the lag where the
Ljung-Box Q-test could no longer reject the null of no autocorrelation in the residuals.9 In almost
none of the cases could I find autocorrelation beyond the first lag.10
8T is the number of observations in each sample.
9The PACF of the residuals in the LSTAR model for the cointegrating residuals are shown at Figure 4 in the appendix.
10However, one should question the power of the Ljung-Box test in the case of nonlinearities.
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Table 2: Linearity LM tests
HL(d) H01 H02 H03
Czech Republic 0.0246 (dˆ = 12) 0.3730 0.0045 0.2781
Lithuania 0.017(dˆ = 16) 0.6928 0.1429 0.0048
Slovak Republic 0.0000 (dˆ = 1) 0.0980 0.0122 0.0000
Slovenia 0.0000 (dˆ = 3) 0.0000 0.2195 0.0351
Hungary 0.0413 (dˆ = 9) 0.0199 0.2391 0.2365
Poland 0.0003 (dˆ = 1) 0.8947 0.7105 0.0000
Latvia 0.0804 (dˆ = 12) 0.0295 0.2071 0.5421
Notes: P-values reported. Numbers in parentheses refer to the
delay parameter.
The power of the Dickey fuller test is computed. I perform a number of Monte-Carlo experiments
on an artificial data generating process identical to both an autoregressive and a STAR model, with
independent and identically distributed Gaussian innovations. The artificial series were initialized
at zero. 10000 samples of 100 + T observations were generated where the first 100 observations
were discarded, leaving 10000 samples of T observations.11 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic
was calculated in each of the 10000 samples and rejection frequencies over the 10000 samples were
computed taking the five percent significant values calculated by MacKinnon (1991).12 At table 4
I show the power of the ADF for each country.
Finally, in order to test for global stationarity in the estimated STAR models for the cointe-
grating residuals, I performed the Kapetanios et al. (2003) test (from now on KSS test) for global
stationarity. The test results show that the nonlinear models for the cointegrated residuals are all
globally stationary. The null hypothesis is rejected in all cases against the alternative of global
stationarity. The results from the KSS are shown in Appendix B.
11T is the number of observations that applies to each country
12In order for the results to be comparable across countries in all simulations the autoregressive parameter was set to be arbitrarily
equal to 0.80.
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Table 3: Estimated STAR models for the cointegrating residuals
c0 c1 c
′
0 c
′
1 cE , cL kE , kL R
2 LM TS
Czech - 0.722 - -0.049 0.007 169.33 0.842 {0.887} {0.738}
(0.000) (0.099) (0.000) [0.037]
Lithuania - 0.145 0.034 0.854 -0.137 6.587 0.466 {0.559} {0.104}
(0.018) (0.015) (0.003) (0.000) [0.000]
Slovak 0.011 0.917 - -0.800 - 1.970 0.244 {0.282} {0.930}
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) [0.000]
Slovenia - 0.834 -0.079 2.171 - 2.211 0.688 {0.744} {0.271}
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.005) [0.034]
Hungary - 1.079 - -0.484 - 2.426 0.3608 {0.821} {0.326}
(0.000) (0.001) [0.000]
Poland - 0.812 - - - 0.615 0.3740 {0.951} {0.422}
(0.000) [0.000]
Latvia - 0.810 - 0.017 -0.041 33.391 0.6023 {0.136} {0.496}
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) [0.000]
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Numbers in square brackets below transition parameters estimates show
the marginal significance levels. LM is the test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity in the residuals.
TS is the test for remaining nonlinearities. For the LM and the TS tests only p− values are reported.
Table 4: Power of the Dickey-Fuller test
(AR true process) (STAR true process)
Czech 99.48 49.71
Lithuania 89.56 50.33
Slovak 88.96 61.52
Slovenia 89.65 49.43
Hungary 99.47 52.11
Poland 89.35 14.62
Latvia 96.78 13.88
Estimation of MSTEqC models
Specification in the multivariate smooth transition equilibrium correction models is conducted
in the same manner as in section 4.3. However, what makes the analysis easy is that I do not
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need to do any testing procedure in order to find out which is the appropriate transition variable,
since the specification I use makes such a sequence of tests unnecessary13. The estimation of
the nonlinear error correction models shows that the four variables considered here adjust to any
deviations from the long-run equilibrium in a nonlinear fashion.
The specification tests for the multivariate smooth transition equilibrium correction model
were implemented as described in section 4.3.1. Additionally, a neglected nonlinearities test, as
suggested by Tsay (1996), was performed in each equation of the system individually. According
to the test there is not remaining nonlinearity in the system. The LM test for autoregressive
conditional heteroskedasticity can be performed in the same way as in the linear case. Individual
LM tests were performed in the residuals from each equation. The number of lags included in each
test was determined according to the partial autocorrelations in the equation specific residuals.
According to the test, in all cases conditional heteroskedasticity is rejected in the residuals.14 The
equation specific residuals do not exhibit significant autocorrelation except from those for the
regression with the differenced productivity as the dependent variable, which appear to be highly
autocorrelated for almost all the countries. However, I did not include more lags in the system to
account for that in order to keep the model parsimonious. The estimation results as well as the
results from the LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, residual autocorrelation
and neglected nonlinearities are shown in appendix C and D.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I show that the Balassa-Samuelson effect cannot describe the behaviour of the real
exchange rate for all economies in transition. Using an appropriate proxy for productivity I show
that its effect on the real exchange rate is negative (i.e. causes appreciation) for only three
countries, namely, the Czech Republic, Poland and Latvia. However, the effect of the capital
account is negative (i.e. causes appreciation) for all countries but Slovenia. I show that this is
13However, one could do that sequence of tests in the MSTEqM as a way of testing whether this model is the correct one to model
the variables. On the other hand, one could go short by just performing a common nonlinearities test in model (11) as described by
Anderson and Vahid (1998).
14Note that the test for linearity can be robust to both autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and unspecified heteroskedasticity,
by adjusting the LM statistic so that to account for that.
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mainly caused by the composition of the capital account. When foreign direct investment exceeds
portfolio investment, for a long period of time, the effect of the capital account is negative. The
opposite holds when portfolio investment exceeds foreign direct investment, as was the case for
Slovenia. Therefore, long-run investment seems to have caused the appreciation of those currencies,
rather than the Balassa-Samuelson effect itself.
I test for cointegration among the real exchange rate, the real interest rate differential, the
proxy for productivity and the capital account. I show that they cointegrate in a nonlinear fashion.
This implies that a linear vector error correction model is no longer valid, as it implies a linear
adjustment for each variable following deviation from the long-run equilibrium. For this reason I
use a nonlinear multivariate error correction model, whose nonlinearity is determined by that found
for the cointegrated residuals. For simplicity, I assume that the four variables under consideration
share a common nonlinearity. The threshold variable is the cointegrated residuals. Adjustment
towards the long-run equilibrium happens in both a linear and a nonlinear fashion.
Finally, specification tests in the multivariate error correction model show that this is a correct
specification to capture the dynamics of the variables considered.
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Chapter 2: Rule-of-thumb behavior and Real Exchange Rate targeting
Konstantinos Mavromatis
Abstract
How important is for the central bank to have a real exchange rate target? In this paper I
address that question both empirically and theoretically. Using monthly data I estimate
of a structural VAR model for the Eurozone providing evidence in favour of real exchange
rate targeting. I examine this case theoretically using a two-country DSGE model; I find
that when the home central bank includes a real exchange rate target in its interest
rate rule, it achieves lower welfare losses compared to the Taylor rule. Contrary to
similar papers, I compute the optimized coefficients in the interest rate rules considered.
I show that the benefits from real exchange rate targeting at home rise as persistence
in inflation and output increases. In the robustness analysis I show that a rise in the
fraction of backward looking consumers affects negatively the performance of the real
exchange rate targeting rule and positively that of the Taylor rule. Asymmetries in the
degree of rule-of-thumb behavior in consumption have important effects, as regards the
performance of a real exchange rate targeting rule. The performance of both rules is not
sensitive to variations in the degree of backward looking price setting behavior .
Keywords: Taylor rule, real exchange rate targeting, asymmetries, output and inflation
endogenous persistence, optimal monetary policy
JEL Classification: E52, F41, F42.
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1 Introduction
Research on monetary policy analysis over the last years has focused on whether simple mone-
tary policy rules keep their properties once put into an international framework, or not. Svensson
(2000), Weerapana (2000), Benigno (2004) and Benigno and Benigno (2001) have analyzed exten-
sively the properties of simple interest rate rules in both small and large open economy models.
The general conclusion so far is that interest rate rules that are optimal for closed economy are
not necessarily optimal for open economy models at the same time. The reason is that an open
economy model is richer in its dynamics. This implies that the central bank needs to adjust its
instruments in such a way so that to minimize as much as possible the welfare losses, in the face
of various exogenous shocks.
In this paper I examine, both empirically and theoretically, the ability of real exchange rate
targeting in achieving lower inflation and output gap fluctuations. Using monthly data I estimate
of a structural VAR model with short-run restrictions for the Eurozone. I find that when the ECB
reacts contemporaneously to the real exchange rate it controls both inflation and the output gap
better. I examine this case theoretically using a two-country DSGE model. I find that when the
home central bank includes a real exchange rate target in its interest rate rule, it achieves a better
control of inflation and output gap. I compare the performance of a rule with a real exchange rate
target to that of the Taylor rule using a welfare criterion. The latter is derived from a second order
approximation to the agents utility function as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998). Contrary to
similar papers, I compute the optimized coefficients in the interest rate rules considered. Real
exchange rate targeting yields lower welfare losses. Notably, the benefits from real exchange rate
targeting at home rise as persistence in inflation and output increases. In the robustness analysis I
show that a rise in the fraction of backward looking consumers affects negatively the performance
of the real exchange rate targeting rule and positively that of the Taylor rule. The performance
of both rules, though, is not sensitive to variations in the degree of backward looking price setting
behavior .
In an empirical exercise, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), estimated simple interest rate rules
for the G3 and E3 economies. Their estimates showed that the standard Taylor rule appears
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to be a good approximation to the policy rate of the central banks of the countries considered.
In particular, the coefficients on the inflation and the output gap targets seemed to move close
to Taylor’s (1993) suggestion. Interest rate smoothing is proved to be statistically significant.
Extending their analysis through adding more targets, they found that their coefficients were
either very small, or statistically insignificant1.
In a theoretical small open economy model, Svensson (2000) argues that additional targets could
be included in an interest rate rule of an open economy. Those could include variables like the
exchange rate (either real, or nominal), or even foreign variables. On the other hand, McCallum
and Nelson (1999) argue against exchange rate targeting. Their conclusion is that the central
bank should not react to exchange rate movements since the it reacts to it indirectly through its
inflation target. In their model, however, McCallum and Nelson assume perfect exchange rate pass
through. I assume that the pass through is imperfect. In our model, firms set one price for the
Home country and one for the Foreign country for the good they produce. Weerapana (2000), on
the other hand, argues in favor of an exchange rate target. Simulating a two country sticky price
model, he finds that an exchange rate target yields lower welfare losses. However, Weerapana does
not specify whether the central bank achieves a better control of inflation.
Exchange rate targeting is perfectly aligned with the effort of a central bank to keep the exchange
rate within certain bands. In this case Benigno and Benigno (2001) show that a nominal exchange
rate target is welfare improving. Their focus, though, is on different exchange rate regimes and
how their choice affects welfare. My focus is different. I try to explore whether adding a real
exchange rate target in a simple interest rate rule, allows the Central Bank to achieve a better
control of inflation and, at the same time, lower welfare losses. Achieving lower welfare losses does
not necessarily imply lower CPI or PPI inflation variation. The reason is that my two country
model is very rich in its dynamics. As is shown, welfare is affected not only by the variances of
PPI inflation, the output gap and the real exchange, but also by their covariances. Additionally,
since I introduce endogenous output and inflation persistence, I show that welfare is affected by
the lags of output and inflation.
Benigno and Benigno (2008) show that in exchange rate regimes where the Central Bank reacts
1The additional targets considered were the real exchange rate, lagged inflation rate, money supply and the federal funds rate.
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either to the change in the nominal exchange rate or its level, it achieves a better control of the
terms of trade, in terms of volatility. However, they focus only on shocks to the natural terms
of trade without proceeding to an impulse response analysis in the face of monetary policy, real
exchange rate and productivity shocks. Restricting the analysis in only one kind of shock may
be misleading, since the choice of an exchange rate regime may not be sustainable in the face of
alternative policy or real shocks. Additionally, they do not conduct a welfare analysis. Benigno
and Benigno (2001) , however, proceed to the evaluation of the alternative interest rate rules
based on a welfare criterion. Their welfare analysis shows that interest rate rules with a nominal
exchange rate target perform worse than a standard Taylor rule. However, they do not perform a
robustness exercise, in order to test whether the rule is robustly optimal. Their model does not
include endogenous inflation and output persistence and asymmetry, between the two countries,
is considered only in the coefficients of the interest rate rules. I consider alternative kinds of
asymmetries, as far as the structural parameters are concerned. The reason, as I show, is that
asymmetries have important implications for monetary policy.
Leitemo and Soderstrom (2001) find that the inclusion of a real exchange rate target into
the Taylor rule gives only slight improvements in terms of volatility of the important variables
in the economy. They consider a small open economy model with model uncertainty. Altering
parameters in the model, and more importantly, increasing the degree of asymmetries has non-
negligible effects in terms of welfare losses. Leitemo and Soderstrom, like Weerapana (2000) do
not derive the welfare loss from the utility function of households, but they, rather, impose an
ad hoc version of it. Moreover, in our paper the coefficients in the interest rate rule of the home
country are not imposed exogenously, but rather they are the ones that minimize the welfare loss
function. Under this approach we show that the differences in welfare losses can be very large.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I estimate a structural VAR model using data
for the Eurozone and the US. I compute impulse responses under different restrictions in the
companion matrix. In section 3 I develop a two-country DSGE model. In section 4 I present
the log linearized version of the model. In section 5 I introduce monetary policy by presenting
alternative interest rate rules the central bank may follow. In section 6 I present the calibration
and simulation results. In section 7 I perform a robustness analysis. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Empirical evidence and motivation
In this section I present a structural VAR model for the Eurozone. The SVAR model consists
of four variables, namely inflation, output gap, interest rate and real exchange rate. The output
gap2 is proxied by the hp filter. The SVAR representation is specified as
B0Xt =
∑k
i=1BiXt−i + Ut
where Bi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are 4× 4 matrices and Xt = (yt, pit, qt, it)′ , where it is the nominal interest
rate, qt the real exchange rate, yt the output gap, pit the inflation rate and Ut = [uy,t upi,t uq,t ui,t]
′
is the matrix of fundamental errors with a variance-covariance matrixΣu = E(ut, u
′
t) assumed to
be diagonal.
In order to consider real exchange rate targeting, along with inflation and output gap targeting
I imposed the restriction that real exchange rate shock enters contemporaneously into the interest
rate equation. Matrix B0t receives the following form
B0 =

1 0 0 0
apiy 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
aiy a
i
pi a
i
q 1

When the Central Bank targets the real exchange rate, real exchange rate shocks affect the nominal
interest rate contemporaneously. In this case aiq 6= 0.
2The output gap was proxied using the hp filter. The latter’s accuracy in capturing the actual output gap has been criticized. One
reason is that the natural rate of output is proxied by a deterministic trend. However, the former may be a function of technology,
monetary and demand shocks, and thus, more volatile. For a more detailed survey on the criticism on the output gap measures see Gali
(2002), Gali and Gertler (1999), Sbordone (1999), Gertler, Gali and Lopez-Salido (2000) and the references therein.
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2.1 Data
Monthly data are gathered from the IMF International Financial Statistics for the Eurozone
and US CPI , the end of period spot exchange rate of the Euro against the US dollar respectively.
The interbank overnight rate is used as proxies for the nominal interest rate. The dataset spans
from 1999:1 to 2009:3.
2.2 Impulse response analysis
The goal in this paper is to show the importance of the real exchange in the interest rate rule
in terms of inflation and output gap variation. Specifically, I want to show that the central bank
is able to achieve better control of inflation and, if possible, the output gap.
Figure 1: Impulse Responses
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The impulse response functions for the inflation rate and the output gap in Eurozone are
computed under a one standard deviation policy shock. The results are illustrated in figure 1.
The impulse responses show that the ECB achieves a better control of the inflation rate whenever
the real exchange rate is introduced into the interest rate rule. Following a monetary policy shock,
the CPI inflation rate initially jumps higher than under the Taylor rule, but reverts faster back to
its initial level. The output gap has similar dynamics. It jumps higher under real exchange rate
targeting, but is less persistent than under the Taylor rule .
3 The model
3.1 Households
In this section, I specify the structure of the baseline, two country stochastic general equilibrium
model. Each country is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived and identical households in
the interval [0, 1]. Foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk.
Persistence has been found to be an important feature of output in Eurozone and the US.3
For this reason I introduce endogenous persistence in consumption by assuming that there are
two kinds of households as in Amato and Laubach (2003). Let ψ denote the probability that the
household is able to choose its consumption optimally, and which is independent of the household’s
history. Therefore, by the law of large numbers, in each period a fraction ψ of households will
reoptimise, whereas the remaining fraction 1− ψ will not. The latter will choose its consumption
in period t according to the following rule of thumb
CRt = Ct−1 (1)
where Ct denotes aggregate per capita consumption in period t. The remaining 1−ψ of households
choose COt so as to maximize their utility. Thus, per capita consumption in period t is given by
Ct = ψCOt + (1− ψ)CRt (2)
3Smets and Wouters (2005), Sahuc and Smets (2008) and Adjemian et al. (2008) using Bayesian techniques to estimate DSGE
models for the Eurozone and the US find that output persistence in both regions is high.
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As in Laubach and Amato, this modification to the consumer’s problem is based on the assumption
that it is costly to reoptimise every period4. The households who choose consumption optimally
choose COt to maximize their utility function. They derive utility from consumption and disutility
from labor supply. The utility function, thus, is specified as
Ut = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
(Cs)1−σ
1− σ −
(Ls)1+γ
1 + γ
]
(3)
where σ is the degree of relative risk aversion.
Home agents consume home and foreign goods. Therefore, per capita consumption Ct is a com-
posite consumption index described as
Ct =
[
δ
1
ρC
ρ−1
ρ
H,t + (1− δ)
1
ρC
ρ−1
ρ
F,t
] ρ
ρ−1
ρ > 1
C∗t =
[
(δ∗)
1
ρ (C∗F,t)
ρ−1
ρ + (1− δ∗) 1ρ (C∗H,t)
ρ−1
ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
(4)
where ρ captures the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods.
δ > 12 is a parameter of home bias in preferences.CH and CF is the home and foreign goods
consumption index respectively, in the home country. In the foreign country C∗H and C∗F is the
home and foreign goods consumption index respectively. Consumption indices in the two countries
are defined as
CH,t =
[´ 1
0 ct(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1 , CF,t =
[´ 1
0 ct(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
C∗H,t =
[´ 1
0 c
∗
t (z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1 , C∗F,t =
[´ 1
0 c
∗
t (z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
(5)
The aggregate consumption price index for the home and foreign country is specified as
Pt =
[
δ(PH,t)1−ρ + (1− δ)P 1−ρF,t
] 1
1−ρ
P ∗t =
[
δ∗(P ∗F,t)1−ρ + (1− δ∗)P ∗H,t1−ρ
] 1
1−ρ
(6)
4Amato and Laubach note that Rule (4) has the important feature that rule-of-thumb consumers learn from optimizing households
with one period delay. Hence, although Rule (4) is not optimal, it has three important properties. First agents are not required to
compute anything. Second, rule-of-thumb households learn from optimizing ones, because last period’s decisions by the latter are part
of Ct−1. Third, the differences between CRt and COt are bounded, and will be zero in the steady state.
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where PH and PF are price indices for home and foreign goods, expressed in the domestic currency.
The price indices for the home and foreign country are defined as
PH,t =
[´ 1
0 pt(z)
1−θdz
] 1
1−θ , PF,t =
[´ 1
0 pt(z)
1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
P ∗H,t =
[´ 1
0 p
∗
t (z)1−θdz
] 1
1−θ , P ∗F,t =
[´ 1
0 p
∗
t (z)1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
(7)
Capital markets are complete. The consumers of both countries purchase state uncontingent bonds
denominated in the domestic currency, Bt for domestic agents and B∗t for foreign agents at price
Qt. That is Bt denotes the home agent’s holdings of a one period nominal bond paying one unit
of the home currency.
The home agent maximizes her utility subject to the period budget constraint
PtCt +Qt,t+1Bt+1 = Bt +WtLt + Πt (8)
where Wt is the nominal wage and Πt are nominal profits the individual receives.
3.2 First order conditions
Maximizing the utility function (6) subject to the budget constraint (11) yields the following first
order conditions
Qt,t+1 =
βPt
Pt+1
(
COt
COt+1
)σ
(9)
Lt = (COt )
−σ
γw
1
γ
t (10)
where the first equation is the usual Euler equation while the second determines the labor supply
schedule.
Individual demands for each good i = h, f produced in the home and in the foreign country
respectively are expressed as
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ch,t(h) =
(
pht (h)
PH,t
)−θ (
PH,t
Pt
)−ρ
δCt (11)
cf,t(h) =
(
p∗t (h)
PF,t
)−θ (
PF,t
Pt
)−ρ
(1− δ)Ct (12)
3.3 Risk sharing
The fraction of foreign households who choose their consumption optimally (ψ∗) , maximize their
utility subject to their budget constraint specified as
P ∗t C
∗
t +
Qt,t+1B
∗
t+1
zt
= B
∗
t
zt
+W ∗t L∗t + Π∗t (13)
where zt is the nominal exchange rate defined as the domestic currency price of the foreign currency.
Therefore, the Euler equation from the foreign agent’s maximization problem is
Qt,t+1 =
βP ∗t zt
P ∗t+1zt+1
(
CO∗t
CO∗t+1
)σ
(14)
International financial markets are complete. Domestic and foreign households trade in the state
contingent one period nominal bonds denominated in the domestic currency. Therefore, combining
(12) and (17) , I receive the following optimal risk sharing condition
(
CO∗t
COt
)−σ
= $qt (15)
where $ ≡
(
Cf0 +x
Ch0 +x
)−σ
P0
z0P ∗0
depends on initial conditions and qt = ztP
∗
t
Pt
is the real exchange rate.
3.4 Price setting
There is local currency pricing in both countries. That is, each firm sets one price for its goods
consumed domestically and another for the same good consumed abroad. Prices are sticky with a
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price setting behavior a``a Calvo (1983). At each date, each firm changes its price with a probability
1− ω , regardless of the time since it last adjusted its price. The probability of not changing the
price, thus, is ω. The probability of not changing the price in the subsequent s periods is ωs.
Consequently, the price decision at time t determines profits for the next s periods. The price level
for home goods at date t will be defined as
PH,t =
[
ωP 1−θH,t−1 + (1− ω)p˜t(h)1−θ
] 1
1−θ (16)
In the literature on inflation dynamics in the Eurozone and the US its has been found that per-
sistence is one of the key features. Therefore, I introduce endogenous inflation persistence by
assuming that firms that are given the opportunity to adjust their prices will either follow a rule of
thumb (backward looking firms) or will chose the price that maximizes their expected discounted
profits (forward looking firms), as in Gali et al. (2001). The price p˜t(h) that will be set at date t
is specified as
p˜t(h) = ζpBt (h) + (1− ζ) pFort (h) (17)
where ζ ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of backward looking firms, pBt (h) and pFort (h) is the price set by
the backward and the forward looking firms, respectively. A continuum of firms is assumed for the
home economy indexed by h ∈ [0, 1]. Each firm produces a differentiated good, with a technology
Yt(h) = AtLt(h) (18)
where At is a country specific productivity shock at date t which is assumed to follow a log
stationary process
The structure of productivity shocks across the two countries receives the following form
 αt
α∗t
 =
 ραt ραtα∗t
ρα∗tαt ρα∗t

 αt−1
α∗t−1
+
 εα,t
ε∗α∗,t

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where
 εα,t
ε∗α∗,t
 ∼ N(0,Σ2), with Σ2 =
 σ2εa 0
0 σ2ε∗
α∗
.
Backward looking firms.
Backward looking firms set their prices according to the following rule
pBt (h) = PH,t−1 + piH,t−1 and pB∗t (h) = P ∗H,t−1 + pi∗H,t−1 (19)
Forward looking firms.
Forward looking firms set their prices by maximizing their expected discounted profits. Their
maximization problem comprises of two decisions. The one concerns the price for the domestic
market and the other the price charged in the foreign market, when it exports. Hence their
maximization problem is described as
maxEt
∞∑
s=0
ωsQt,t+s
{
p˜t(h)yht+s(h) + εtp˜t∗(h)y
f
t+s(h)−W ht+sLht+s
}
(20)
where yit(h), i = h, f is the demand for the home good for home and foreign agents specified as
yht (pt(h)) =
(
p˜t(h)
PH,t
)−θ (
PH,t
Pt
)−ρ
δ∗Ct, (21)
yft (p∗t (h)) =
(
p˜∗t (h)
P ∗H,t
)−θ (P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−ρ
(1− δ∗)C∗t (22)
The firm maximizes its objective function (20) subject to (21) in order to find the optimal price
for the home good in the home economy. It maximizes subject to (22), in order to find the optimal
price for the home good in the foreign economy. The firm chooses a price for the home good in
the home economy that satisfies the first order condition
Et
∞∑
s=0
ωsQt,t+syt+s(pt(h))
{
pt(h)− θ
θ − 1MCt+s
}
= 0
where MCt+s = Wt+sAt+s denotes the nominal marginal cost and
θ
θ−1 captures the optimal markup.
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The optimal price for the home good in the home country is specified as
pt(h) =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+sMCt+sy
h
t+s(pt(h))
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+syht+s(pt(h))
(23)
Respectively, the optimal price for the home good in the foreign country is specified as
p∗t (h) =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+sMCt+sy
f
t+s(p∗t (h))
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+sy
f
t+s(p∗t (h))zt+s
(24)
Aggregate price level
Dividing (19) by PH,t−1:
Π1−θH,t = ω + (1− ω)
(
p˜t(h)
PH,t−1
)1−θ
(25)
where ΠH,t ≡ PH,tPH,t−1 .
Similarly, for the foreign goods consumed in the home economy:
Π1−θF,t = ω + (1− ω)
(
p˜t(f)
PF,t−1
)1−θ
(26)
The aggregate price level dynamics are specified, thus, as
Π1−ρt = δ
[(
PH,t−1
Pt−1
)
ΠH,t
]1−ρ
+ (1− δ)
[(
PF,t−1
Pt−1
)
ΠF,t
]1−ρ
(27)
4 Log linearized model
A log linearized version of the relationships found in the previous section serves in providing us
with a way to deal with the problem of no closed form solution. Additionally, this is a way to end
up in a state space form which can be estimated using real time series data.
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4.1 Supply side
I use a first order Taylor approximation around the steady state of zero inflation rate. Log linearized
variables are denoted with a hat.
After loglinearizing the first order condition (10), the production function (18) the demand sched-
ules faced by each firm (21) and (22) and optimal price setting rules (23) and (24), I receive the
two relations describing the domestically consumed home goods inflation rate and the respective
of the home goods consumed in the foreign country
piH,t = bpiH,−1piH,t−1 + bpi∗H,−1pi
∗
H,t−1 + βEtpiH,t+1 + bpi∗Hpi
∗
H,t + bCCˆt + . . .
. . .+ bT Tˆt + bT ∗Tˆ ∗t + bq qˆt + baat (28)
pi∗H,t = bpiH,−1piH,t−1 + bpi∗H,−1pi
∗
H,t−1 + βEtpi∗H,t+1 + b∗piHpiH,t + b
∗
CCˆt + . . .
. . .+ b∗T Tˆt + b∗T ∗Tˆ ∗t + b∗q qˆt + b∗aat (29)
where Tt = PF,tPH,t and T
∗
t =
P ∗H,t
P ∗F,t
denote relative prices in the home and foreign country respectively.
The log linearized aggregate price level relation (27) is specified as
pit = piH,t + (1− δ)(piF,t − piH,t) (30)
which can be further simplified as5
pit = piH,t + (1− δ)∆Tˆt
4.2 Demand side
In this section I proceed to the loglinearization of the Euler equation
5To end up to that expression, I used equation Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + piF,t − piH,t for the relative price which is reported later in the text.
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CˆOt = κ(it − Etpit+1) + EtCˆOt+1 (31)
where κ = − 1
σ
, and using (2) the Euler equation receives the forward form, which includes both
backward and forward looking elements
Cˆt =
κψ
2− ψ (it − Etpit+1) +
1
2− ψEtCˆt+1 +
1− ψ
2− ψCˆt−1 (32)
Goods market clearing assumes the following two conditions
Y = CH + C∗H +Gt and Y ∗ = CF + C∗F +G∗t
where Gt and G∗t capture government expenditures for home and foreign country respectively,
assumed to follow an exogenous stationary AR(1) process gt = ρggt−1 +εg,t and g∗t = ρg∗g∗t−1 +ε∗g,t,
εg,t ∼ N(0, σ2εg) and ε∗g,t ∼ N(0, σ∗2εg ).
Combining equation (35) and the market clearing conditions, I derive the aggregate demand equa-
tion:
Yˆt = η1Yˆt−1 + η2EtYˆt+1 + η3(it − Etpit+1) + η4qˆt + η5qˆt+1 + η6qˆt−1 + . . .
. . .+ η7∆Tˆt + η8Et∆Tˆt+1 + η9∆Tˆ ∗t + η10Et∆Tˆ ∗t+1 (33)
where ηi , i = 1, .., 9 are defined in detail in appendix B.
4.3 Real exchange rate and relative prices
The real exchange rate dynamics are specified by the following relationship
∆qˆt = ∆zt + pi∗t − pit (34)
In the home country the price of imported goods relative to that of home goods is specified as
Tt = PF,tPH,t , whereas in the foreign country the relative price of home exported goods to foreign
goods is specified as T ∗t =
P ∗H,t
P ∗F,t
. Loglinearizing those two expressions we receive the following
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + piF,t − piH,t Tˆ ∗t = Tˆ ∗t−1 + pi∗H,t − pi∗F,t
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4.4 Flexible price equilibrium
At the flexible price equilibrium firms adjust their prices in each period. Each firm will set its
marginal cost equal to the optimal marginal cost (i.e. −log
(
θ
θ−1
)
) which is constant over time and
equal across firms. Since firms adjust their prices every period, monetary policy will not have any
real effects into the economy. The real marginal cost is specified by the following equations
mct = −log
(
θ
θ − 1
)
= −µ
mct = wt − αt − ν
where wt is the real wage, αt (log) productivity and ν a subsidy to labor.6 Solving for the case
with flexible prices, I receive the following set of equations describing the equilibrium processes for
output, consumption, labor, real interest rate7, given by:
ynt = ψcc¯t−1 + ψζζ + ψaαt + ψa∗α∗t + ψggt + ψg∗g∗t (35)
cnt = ψ˜cc¯t−1 + ψζζ +
(
γδ∗ + σ
δ(γ + σ)− γ(1− δ∗)
)
ψααt −
(γ
σ
ψα∗
)
α∗t −
(γ
σ
ψg
)
gt −
(γ
σ
ψg∗
)
g∗t (36)
lnt = ψ˜cc¯t−1 + ψζζ +
(
γ(δ∗(1− σ)− (1− δ))− σ(1− δ)ψα
δ(γ + σ)− γ(1− δ∗)
)
αt − ψa∗α∗t + ψggt + ψg∗g∗t (37)
rnt =
˜˜ψcc¯t−1+
(
(γδ∗ + σ)(1− ρa)ψa
κδ(γ + σ)− γ(1− δ∗)
)
αt−
(
γ(1− ρa∗)ψa∗
κσ
)
α∗t −
(
γ(1− ρg)ψg
κσ
)
gt−
(
γ(1− ρg∗)ψg∗
κσ
)
g∗t (38)
5 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is conducted through nominal interest rate rules by the central bank.
6This subsidy serves in rendering the flexible price equilibrium efficient. This is achieved by setting the subsidy equal to the mark-up
(i.e. ν = µ), in order to remove the distortion associated with monopolistic competition.
7The flexible price expression for the real exchange rate can be easily derived using the risk sharing condition.
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Open economy monetary policy literature has often rejected the importance of the exchange
rate in the interest rate feedback rules, either because it is argued that its effect is already there,
indirectly through its pass through on prices and then in inflation (Ball, 1999; Taylor, 1999),
or because data do not support its significance (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998). However, a
weakness of many empirical studies is that they do not estimate a structural model, but, rather,
they estimate an interest rate rule. This strategy is able, of course, to provide some information
about the range of values of the coefficients, but its weakness rests on the fact that it does not
take into account the interactions among the fundamental variables in the economy.
5.1 Policy rules
In this section I focus on two different policy rules. Each rule leads to a different system of
equations and, thus, different conditions that are necessary for determinacy.
5.1.1 Taylor rule and real exchange rate targeting
The standard Taylor rule is known to perform quite well in a wide range of models. However, one
weakness is that, the Taylor rule, in its standard form does not introduce history dependence. The
latter is crucial in forward looking models. An interest rate rule with history dependence allows
the central bank to control private sectors expectations better and, hence, to achieve lower welfare
losses. Therefore, I consider the Taylor rule with some interest rate inertia.
As already mentioned, my main goal is to show that the real exchange rate has important
information for the conduct of monetary policy in open economies. Therefore, I consider the
Taylor rule expanded by a target for the real exchange rate as well. The two rules receive the
following form
it = φxxt + φpipit + φiit−1 (39)
it = φxxt + φpipit + φqqt + φiit−1 (40)
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where xt = yt − ynt denotes the output gap.
5.2 Welfare
The central bank sets the interest rate in such a way to minimize a measure of social loss derived by
a second order Taylor expansion of the consumer’s utility function as in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998), Amato and Laubach (2003) and Pappa (2004). It is summarized as8
Wt = −12ucCΞ{λ1(Yˆt − ynt )2 + λ2(Yˆ ∗t − y∗nt )2 + λ3(qˆt − qnt )2 + λ4∆qˆ2t + λ5∆Yˆ ∗t 2 + λ6∆Yˆt2 + . . .
+pi2H,t + λ7(piH,t − piH,t−1)2 + λ8(pi∗H,t)2 + λ9(pi∗H,t − pi∗H,t−1)2 + λ10(qˆt + Yˆt)2 + λ11(qˆt + Yˆ ∗t )2 + . . .
λ12(qˆt−1 + Yˆt)2 + λ13(qˆt−1 + Yˆ ∗t )2 + λ13(qˆt−1 + Yˆ ∗t )2 + . . .
λ14(Yˆ ∗t−1 − y∗nt−1)(qˆt−1 − qnt−1) + λ15(yt−1 − ynt−1)(y∗t−1 − y∗nt−1) + λ16(Cˆt − cnt )(qˆt − qnt ) + . . .
λ17(Yˆt + Yˆ ∗t−1)2 + λ18(Yˆt−1 + Yˆ ∗t )2 + λ19(Yˆt−1 − ynt−1)(qt−1 − qnt−1) + . . .
+λ20(Yˆ ∗t − Yˆ ∗nt )(Yˆ ∗t−1− Yˆ ∗nt−1) +λ21(Yˆ ∗t−1 + qˆt)2 +λ22(Yˆt−1 + qˆt)2 +λ23(Yˆt−1− ynt−1)(qˆt−1− qnt−1) + . . .
λ24(Cˆ∗t−1−c∗nt−1)(qˆt−1−qnt−1)+λ25(qˆt−qnt )(qˆt−1−qnt−1)+λ26(Yˆt−1−ynt−1)(Yˆt−ynt )+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3) (41)
where the coefficients λi, i = 1, ..., 21 are functions of the structural parameters.
6 Calibration
In this section I proceed to the calibration and simulation of the model in order to evaluate
alternative monetary policy rules. Alternative monetary policy rules will be compared according
to the value of the welfare loss they generate.9 The values of most the parameters are taken from
similar studies. However, since the model is very rich, in terms of parameterization, I have made
my own choice of some other parameters. This is the reason why I proceed at section 7 in a
8The derivation of the loss function is given in detail in the Appendix.
9As usual, optimal monetary policy is defined as one that minimizes the welfare loss as measured by (41).
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robustness check, in order to figure out whether the results from the baseline calibration are highly
sensitive to alternative values of the structural parameters.
6.1 Calibration results
In this section I calibrate the model to investigate how the variables of the model respond to
shocks. In table 1 below I provide the values of the calibrated parameters.
Table 1: Parameter Values
Structural parameters
σ 3 ( Amato & Laubach, 2003)
θ 10 (Benigno & Benigno, 2006)
ρ 4.5 (Benigno & Benigno, 2006)
γ 3 (Pappa, 2004)
ω = ω∗ 0.75
δ = δ∗ 0.8 (Pappa, 2004)
ζ = ζ∗ 0.4 (Amato & Laubach, 2003)
ψ = ψ∗ 0.5
Interest rate weight
λr 0.236 (Amato & Laubach, 2003)
The coefficients imposed in the foreign country policy rule are those estimated by Clarida et al.
(1998) for the US in the post Volcker period, specified as φ∗pi = 2.15, φ∗x = 0.93 and φ∗i = 0.85. In
order to derive secure inference about the policy implications of the different interest rate rules,
I computed the optimized coefficients for each rule. That is, the coefficients that minimize the
welfare loss function subject to the equations describing the behaviour of the private sector.10
10For a detailed description of the optimal problem see Benigno and Benigno (2006) and Giannoni (2010).
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Table 2: Optimized coefficients (all shocks)
φpi φx φq φi Loss
ψ = ψ∗ = 0.5, ζ = ζ∗ = 0.2
Taylor Rule 1.40352 0.997814 - 0.969422 3.1582
RER targeting 1.52539 0.648157 -0.0158189 0.878512 0.6833
ψ = ψ∗ = 1.0, ζ = ζ∗ = 0.0
Taylor Rule 1.38497 1.63529 - -1.30846 0.0210
RER targeting 1.45215 0.776324 -0.122784 -0.63034 0.0185
Table 3: Standard deviations
σpi σpiH σx σq
ψ = ψ∗ = 0.5, ζ = ζ∗ = 0.4 (Persistence in inflation and output)
RER targeting 0.0770 0.0784 0.4773 2.0274
Taylor Rule 0.2015 0.2126 1.7403 6.8933
ψ = ψ∗ = 1.0, ζ = ζ∗ = 0.0 (No persistence)
RER targeting 0.0290 0.0275 0.0222 1.0543
Taylor Rule 0.0299 0.0289 0.0392 1.6144
The results in table 2 show that a real exchange rate target yields lower welfare losses. When
persistence in inflation and output is set to zero (i.e. ψ = ψ∗ = 1.0, ζ = ζ∗ = 0.0) the differences
in welfare are very small. However, when I allow for persistence the differences in welfare increase
abruptly.
All the key macroeconomic variables are more volatile under the Taylor rule as shown at table 3.
When the home central bank follows a simple Taylor rule then real exchange rate volatility is higher
compared to the case where a real exchange rate target is adopted. Given local currency pricing,
a highly volatile real exchange rate has a direct impact on both home CPI and PPI inflation rates.
Therefore, since a real exchange rate target decreases its volatility, the home central bank is able
to control inflation fluctuations better. Moreover the differences in inflation volatility increase as
the degree of persistence on inflation and output goes up. In particular, home CPI inflation is 2.6
times more volatile under the Taylor under persistence, while it is only 1.03 times higher without
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persistence. The same conclusion holds for the output gap.
The impulse responses in figure 2 from the baseline calibration, presented at table 1, give a
picture of the main argument. That is, a real exchange target into an interest rate rule allows the
policy maker to have a better control of CPI inflation. CPI inflation falls less when the central
bank reacts to the real exchange rate, following a one standard deviation home monetary shock,
and jumps less, following a foreign monetary policy shock. The output gap is also better stabilized
under real exchange rate targeting. Both variables revert back to the steady state much faster
under real exchange rate targeting.
Figure 2: Impulse responses-Monetary policy shock
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7 Robustness analysis
In this section I proceed to a sensitivity analysis of our results. In particular, I look at the
behaviour of the welfare loss as structural parameters change over time.
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7.1 Rule of thumb consumers
As a first exercise I focus on the importance of rule of thumb behavior in consumption. My
approach is twofold. First, I keep symmetry between the two countries and see how loss varies as
the fraction of rule of thumb consumers increases jointly in both countries. In every step of the
simulations, optimized coefficients are computed and stored so as to compute the corresponding
value for the welfare loss. As already mentioned, I do that, because the welfare loss is derived from
a second order approximation of the utility function, being, thus, highly sensitive to small changes
in the structural parameters. Second, I relax the symmetry assumption and allow for asymmetries
in the degrees of rule of thumb behavior.
Figure 3: Variations in Rule-of-thumb Consumers - Symmetric Case
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As the fraction of rule of thumb consumers rises symmetrically in both countries both interest
rate rule lead to higher welfare losses. The two interest rate rules exhibit asymmetric behavior
with respect to variations in rule-of-thumb behavior. The Taylor rule leads to higher welfare losses
as the degree of rule-of-thumb behavior falls, whereas the real exchange rate targeting rule leads
to to higher welfare losses as this degree goes up. Moreover, real exchange rate targeting interest
rate rule seems to be preferred over the Taylor rule at all levels of output persistence. Under real
exchange rate targeting, welfare losses start to increase abruptly for values of 1− ψ > 0.6.
As a next step I do a similar exercise, but now allowing for an asymmetric variation in the
degrees of rule of thumb behavior between the two countries. In particular, as the domestic
fraction of rule of thumbers increases the foreign falls11.
Figure 4: Variations in Rule-of-thumb Consumers - Asymmetric Case
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11The graphs should be interpreted with this ordering. Otherwise, they may lead to the wrong conclusions.
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In the asymmetric case, under real exchange rate targeting welfare losses are always lower than
in the Taylor rule. The difference, however, with the symmetric case is that the gap between the
losses from the two interest rate rule is now much wider than in the symmetric case. The Taylor
rule may yield even twenty times high welfare losses when there is asymmetry in the fraction of
backward looking consumers in the two countries. On the other hand, losses from the real exchange
rate targeting rule seem to increase abruptly for high levels of domestic backward looking behavior
associated with low levels in the foreign country.
Looking at the four plots I conclude that adding a real exchange rate target in the interest rate
rule leads to lower welfare losses for a wide range of backward looking behavior in consumption.
However, the performance of the real exchange rate targeting rule worsens abruptly when, at least,
the domestic fraction of backward looking consumers is high.
7.2 Rule of thumb price setters
In this part I turn our focus on the effects of rule of thumb behavior in price setting. The
strategy I follow is exactly the same as in the previous section. I first look at the symmetric case
and then at the asymmetric.
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Figure 5: Variations in Rule-of-thumb price setters - Symmetric Case
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Symmetry in the fraction of backward looking firms leads to the same conclusions as in the
case of rule-of-thumb consumption. The Taylor rule yields higher welfare losses. Real exchange
rate targeting is able to keep losses fluctuating within a certain band, that includes losses that are
lower than those in the Taylor rule.
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Figure 6: Variations in Rule-of-thumb Consumers - Asymmetric Case
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The results from the asymmetric case are similar to the symmetric one, as far as rule-of-thumb
price setting behavior is concerned. The Taylor rule performs always worse. When the home central
bank follows the optimized Taylor rule, welfare loss rises as the fraction of foreign backward looking
firms goes down, for a given level of the domestic ratio. This is not the case under real exchange
rate targeting. As the fraction of foreign backward looking firms goes down, welfare loss falls, for
a given level of the domestic fraction The main result, though, is that losses are considerably lower
when an exchange rate target is adopted.
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7.3 Risk aversion coefficient
As a final robustness check, I look at the degree of relative risk aversion. Given its importance in
the model, I expect that changes in this parameter will have remarkable impact in the performance
of each rule. I allow this parameter to vary between 1.1 and 4. The results for each rule are
summarized in the two figures below.
Figure 7: Variations in Risk Aversion
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The two figures above show that for degrees of risk aversion that are in the band of actual
data estimates (i.e. between 1 and 5), the Taylor rule performs worse.Moreover, welfare losses
increase abruptly as risk aversion coefficient rises above 2.5. On the other hand welfare loss from
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real exchange rate targeting seems to increase smoothly as risk aversion rises. CPI volatility is
considerably lower compared to its volatility under the Taylor rule.
8 Conclusion
In this paper I estimate a structural VAR for the nominal interest rate, CPI inflation, the output
gap and the real exchange rate. From the impulse response analysis and I find that the ECB
achieves a better control of CPI inflation when it allows its policy rate to react contemporaneously
to exchange rate movements.
Relying on the above finding I constructed a two country DSGE model for the Eurozone and
the US. I modelled the foreign monetary policy using the estimates of Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1998) for the coefficients in the output gap and CPI inflation in the interest rate rule for the US.
Taking this policy as given and contrary to past papers, I compute the optimized coefficients in
the interest rate rule of the home central bank. Adding the real exchange rate into the interest
rate rule leads to robustly lower welfare losses. The gap in losses between the Taylor rule and the
real exchange rate targeting rule is wider, the higher the degree of persistence on inflation and
output.
Therefore both empirical and theoretical evidence in this paper suggest that an interest rate
rule with a real exchange rate target is Pareto superior to the Taylor rule.
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Chapter 3: Markov Switching Monetary Policy in a two-country DSGE
Model
Konstantinos Mavromatis
JOB MARKET PAPER
Abstract
In this paper I show, using both empirical and theoretical analysis, that changes in
monetary policy in one country can have important effects on other economies. My
new empirical evidence shows that changes in the monetary policy behaviour of the
Fed since the start of the Euro, well captured by a Markov-switching Taylor rule, have
had significant effects on the behaviour of inflation and output in the Eurozone even
though ECB’s monetary policy is found to be fairly stable. Using a two-country DSGE
model, I examine this case theoretically; monetary policy in one of the countries (labelled
foreign) switches regimes according to a Markov-switching process and this has non-
negligible effects in the other (home) country. Switching by the foreign central bank
renders commitment to a time invariant interest rate rule suboptimal for the home central
bank. This is because home agents expectations change as foreign monetary policy
changes which affects the dynamics of home inflation and output. Optimal policy in the
home country instead reacts to the regime of the foreign monetary policy and so implies
a time-varying reaction of the home Central Bank. Following this time-varying optimal
policy at home eliminates the effects in the home country of foreign regime shifts, and
also reduces dramatically the effects in the foreign country. Therefore, changes in foreign
monetary regimes should not be neglected in considering monetary policy at home.
Keywords: Markov-switching DSGE, Optimal monetary policy, Dynamic programming,
SVAR, real-time data.
JEL Classification: E52, F41, F42.
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1 Introduction
Regime changes in the conduct of monetary policy have been documented largely over the last ten
years. They refer to changes in the way a central bank reacts to the key macroeconomic variables,
i.e. inflation and output. An example of this kind of change in monetary policy is that of the
US. In particular, Clarida et al. (2001), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni
(2006) show that the reaction of the Fed towards inflation fluctuations until the late ’70s was less
aggressive compared to that from the early ’80s onwards. As a result many authors attribute high
inflation volatility in the US during the ’70s to the way the Fed was reacting over that period to
inflation fluctuations.1 Moreover, according to these authors, changes in monetary policy are the
main reason for the changes in the impulse responses of inflation and output. Even though there
is ample empirical and theoretical evidence regarding the effects of changes in monetary policy in
a closed economy setup, there is very little evidence about the international effects.
In this paper I show, both empirically and theoretically, that changes in monetary policy in
one country have important effects on other economies. In the empirical analysis, I find that the
monetary policy of the US has changed since the start of the Euro. This change affected the
dynamics of inflation and output in the Eurozone significantly. However, the monetary policy
of the ECB is found to be fairly stable. In the theoretical analysis, I show that changes in the
monetary policy of one country (labelled foreign) have non-neglible effects on the dynamics of the
key macroeconomic variables in the other (home) country. This result is further enhanced as long
as the home country does not take into account changes in foreign monetary policy. However, both
economies benefit when the home central bank reacts optimally to foreign monetary policy regime
shifts.
A popular way of modelling regime changes in monetary policy is by assuming that the interest
rate rule coefficients change according to a Markov switching process. Using this approach Davig
and Leeper (2007), Liu et al. (2008, 2009), Farmer et al. (2011) and Bekaert et al. (2011) construct
closed economy DSGE models in order to analyze the effects of regime shifts in monetary policy
on inflation and output.2 These papers conclude that the expectation of a future regime shift in
1There is a huge literature over the causes of a change in inflation volatility in the US. Some authors, such as Stock and Watson
(2003), attribute that change to different shock sizes, rather than to changes in the way monetary policy was conducted .
2In all of these papers the theoretical analysis is motivated by the empirical estimates about the way monetary policy was conducted
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monetary policy has significant effects on inflation and output today. Those effects can be either
stabilizing or destabilizing depending on what is the expected future policy.
The existing literature on Markov-switching DSGE models, though, is restricted to a closed
economy framework. As a result, so far, the cross country effects of regime shifts in monetary policy
have not been analyzed. Therefore, it is important that we have an open economy framework, so
that to analyze the effects in one country of a change in monetary policy of another country.
The first contribution of the paper is to provide empirical evidence regarding the international
effects of changes in monetary policy. I estimate a SVAR model for the US and the Eurozone using
real time monthly data spanning from 1999 through 2010. The empirical model includes seven
variables, namely inflation, output gap and the nominal interest rate for both the Eurozone and
the US, as well as the real exchange rate. I perform parameter stability tests using the Andrews
sup-Wald test, as in Boivin and Giannoni (2002) and the Andrews-Ploberger test.3 Both tests
find that there have been statistically significant changes in the coefficients in the US interest
rate equation. This implies that there has been a change in the systematic behaviour of the Fed.
However, coefficients in the Eurozone interest rate equation are stable throughout the sample. The
Andrews-Ploberger test identifies the break date in June 2004. Therefore, I split the sample into
two sub-samples, namely before and after that date. The impulse response analysis shows that the
responses of inflation and output gap in the Eurozone are completely different in the two samples.
But what drives the changes in the impulse responses of inflation and output in the Eurozone?
In order to answer that question, I perform a countrefactual analysis in the VAR model. I find
that the main reason for the change in the impulse responses of those variables was the change in
the US monetary policy. I examine also whether changes in the conditions in the Euro area can
account for that. I find that their contribution at causing changes in the impulse responses is tiny.
Given the weakness of the SVAR model in uncovering a Taylor rule, a last step in the empirical
analysis is to explore whether there have been indeed changes in Fed’s contemporaneous reaction
to inflation and output gap fluctuations. For this reason I estimate a Taylor rule for the US whose
coefficients change over time according to a Markov-switching process. The estimated rule findings
validate that the monetary policy of the Fed has changed since the start of the Euro and are in
in the US from 1970 until recently.
3I use the Andrews-Ploberger test because of its virtue of identifying the break date.
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line with the stability tests from the SVAR model. The rule changes state only once. Notably,
the regime change date is very close to the break date identified by the Andrews-Ploberger test in
the US interest rate equation. Keeping those findings in mind, I proceed to the construction of a
two-country DSGE model.
The theoretical model is similar to that of Benigno and Benigno (2001) and Benigno (2004). I
extend their approach by allowing the coefficients in the foreign interest rate rule only to change
according to a Markov-switching process. The home country instead adopts a time-invariant
Taylor rule with some interest rate smoothing. I show that even though the home monetary policy
is constantly (and with a constant coefficient) hawkish4, home inflation exhibits changes in its
volatility over time. Specifically, if there is a positive probability that foreign monetary policy
will be dovish5 in the future, then not only foreign inflation will be more volatile, but also home
inflation. This is because both home and foreign agents incorporate this probability in their future
inflation expectations.6 The increase in the volatility of home inflation in this case comes from the
home agents expectation of an increasing volatility in the real exchange rate and relative prices.
Therefore, commitment to a regime independent interest rate rule proves not to be enough to
stabilize the home economy.
Hence, as a next step, I examine the optimal policy of the home country. I solve the optimal
policy problem of the home central bank conditional on foreign monetary policy switching regimes
over time. I extend Soderlind’s (1998) algorithm for solving optimal policy problems in linear
rational expectations models to a Markov-switching framework. I show that a time invariant
interest rate rule is suboptimal for the home country. The home central bank must be always
hawkish. How much hawkish the home central bank should be, depends on the regime which
the foreign monetary policy lies in. More specifically, I find that as the probability that the
foreign central bank becomes dovish rises, the home central bank should increase the coefficient
on inflation further. The opposite holds as the probability that the foreign central bank becomes
hawkish increases. The intuition behind this result is that when home agents expect that foreign
monetary policy will become dovish, they anticipate an increase in the volatility of home inflation.
4Throughout the paper hawkish refers to the case where the coefficient on inflation in the interest rate rule is greater than one. In
the literature, this implies that the central bank cares a lot about inflation stabilization.
5Throughout the paper dovish refers to the case where the coefficient on inflation in the interest rate rule is less than one. In the
literature, this implies that the central bank is more tolerant of inflation fluctuations.
6Throughout the paper I assume that the probability of a regime switch is the same for both home and foreign agents.
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Hence, the home central bank must react in such a way so that to offset this effect on home agents
expectations. And this, as I show, is achieved by increasing the coefficient on home inflation in the
home interest rate rule. Additionally, the coefficient on output gap must increase as well, as the
foreign monetary policy becomes dovish. This means that when the foreign country changes its
policy, then the home must adjust (change) its policy appropriately. Regime switching monetary
policy proves to be Pareto superior for the home country. More importantly, I show that when the
home central bank reacts optimally to changes in foreign monetary policy, the effects of changes
in the latter are eliminated in the home country, and reduced dramatically in the foreign.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 a SVAR model is estimated using real time
data for the Eurozone and the US, in order to motivate the theoretical model. In section 3 a
two country DSGE model is constructed, allowing for regime switching in monetary policy of the
foreign country. In section 4, I describe how Markov switching monetary policy is introduced into
the model. In section 5, the model is presented in its loglinear form. In section 6 the solution
technique of the Markov-Switching DSGE (MSDSGE) is described. In section 7 the model is
calibrated and simulated. In section 8 the optimal policy problem of the home central bank is
solved, in order to find what the optimal reaction of the latter should be, conditional on foreign
monetary policy switching regimes. Section 9 concludes.
2 Stylized facts
2.1 A SVAR model for the Eurozone and the US
In this section I present a structural VAR model for the Eurozone and the US.
The SVAR model consists of seven variables, namely output gap, inflation rate and nominal
interest rates in the Eurozone and the US, and the real exchange rate. Such a model may lead to
better policy implications because the regions under consideration are close trade partners and,
hence, it is likely that changes or shocks in the monetary policy of one region have important effect
on the other. The SVAR model has the following form.
A0Xt = Γ0 + Σpi=1ΓiXt−i + ut (1)
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where A0 is nonsingular, while the variance-covariance matrix of the fundamental disturbances
Σu = E(ut, u
′
t) is assumed to be diagonal. The short-run restrictions imposed allow for contempo-
raneous effects of the CPI rate and the output gap on the policy rate in each region. Therefore,
the complete representation of the SVAR model is summarized as follows.

1 a12 0 a14 0 a16 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
a31 a32 1 0 0 0 0
a41 0 0 1 a45 0 0
0 a52 0 a54 1 a56 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 a75 a76 1


CPIEuro
GapEuro
iEuro
RER
CPIUS
GapUS
iUS

t
=
=

γ10
γ20
γ30
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γ70

+

γ11 γ12 γ13 γ14 γ15 γ16 γ17
γ21 γ22 γ23 γ24 γ25 γ26 γ27
γ31 γ32 γ33 γ34 γ35 γ36 γ37
γ41 γ42 γ43 γ44 γ45 γ46 γ47
γ51 γ52 γ53 γ54 γ55 γ56 γ57
γ61 γ62 γ63 γ64 γ65 γ66 γ67
γ71 γ72 γ73 γ74 γ75 γ76 γ77


CPIEuro
GapEuro
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RER
CPIUS
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iUS

t−1
+

u1,t
u2,t
u3,t
u4,t
u5,t
u6,t
u7,t

The reduced form of the VAR model is specified as
Xt = A−10 Γ0 + A−10 Σ
p
i=1ΓiXt−i + εt
where εt = A−10 ut are the reduced form errors with a variance-covariance matrix Σε = E(εt, ε
′
t) =
A−10 E(ut, u
′
t)A−10 = A−10 ΣuA−1
′
0 .
The target in this section is to ascertain whether there have been changes in the way monetary
policy was conducted until today by both the ECB and the Fed. Therefore, for each equation of the
SVAR model, the stability of its the coefficients is tested.7 The first test the Andrews sup-Wald
test. The second is the Andrews-Ploberger test.8 The former has the virtue that it has power
against various alternatives, as far as the process of the structural parameters is concerned. The
7Evidence of parameter instability in monetary VAR models is mixed. Boivin and Giannoni (2002), Bernanke, Gertler and Watson
(1997) and Boivin (2005) find evidence of parameter instability, while Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) find the opposite.
8Note that the heteroskedasticity robust version of both tests was used.
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latter is able to identify the timing of the break, if there is one. If there is evidence of parameter
instability, then the impulse responses computed using the model estimated for the whole sample
are no longer valid. Therefore, if this is the case, I will split the sample in smaller sub-samples,
depending on the timing of the break, estimated by the Andrews-Ploeberger test.
Given that some authors have argued in favour of changes in the size of shocks hitting the
economy, rather than changes in the structural parameters, being the reason for changes in the
transmission of monetary policy, heteroskedasticity tests in the estimated residuals are also per-
formed. For each equation specific estimated residual the LM test for ARCH effects is used.
2.2 Data
Real-time monthly data9 were gathered from the ECB statistical warehouse and the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia. The dataset spans from 1999:1 though 2010:6. GDP is proxied by total
industrial production. CPI for each region is used as the inflation rate. As far as the policy rates
are concerned, the Federal Funds rate for the US and the interbank overnight rate for the Eurozone
are used. Finally, the nominal exchange rate is measured by the end of period euro-dollar rate.
2.3 Empirical results
2.3.1 Stability and heteroskedasticity tests
Prior to the estimation of the SVAR model10, I perform stability tests in each equation’s coefficients
in the reduced form VAR model. At table 1 below the p− values from both tests are reported11.
Stability tests show that at 1% significance level, the systematic behaviour of the Fed has changed
over the sample considered. Four out of seven coefficients in the equation for the Fed Funds rate
have changed over time. On the other hand, monetary policy in the Eurozone has not changed at
1% significance level. At 5% significance level, though, the coefficients on lagged foreign inflation
and the real exchange rate appear to have changed. As for the output gap in the Eurozone, it
9For the importance of using real-time data for monetary policy prescriptions see Orphanides (2003) and the references therein.
10The lag length of the VAR model was chosen based on the AIC and the BIC criterion. Both criteria showed that 2 lags is optimal.
11I report p − values obtained only from the Andrews-Ploberger test in order to save space. The results from the Andrews-Quandt
test lead to the same conclusions.
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is stable. I derive the same result for CPI in the US. On the other hand the coefficients in the
Eurozone CPI and the US output gap equations are subject to breaks at 5 %significance levels.
Although, it is easy to interpret breaks in the coefficients in the interest rate equations as changes
in the way monetary policy is conducted, breaks in the CPI and the output gap equations are less
easy to interpret.
Table 1: Stability Tests on Reduced-form VAR coefficients
Regressors
Dep. vrb CPIEuro GapEuro iEuro RER CPIUS GapUS iUS
CPIEuro 0.0181* 0.9491 0.0189* 0.0415* 0.0174* 0.4007 0.0353
GapEuro 0.7225 0.2944 0.7338 0.7030 0.7407 0.3018 0.6947
iEuro 0.0508 0.6871 0.1231 0.0432* 0.0497* 0.5500 0.0825
RER 0.0008** 0.5122 0.0002** 0.0015** 0.0007** 0.7031 0.0047*
CPIUS 0.5558 0.4223 0.2338 0.6056 0.5608 0.4859 0.1903
GapUS 0.0112* 0.0561 0.0132* 0.0429* 0.0112* 0.1491 0.0388*
iUS 0.0025** 0.6122 0.0000** 0.0030** 0.0026** 0.2339 0.1093
Notes: p− values reported. ** Significant at 1% s.l., * Significant at 5% s.l.
As regards Eurozone CPI, it is found that the coefficients on the lagged Eurozone and US CPI
rates are subject to breaks. This could be attributed to changes in the degree of openness in the
Eurozone, or home bias. Taking into account the structure of a hybrid New-Keynesian Phillips
curve, the break in the coefficient on lagged interest rate in the Eurozone CPI equation , could be
due to either a change in the frequency of price adjustments, or a change in the degree of backward
lookingness in price setting behaviour, or a change in the degree of risk aversion, or change in the
degree of habits in consumption, or a combination of all the above. Finally, the changes in the
coefficients on lagged Eurozone CPI rate, on lagged Eurozone interest rate, on lagged real exchange
rate, on lagged US CPI rate and on lagged US interest rate in the US output gap equation could
be attributed to changes in the degree of openness of the US economy, the degree of risk aversion,
the degree of endogenous persistence in output, or to a combination of those three factors. I keep,
however, the fact that US monetary policy is found to have changed which is the main motivation
of this paper.
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Finally, the Andrews-Ploberger test showed that the break in the US interest rate equation
coefficients took place in June 2004.12 I use this estimate to split the initial sample into two
sub-samples when I will be doing the impulse response analysis in the next section.
The last test performed was on the variance of the estimated equation specific residuals. As
already mentioned, I test for this using the LM test for ARCH effects. The results are shown at
table 2. Results at table 2 show that at 5% significance level only the variance of the residuals
from the Eurozone interest rate equation has changed over time.
Table 2: Heteroskedacticity tests
p− values
CPIEuro 0.6088
GapEuro 0.1550
iEuro 0.0105
RER 0.5734
CPIUS 0.2365
GapUS 0.4856
iUS 0.4261
2.3.2 Impulse responses
In this section the impulse responses are computed. I split the initial sample into two sub-samples,
according the results from the Andrews-Ploberger test. Namely, until and after June 2004.13 The
impulse responses of the variables are computed for each sub-sample. At figure 1 below I present
the responses of CPI in the Eurozone following a contractionary monetary policy shock, a positive
cost-push shock, a positive demand shock and a positive RER shock in both the Eurozone and the
US.
The impulse responses are different in the two samples. In particular, CPI inflation is more
volatile and persistent in the second sample for all kinds of shocks considered14. Moreover, the sign
12Ben Bernanke in his speech at the annual meeting of the American economic association in 2010 mentions that the FOMC increased
its target for the federal funds rate in June 2004.
13From now on I will refer to the sample spanning from 1999:1 to 2004:6 as Sample 1. Sample 2 will represent the sample spanning
from 2004:7 to 2010:6.
14Impulse responses of the output gap lead to the same conclusion. The latter is less volatile and persistent after all kinds of shocks,
in the first sample.
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of the initial impact seems to change as well, following a monetary policy shock in the Eurozone
and the US. For example, CPI initially jumps in sample 1, after a monetary policy shock in the
Eurozone. On the contrary, it falls in sample 2.
Figure 1: Impulse Responses of Eurozone CPI to alternative shocks
Sample 1: 1999:1 - 2004:6
Sample 2: 2004:7 - 2010:6
Notes: Blue lines: 95% posterior confidence interval. Demand: demand shock in the Eurozone. Supply: supply
shock in the Eurozone. RER: real exchange rate shock. MP-Euro: monetary policy shock in the Eurozone. MP-US:
monetary policy shock in the US. Demand-US: demand shock in the US. Supply-US: supply shock in the US.
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Counterfactual Analysis with the SVAR
In the previous section, I showed that the responses of Eurozone CPI to monetary policy shocks has
changed over time. Given that stability tests suggest that coefficients in equations other than that
of the US interest rate have changed as well, it may be that the changes in the impulse responses
are due to changes in the coefficients in the nonpolicy part of the VAR rather than the policy one.
For this reason, I now investigate the source of the change in the impulse responses of inflation
and output in both countries. I perform a counterfactual exercise on the structural VAR model. I
implement two experiments. At the first, I am trying to figure out whether the observed changes
in the impulse responses are explained by the change in the US monetary policy, keeping all other
coefficients constant. At the second, I allow only for the coefficients in the US output gap and the
Eurozone CPI equation to change. This allows me to explore the extent to which the differences
in the impulse responses can be attributed to changes in the coefficients in the nonpolicy block of
the SVAR model, rather than the policy one.
To address the above two questions, let T characterize US monetary policy, K characterize
Eurozone CPI and US GDP and N characterize the remaining part of the economy. In particular,
TS is the set of the estimated parameters of the US interest rate equation, KS is the set of the esti-
mated parameters in the Eurozone CPI and US GDP equation and NS is the set of the estimated
parameters of the remaining part of the VAR. Subscript S refers to the period within which those
parameters have been estimated. For instance a combination (Tpre−2004:6, Kpre−2004:6, Npre−2004:6)
denotes the set of all the estimated parameters in the Sample 1. This set of parameters charac-
terizes completely the impulse response functions computed for that sample. On the other hand a
combination (Tpost−2004:6, Kpost−2004:6, Npost−2004:6) denotes the set of all the estimated parameters
in Sample 2.
In order to answer the first question (i.e. whether the change in the impulse responses is due
to a change in the US monetary policy) I will use (Tpost−2004:6, Kpre−2004:6, Npre−2004:6). That
is, keeping all other coefficients fixed and allowing only the coefficients in the US interest rate
equation to change, I will compute the new impulse response functions. The same strategy will be
followed in order to answer the second question. Since, now, the focus is on the effect of changes in
the parameters in the Eurozone CPI and the US GDP equations, I will keep all other coefficients
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fixed. In particular, the new impulse response functions are obtained using the combination
(Tpre−2004:6, Kpost−2004:6, Npre−2004:6). Table 3 gives a picture of the two experiments. In the left
column, I indicate the impulse response functions that will be used in each experiment. In the
right column I refer to the coefficients used for the computation of each impulse response function.
Table 3: Counterfactual Analysis
Experiment 1: Changes only in US interest rate equation coefficients
Impulse Response Set of coefficients used
Sample 1 (Tpre−2004:6, Kpre−2004:6, Npre−2004:6)
Counterfactual (Tpost−2004:6, Kpre−2004:6, Npre−2004:6)
Sample 2 (Tpost−2004:6, Kpost−2004:6, Npost−2004:6)
Experiment 2: Changes only in US GDP and Euro CPI equation coefficients
Impulse Response Set of coefficients used
Sample 1 (Tpre−2004:6, Kpre−2004:6, Npre−2004:6)
Counterfactual (Tpre−2004:6, Kpost−2004:6, Npre−2004:6)
Sample 2 (Tpost−2004:6, Kpost−2004:6, Npost−2004:6)
The impulse responses from experiments 1 and 2 are illustrated in panel (a) and (b) in figure
2. The impulse response functions in panel (a) in figure 2 show that changes in the US interest
rate coefficients account more for the change in the impulse responses in the Sample 1. In fact,
the blue dashed line (counterfactual impulse response) moves close to the red dotted line, which
is the impulse response function in Sample 2.
On the other hand, as shown in panel (b), when only the coefficients in the US output gap and
the Eurozone CPI equations change, the impulse response functions in Sample 1 do not seem to
be affected significantly. The blue dashed line, now, moves very close to the black solid line in
all cases. Therefore, the two experiments show that it is indeed the change in the US systematic
reaction that caused the change in the impulse response functions of inflation and output gap in
the Eurozone.15
15Note that the results are the same for US CPI inflation and the output gaps of both countries. I do not present them here, in order
to save space.
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Figure 2: VAR Counterfactual Exercise
Panel (a): Experiment 1 - Changes only in US interest rate equation coefficients
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Panel (b): Experiment 2 - Changes only in US GDP and Euro CPI equation coefficients
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Notes: Red dotted line: Impulse responses from Sample 2. Blue dashed line: Counterfactual impulse responses.
Black solid line: impulse responses from Sample 1.
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2.3.3 Robustness checks
In order to check the sensitivity of the results found so far, various robustness exercises are
implemented. The first one considers alternative measures for the output gap. The procedure
followed is similar to that in CGG (2000). In particular, instead of using the hp-filter, the output
gap was measured as the deviation of log industrial output from a fitted quadratic function of time.
The results do not differ significantly.16 Both the AIC and the BIC information criteria show that
two is the optimal choice of lags in the VAR model. The parameter stability tests do not differ
significantly from those reported at table 1 above. The Andrews-Ploberger test locates a break in
the parameters in the Federal Funds rate equation in June 2004, as was the case when the hp-filter
was used. However, what seems to change now is the coefficients only on the lags of the Euro-rate
at 1% significance level. The coefficients on the rest the parameters remain unchanged.17 The LM
test for ARCH effects provides the same results as before. That is, only the the variance of the
errors in the Euro-rate equation changes at 1% significance level. Finally, the impulse responses
lead to the same conclusion as above. Both the CPI and the output gap in the Eurozone responses
are different in the two sub-samples.
As a second exercise, a more parsimonious SVAR model was constructed. Given that the dataset
is small, it is likely that the impulse responses may not be accurate, the higher the number of the
free parameters to be estimated in matrix A in (1). Therefore, a new SVAR model was estimated
allowing for a31, a32, a75, a76 to be the only free parameters to be estimated. The key results, found
so far, do not change. The impulse responses of the CPI and the the output gap in the Eurozone
show that both are more volatile and persistent in sample 2.18
Moreover, the importance of additional targets in the interest rate rule of both central banks
was tested. That is, it was assumed that the each of rest the variables in the system has a
contemporaneous effect on the interest rate of each region. At first, the strategy followed was to
16I do not show the results of the robustness exercise here, in order to save space.
17Remember that when the hp − filter was used, the Andrews-Ploberger test found that the coefficients on the US and the Euro
CPI, the Eurozone output gap and the real exchange rate change, as well, apart from those on the lags of the Euro-rate.
18Setting a12 = a16 = a52 = a56 = a75 = a76 = 0 has negligible effects on the impulse responses. Setting, though, a14 = a54 = 0
has non-neglible effects on the impulse responses. That is, allowing for a contemporaneous effect of real exchange rate shocks on the
CPI in either country changes the behavior of both the output gap and inflation. In the first sub-sample, the Eurozone output gap is
less volatile after a shock to the RER than when a14, a54 6= 0. The same holds for the Eurozone CPI. In the second subsample, the
Eurozone CPI is much less volatile after a shock to the RER. Following a demand shock, though, the latter is more volatile. The output
gap in the Eurozone is more volatile after a RER shock whenver a14 = a54 = 0. However, as regards the rest of the shocks, the effects
of not allowing for contermporaneous effects of RER shocks to the CPI are negligible. Finally, note that still the main conclusion does
not change. All variables are more volatile in the secong sub-sample.
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test the importance of each of the parameters in matrix A individually, so that to avoid the cost of
loosing degrees of freedom. Then, the case where both banks reacting to foreign variables or the
RER, jointly, was considered. In this case, both central banks achieve a better control of inflation
but only in sample 1. It is enough that only one of the two banks adopts a target for the real
exchange rate. However, the opposite holds in sample 2, where RER targeting does worse than
the initial specification in matrix A0. Reacting to foreign inflation yields non-neglible gains19 to
both regions. But this holds only for sample 1. Moreover, the sign of the initial responses of some
variables, after some shocks, seems to be reversed. When both banks react to the foreign interest
rate, there are significant gains regarding inflation fluctuations, in sample 1, especially after a
monetary policy shock in the Eurozone. On the contrary, this no longer holds in sample 2 where
reacting to the foreign rate seems not preferable. Finally, foreign output gap targeting allows for
lower inflation and output fluctuations in both regions, regardless of the sample.
The possibility, though, of both central banks targeting at the same time foreign variables
and/or the real exchange rate was also considered. The differences with the initial results are
negligible.
2.3.4 A Markov switching interest rate rule for the US
Taking into account the stability test results of section 2.4.1 and given the weakness of the
SVAR models in uncovering a Taylor rule, I now estimate a Markov-switching interest rate rule
for the US. This allows me to explore whether there were indeed changes in the reaction of the
Fed against inflation and output gap fluctuations. The rule is specified as
it = α0(st) + αpi(st)pit + αx(st)xt + εt (2)
where pit is inflation and xt is the output gap. st indicates the monetary policy regime and follows
a two-state Markov chain. The sample I use is the same as that used for the estimation of the
structural VAR model above. Table 4 reports the parameter estimates.
19By gains, I mean lower inflation and output gap fluctuations.
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Table 4: Monetary policy rule estimates
States Hawkish Dovish
st = 1 st = 2
αpi 1.1621 (0.00) 0.3298 (0.05)
αx 1.5640 (0.01) 0.9499 (0.02)
σε 0.555436 0.735924
Log likelihood value = -188.5974. P-values in parentheses
the estimated transition matrix is as follows:
P =
 0.99 0.01
0.01 0.99
 (3)
Figure 3 below plots the estimated transition probabilities for each regime.
Figure 3: Smoothed States Probabilities
Notes: Blue solid line: Dovish (State 2). Green dashed line: Hawkish (State 1).
The estimated Markov-switching Taylor rule shows that the Fed started being hawkish since the
start of the Euro and then switched to be more reluctant to inflation fluctuations from 2005
onwards. The regime change date is very close to what stability tests in section 2.3.1 suggest
about the coefficients in the US interest rate equation. Note that the SVAR model specified
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cannot uncover a Taylor rule. However, the Markov-switching specification in this section does.
Moreover, it ensures that there was indeed a change in the coefficients in the interest rate rule of
the Fed throughout the sample considered.
2.3.5 Key Results
From the empirical analysis above, I keep the following key messages. The first is that there were
changes in US monetary policy since the adoption of the common currency in Europe which have
affected the bahaviour of key macroeconomic variables not only in the US, but also in the Eurozone.
Moreover, this change in US monetary policy has affected the way macroeconomic aggregates react
to various kinds of domestic and foreign shocks. Therefore, changes in the way monetary policy
is conducted in the foreign country (US) have important implications on the behaviour of the
home country (Eurozone) macroeconomic variables, even though domestic monetary policy does
not change. The degree of openness and, hence, terms of trade effects are likely to be one of
the main driving forces for this result. The second is that, there were changes in the behavior of
the private sector, as well. The counterfactual analysis, though, shows that their effect is small
at changing the behavior of inflation and output in either region. Finally, a markov-switching
interest rate rule for the US is in line with the stability tests in the SVAR model and provides
evidence in favour of changes in the coefficients on inflation and output gap. Keeping those facts
I proceed to the construction of a two country DSGE model, in order to explore theoretically
what are the international effects of regime changes in foreign monetary policy. I then solve for
the optimal policy problem of the home Central Bank, conditional on foreign monetary policy
switching regimes over time.
3 The model
3.1 Households
In this section, I specify the structure of the baseline, two country stochastic general equilibrium
model. Each country is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived and identical households in
the interval [0, 1]. Foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk.
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Persistence has been found to be an important feature of output in Eurozone and the US.20
For this reason I introduce endogenous persistence in consumption by assuming that there are
two kinds of households as in Amato and Laubach (2003). Let ψ denote the probability that the
household is able to choose its consumption optimally, and which is independent of the household’s
history. Therefore, by the law of large numbers, in each period a fraction ψ of households will
reoptimise, whereas the remaining fraction 1− ψ will not. The latter will choose its consumption
in period t according to the following rule of thumb
CRt = Ct−1 (4)
where Ct denotes aggregate per capita consumption in period t. The remaining 1−ψ of households
choose COt so as to maximize their utility. Thus, per capita cunsumption in period t is given by
Ct = ψCOt + (1− ψ)CRt (5)
As in Laubach and Amato, this modification to the consumer’s problem is based on the assumption
that it is costly to reoptimise every period21. The households who choose consumption optimally
choose COt to maximize their utility function. They derive utility from consumption and disutility
from labor supply. The utility function, thus, is specified as
Ut = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
(Cs)1−σ
1− σ −
(Ls)1+γ
1 + γ
]
(6)
where σ is the degree of relative risk aversion.
Home agents consume home and foreign goods. Therefore, per capita consumption Ct is a com-
posite consumption index described as
20Smets and Wouters (2005), Sahuc and Smets (2008) and Adjemian et al. (2008) using Bayesian techniques to estimate DSGE
models for the Eurozone and the US find that output persistence in both regions is high.
21Amato and Laubach note that Rule (4) has the important feature that rule-of-thumb consumers learn from optimizing households
with one period delay. Hence, although Rule (4) is not optimal, it has three important properties. First agents are not required to
compute anything. Second, rule-of-thumb households learn from optimizing ones, because last period’s decisions by the latter are part
of Ct−1. Third, the differences between CRt and COt are bounded, and will be zero in the steady state.
75
Ct =
[
δ
1
ρC
ρ−1
ρ
H,t + (1− δ)
1
ρC
ρ−1
ρ
F,t
] ρ
ρ−1
ρ > 1
C∗t =
[
(δ∗)
1
ρ (C∗F,t)
ρ−1
ρ + (1− δ∗) 1ρ (C∗H,t)
ρ−1
ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
(7)
where ρ captures the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods.
δ > 12 is a parameter of home bias in preferences.CH and CF is the home and foreign goods
consumption index respectively, in the home country. In the foreign country C∗H and C∗F is the
home and foreign goods consumption index respectively. Consumption indices in the two countries
are defined as
CH,t =
[´ 1
0 ct(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1 , CF,t =
[´ 1
0 ct(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
C∗H,t =
[´ 1
0 c
∗
t (z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1 , C∗F,t =
[´ 1
0 c
∗
t (z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
(8)
The aggregate consumption price index for the home and foreign country is specified as
Pt =
[
δ(PH,t)1−ρ + (1− δ)P 1−ρF,t
] 1
1−ρ
P ∗t =
[
δ∗(P ∗F,t)1−ρ + (1− δ∗)P ∗H,t1−ρ
] 1
1−ρ
(9)
where PH and PF are price indices for home and foreign goods, expressed in the domestic currency.
The price indices for the home and foreign country are defined as
PH,t =
[´ 1
0 pt(z)
1−θdz
] 1
1−θ , PF,t =
[´ 1
0 pt(z)
1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
P ∗H,t =
[´ 1
0 p
∗
t (z)1−θdz
] 1
1−θ , P ∗F,t =
[´ 1
0 p
∗
t (z)1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
(10)
Capital markets are complete. The consumers of both countries purchase state uncontingent bonds
denominated in the domestic currency, Bt for domestic agents and B∗t for foreign agents at price
Qt. That is Bt denotes the home agent’s holdings of a one period nominal bond paying one unit
of the home currency.
The home agent maximizes her utility subject to the period budget constraint
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PtCt +Qt,t+1Bt+1 = Bt +WtLt + Πt (11)
where Wt is the nominal wage and Πt are nominal profits the individual receives.
3.2 First order conditions
Maximizing the utility function (6) subject to the budget constraint (11) yields the following first
order conditions
Qt,t+1 =
βPt
Pt+1
(
COt
COt+1
)σ
(12)
Lt = (COt )
−σ
γw
1
γ
t (13)
where the first equation is the usual Euler equation while the second determines the labor supply
schedule.
Individual demands for each good i = h, f produced in the home and in the foreign country
respectively are expressed as
ch,t(h) =
(
pht (h)
PH,t
)−θ (
PH,t
Pt
)−ρ
δCt (14)
cf,t(h) =
(
p∗t (h)
PF,t
)−θ (
PF,t
Pt
)−ρ
(1− δ)Ct (15)
3.3 Risk sharing
The fraction of foreign households who choose their consumption optimally (ψ∗) , maximize their
utility subject to their budget constraint specified as
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P ∗t C
∗
t +
Qt,t+1B
∗
t+1
zt
= B
∗
t
zt
+W ∗t L∗t + Π∗t (16)
where zt is the nominal exchange rate defined as the domestic currency price of the foreign currency.
Therefore, the Euler equation from the foreign agent’s maximization problem is
Qt,t+1 =
βP ∗t zt
P ∗t+1zt+1
(
CO∗t
CO∗t+1
)σ
(17)
International financial markets are complete. Domestic and foreign households trade in the state
contingent one period nominal bonds denominated in the domestic currency. Therefore, combining
(12) and (17) , I receive the following optimal risk sharing condition
(
CO∗t
COt
)−σ
= $qt (18)
where $ ≡
(
Cf0 +x
Ch0 +x
)−σ
P0
z0P ∗0
depends on initial conditions and qt = ztP
∗
t
Pt
is the real exchange rate.
3.4 Price setting
There is local currency pricing in both countries. That is, each firm sets one price for its goods
consumed domestically and another for the same good consumed abroad. Prices are sticky with a
price setting behavior a``a Calvo (1983). At each date, each firm changes its price with a probability
1− ω , regardless of the time since it last adjusted its price. The probability of not changing the
price, thus, is ω. The probability of not changing the price in the subsequent s periods is ωs.
Consequently, the price decision at time t determines profits for the next s periods. The price level
for home goods at date t will be defined as
PH,t =
[
ωP 1−θH,t−1 + (1− ω)p˜t(h)1−θ
] 1
1−θ (19)
In the literature on inflation dynamics in the Eurozone and the US its has been found that per-
sistence is one of the key features. Therefore, I introduce endogenous inflation persistence by
assuming that firms that are given the opportunity to adjust their prices will either follow a rule of
thumb (backward looking firms) or will chose the price that maximizes their expected discounted
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profits (forward looking firms), as in Gali et al. (2001). The price p˜t(h) that will be set at date t
is specified as
p˜t(h) = ζpBt (h) + (1− ζ) pFort (h) (20)
where ζ ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of backward looking firms, pBt (h) and pFort (h) is the price set by
the backward and the forward looking firms, respectively. A continuum of firms is assumed for the
home economy indexed by h ∈ [0, 1]. Each firm produces a differentiated good, with a technology
Yt(h) = AtLt(h) (21)
where At is a country specific productivity shock at date t which is assumed to follow a log
stationary process
The structure of productivity shocks across the two countries receives the following form
 αt
α∗t
 =
 ραt ραtα∗t
ρα∗tαt ρα∗t

 αt−1
α∗t−1
+
 εα,t
ε∗α∗,t

where
 εα,t
ε∗α∗,t
 ∼ N(0,Σ2), with Σ2 =
 σ2εa 0
0 σ2ε∗
α∗
.
Backward looking firms.
Backward looking firms set their prices according to the following rule
pBt (h) = PH,t−1 + piH,t−1 and pB∗t (h) = P ∗H,t−1 + pi∗H,t−1 (22)
Forward looking firms.
Forward looking firms set their prices by maximizing their expected discounted profits. Their
maximization problem comprises of two decisions. The one concerns the price for the domestic
market and the other the price charged in the foreign market, when it exports. Hence their
maximization problem is described as
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maxEt
∞∑
s=0
ωsQt,t+s
{
p˜t(h)yht+s(h) + εtp˜t∗(h)y
f
t+s(h)−W ht+sLht+s
}
(23)
where yit(h), i = h, f is the demand for the home good for home and foreign agents specified as
yht (pt(h)) =
(
p˜t(h)
PH,t
)−θ (
PH,t
Pt
)−ρ
δ∗Ct, (24)
yft (p∗t (h)) =
(
p˜∗t (h)
P ∗H,t
)−θ (P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−ρ
(1− δ∗)C∗t (25)
The firm maximizes its objective function (23) subject to (24) in order to find the optimal price
for the home good in the home economy. It maximizes subject to (25), in order to find the optimal
price for the home good in the foreign economy. The firm chooses a price for the home good in
the home economy that satisfies the first order condition
Et
∞∑
s=0
ωsQt,t+syt+s(pt(h))
{
pt(h)− θ
θ − 1MCt+s
}
= 0
where MCt+s = Wt+sAt+s denotes the nominal marginal cost and
θ
θ−1 captures the optimal markup.
The optimal price for the home good in the home country is specified as
pt(h) =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+sMCt+sy
h
t+s(pt(h))
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+syht+s(pt(h))
(26)
Respectively, the optimal price for the home good in the foreign country is specified as
p∗t (h) =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+sMCt+sy
f
t+s(p∗t (h))
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+sy
f
t+s(p∗t (h))zt+s
(27)
Aggregate price level
Dividing (19) by PH,t−1:
Π1−θH,t = ω + (1− ω)
(
p˜t(h)
PH,t−1
)1−θ
(28)
where ΠH,t ≡ PH,tPH,t−1 .
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Similarly, for the foreign goods consumed in the home economy:
Π1−θF,t = ω + (1− ω)
(
p˜t(f)
PF,t−1
)1−θ
(29)
The aggregate price level dynamics are specified, thus, as
Π1−ρt = δ
[(
PH,t−1
Pt−1
)
ΠH,t
]1−ρ
+ (1− δ)
[(
PF,t−1
Pt−1
)
ΠF,t
]1−ρ
(30)
4 Markov Switching Monetary Policy
Monetary policy in each country is conducted through nominal interest rate rules by each central
bank. Only foreign monetary policy is assumed to switch regimes over time. I first show that
even though domestic monetary policy does not change its policy, a switch in the foreign monetary
policy has important effects on home domestic output and inflation. In section 8, it is shown that
optimal monetary policy for the home country suggests it changes the coefficients in its interest rate
rule, depending on which regime foreign monetary policy lies in and, of course, on the probabilities
of a switch.
4.1 Policy rules
In this subsection I describe how Markov switching is introduced into the model. A markov
swtiching interest rate rule for the foreign country is specified as
i∗t = i
∗ρ∗st
t−1
(
ξ∗st
(
pi∗t
p˜i∗
)φ∗
pi∗,st
y˜
∗φ∗
y∗,st
t
)1−ρ∗st
eε
∗
t (31)
where st captures the realized policy regime taking values 1 or 2. Regime follows a Markov
process with transition probabilities pji = P [st = i|st−1 = j], where i, j = 1, 2. ξt is a scale
parameter, p˜i∗ is the inflation target and y˜∗t is the output gap. This specification implies that
the policy maker and the private sector does not observe the current regime. Therefore, private
sector expectations about future inflation, for example, are specified as E
[
pit+1|Ω−st
]
, where Ω−st =
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{
st−1, . . . , εt, εt−1, . . . , ε∗t , ε
∗
t−1, . . .
}
captures its information set. Having assumed a two regime
markov process for monetary policy, the transition probability matrix P receives the form
P =
 p11 p12
p21 p22

where p11 measures the probability of staying at date t in regime 1 and p12 the probability of
moving to regime 2 at date t while being in regime 1 at date t− 1. p22 measures the probability of
staying in regime 2 at date t and p21 the probability of moving to regime 1 at date t while being
in regime 2 at date t− 1.
Monetary policy may switch because of various reasons. One of them could be the switch of the
interests of the central banker. There may be periods, for example, that he is more interested in
output gap fluctuations rather than inflation. As a result, the weight on inflation in the interest
rate rule could be lower. A monetary policy switch may also be justified by the change of the
central banker. As already mentioned, there is a number of papers arguing that the US monetary
policy has been more tolerant as regards inflation fluctuations in the pre-Volcker period.
The empirical findings in section 2 showed that there was a change in impulse response functions
and the volatility of inflation in the Eurozone, even though the monetary policy of the latter
remained unchanged. I keep this finding, at first, and assume that the interest rate of home
central bank has time invariant coefficients. A standard Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing
is adopted which can be summarized as
it = iρt−1
((
pit
p˜i
)φpi
y˜
φy
t
)1−ρ
eεt (32)
5 Log linearized model
A log linearized version of the relationships found in the previous section serves in providing a way
to deal with the problem of no closed form solution. The model is loglinearized around a specific
steady state. Given the markov-switching nature of the model, it is necessary to provide the
necessary and sufficient conditions which guarantee that the steady state of the model is unique,
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and, thus, independent of regime changes. This can be summarized in the following proposition,
which is a simple extension to that in Liu, Waggoner and Zha (2008) for the closed economy case
Proposition: The steady state equilibrium values of aggregate output, consumption and
the real wage in both countries are independent of monetary policy and are thus invariant
to monetary policy regime shifts. Moreover, as long as domestic monetary policy does
not change regimes, it is enough that
ξ∗st =
1
β
p˜i∗y¯∗−φ
∗
y∗,st ,
where y¯∗ is the steady state foreign output gap, so that the steady state nominal variables
are given by pi = p˜i, pi∗ = p˜i∗, R = λ
β
p˜i and R∗ = λ∗
β
p˜i∗, and which are independent of
regime changes as well.
Proof. See appendix E. 
5.1 Supply side
I use a first order Taylor approximation around the steady state of zero inflation rate. Log linearized
variables are denoted with a hat.
After loglinearizing the first order condition (12), the production function (21) the demand sched-
ules faced by each firm (24) and (25) and optimal price setting rules (26) and (27), I receive the
two relations describing the domestically consumed home goods inflation rate and the respective
of the home goods consumed in the foreign country
piH,t = bpiH,−1piH,t−1 + bpi∗H,−1pi
∗
H,t−1 + βEtpiH,t+1 + bpi∗Hpi
∗
H,t + bCCˆt + . . .
. . .+ bT Tˆt + bT ∗Tˆ ∗t + bq qˆt + baat (33)
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pi∗H,t = bpiH,−1piH,t−1 + bpi∗H,−1pi
∗
H,t−1 + βEtpi∗H,t+1 + b∗piHpiH,t + b
∗
CCˆt + . . .
. . .+ b∗T Tˆt + b∗T ∗Tˆ ∗t + b∗q qˆt + b∗aat (34)
where Tt = PF,tPH,t and T
∗
t =
P ∗H,t
P ∗F,t
denote relative prices in the home and foreign country respectively.
The log linearized aggregate price level relation (30) is specified as
pit = piH,t + (1− δ)(piF,t − piH,t) (35)
which can be further simplified as22
pit = piH,t + (1− δ)∆Tˆt
5.2 Demand side
In this section I proceed to the loglinearization of the Euler equation
CˆOt = κ(it − Etpit+1) + EtCˆOt+1 (36)
where κ = − 1
σ
, and using (5) the Euler equation receives the forward form, which includes both
backward and forward looking elements
Cˆt =
κψ
2− ψ (it − Etpit+1) +
1
2− ψEtCˆt+1 +
1− ψ
2− ψCˆt−1 (37)
Goods market clearing assumes the following two conditions
Y = CH + C∗H +Gt and Y ∗ = CF + C∗F +G∗t
where Gt and G∗t capture government expenditures for home and foreign country respectively,
assumed to follow an exogenous stationary AR(1) process gt = ρggt−1 +εg,t and g∗t = ρg∗g∗t−1 +ε∗g,t,
εg,t ∼ N(0, σ2εg) and ε∗g,t ∼ N(0, σ∗2εg ).
22To end up to that expression, I used equation Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + piF,t − piH,t for the relative price which is reported later in the text.
84
Combining equation (35) and the market clearing conditions, I derive the aggregate demand equa-
tion:
Yˆt = η1Yˆt−1 + η2EtYˆt+1 + η3(it − Etpit+1) + η4qˆt + η5qˆt+1 + η6qˆt−1 + . . .
. . .+ η7∆Tˆt + η8Et∆Tˆt+1 + η9∆Tˆ ∗t + η10Et∆Tˆ ∗t+1 (38)
where ηi , i = 1, .., 9 are defined in detail in appendix F.
5.3 Real exchange rate and relative prices
The real exchange rate dynamics are specified by the following relationship
∆qˆt = ∆zt + pi∗t − pit (39)
In the home country the price of imported goods relative to that of home goods is specified as
Tt = PF,tPH,t , whereas in the foreign country the relative price of home exported goods to foreign
goods is specified as T ∗t =
P ∗H,t
P ∗F,t
. Loglinearizing those two expressions we receive the following
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + piF,t − piH,t Tˆ ∗t = Tˆ ∗t−1 + pi∗H,t − pi∗F,t
5.4 Flexible price equilibrium
At the flexible price equilibrium firms adjust their prices in each period. Each firm will set its
marginal cost equal to the optimal marginal cost (i.e. −log
(
θ
θ−1
)
) which is constant over time and
equal across firms. Since firms adjust their prices every period, monetary policy will not have any
real effects into the economy. The real marginal cost is specified by the following equations
mct = −log
(
θ
θ − 1
)
= −µ
mct = wt − αt − ν
where wt is the real wage, αt (log) productivity and ν a subsidy to labor.23 Solving for the case
with flexible prices, I receive the following set of equations describing the equilibrium processes for
23This subsidy serves in rendering the flexible price equilibrium efficient. This is achieved by setting the subsidy equal to the mark-up
(i.e. ν = µ), in order to remove the distortion associated with monopolistic competition.
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output, consumption, labor, real interest rate24, given by:
ynt = ψcc¯t−1 + ψζζ + ψaαt + ψa∗α∗t + ψggt + ψg∗g∗t (40)
cnt = ψ˜cc¯t−1 + ψζζ +
(
γδ∗ + σ
δ(γ + σ)− γ(1− δ∗)
)
ψααt −
(γ
σ
ψα∗
)
α∗t −
(γ
σ
ψg
)
gt −
(γ
σ
ψg∗
)
g∗t (41)
lnt = ψ˜cc¯t−1 + ψζζ +
(
γ(δ∗(1− σ)− (1− δ))− σ(1− δ)ψα
δ(γ + σ)− γ(1− δ∗)
)
αt − ψa∗α∗t + ψggt + ψg∗g∗t (42)
rnt =
˜˜ψcc¯t−1+
(
(γδ∗ + σ)(1− ρa)ψa
κδ(γ + σ)− γ(1− δ∗)
)
αt−
(
γ(1− ρa∗)ψa∗
κσ
)
α∗t −
(
γ(1− ρg)ψg
κσ
)
gt−
(
γ(1− ρg∗)ψg∗
κσ
)
g∗t (43)
5.5 Welfare
The Central Bank sets the interest rate in such a way to minimize a measure of social loss de-
rived by a second order Taylor expansion to the consumer’s utility function as in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1998), Amato and Laubach (2003), Pappa (2004) and Benigno and Benigno (2006). It
is summarized as25
Wt = −12ucCΞ{λ1(Yˆt − ynt )2 + λ2(Yˆ ∗t − y∗nt )2 + λ3(qˆt − qnt )2 + λ4∆qˆ2t + λ5∆Yˆ ∗t 2 + λ6∆Yˆt2 + . . .
+pi2H,t + λ7(piH,t − piH,t−1)2 + λ8(pi∗H,t)2 + λ9(pi∗H,t − pi∗H,t−1)2 + λ10(qˆt + Yˆt)2 + λ11(qˆt + Yˆ ∗t )2 + . . .
λ12(qˆt−1 + Yˆt)2 + λ13(qˆt−1 + Yˆ ∗t )2 + λ13(qˆt−1 + Yˆ ∗t )2 + . . .
λ14(Yˆ ∗t−1 − y∗nt−1)(qˆt−1 − qnt−1) + λ15(yt−1 − ynt−1)(y∗t−1 − y∗nt−1) + λ16(Cˆt − cnt )(qˆt − qnt ) + . . .
λ17(Yˆt + Yˆ ∗t−1)2 + λ18(Yˆt−1 + Yˆ ∗t )2 + λ19(Yˆt−1 − ynt−1)(qt−1 − qnt−1) + . . .
+λ20(Yˆ ∗t − Yˆ ∗nt )(Yˆ ∗t−1− Yˆ ∗nt−1) +λ21(Yˆ ∗t−1 + qˆt)2 +λ22(Yˆt−1 + qˆt)2 +λ23(Yˆt−1− ynt−1)(qˆt−1− qnt−1) + . . .
λ24(Cˆ∗t−1−c∗nt−1)(qˆt−1−qnt−1)+λ25(qˆt−qnt )(qˆt−1−qnt−1)+λ26(Yˆt−1−ynt−1)(Yˆt−ynt )+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3) (44)
where the coefficients λi, i = 1, ..., 21 are functions of the structural parameters.
24The flexible price expression for the real exchange rate can be easily derived using the risk sharing condition.
25The derivation of the loss function is given in detail in the Appendix G.
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6 Model Solution
Given the Markov-Switching structure of the model, standard solution techniques cannot be applied
in order to find a solution. In the recent literature on markov-swithing DSGE models, various
alternative techniques for solving such models have been suggested (Farmer, Waggoner and Zha,
2011; Farmer, Waggoner and Zha, 2008; Davig and Leeper, 2007; Svensson and Williams, 2005).
The technique I use is that of Farmer, Waggoner and Zha (2011). The virtue of that technique is
that it is able to find all possible minimal state variable (MSV) solutions. Moreover, the algorithm
is able to find whether the MSV solution is stationary (mean square stable) in the sense of Costa,
Fragoso and Marques (2004).26 The model can be written in the following state space form
A(st)Xt = B(st)Xt−1 + Ψ(st)εt + Π(st)ηt (45)
where Xt = [yt+1, y∗t+1, piH,t+1, pi∗H,t+1, piF,t+1, pi∗F,t+1, qt, zt+1, Tt+1, Tt, yt, y∗t , piH,t, . . .
. . . , pi∗H,t, piF,t, pi
∗
F,t, qt−1, zt, T
∗
t+1, T
∗
t , it, i
∗
t , at, a
∗
t ], εt is a 6 × 1 vector of i.i.d. stationary exogenous
shocks and ηt is an 8× 1 vector of endogenous random variables.
According to that technique the MSV equilibrium of the model takes the form
Xt = g1,stXt−1 + g2,stεt (46)
In order for the above minimal state variable solution to be stationary it must be that the the
eigenvalues of
(P ⊗ I242)diag [Γ1 ⊗ Γ1,Γ2 ⊗ Γ2] (47)
where Γj = A(j)Vj for j = 1, 2. And where Vj is a 24 × 10 matrix resulting from the Schur
decomposition of A(j)−1B(j). In the present model the largest eigenvalue was found to be equal
to 0.9174, implying, thus, that the MSV solution is stationary. The impulse responses and the
moments of the variables of interest are then derived from that stationary solution.
26For an extensive argument regarding the merits of the solution technique used in this paper over the alternative ones see Farmer et
al. (2011) and the references therein.
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7 Parameterization
In this section, the model is simulated so that to explore what regime switching implies about the
dynamic behavior of the key macroeconomic variables. In order to make my argument clearer the
impulse responses of inflation and output are compared to those when there is no regime switching,
as in Liu et al. (2009). Throughout this section I assume that it is only the foreign central bank
switching regimes. The home central bank is assumed to commit to the Taylor rule, independently
of what the foreign central bank does. Therefore, whenever I refer to the hawkish regime, I mean
an inflation coefficient in the interest rate rule of the foreign central bank that is greater than one.
Whenever I refer to the dovish regime, I mean an inflation coefficient in the interest rate rule of
the foreign country that is less than one.
Since it is only the foreign central bank that switches regimes in its monetary policy I have to
choose four different parameters for its interest rate rule, depending on the regime. The values
assigned are those from the Markov-switching interest rate rule for the the US estimated in section
2. That is, φ∗pi,1 = 1.1621 , φ∗pi,2 = 0.3298, φ∗x,1 = 1.5640 , φ∗x,2 = 0.9499. I also assume some interest
rate smoothing with ρ∗1 = ρ∗2 = 0.627.
As far as the rest of the parameters in the model are concerned, they are regime invariant.
Those parameters are the subjective discount factor β, the degree of relative risk aversion σ, the
elasticity of substitution between goods produced domestically θ, the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods ρ, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1/γ, the degree of price
stickiness for the home and the foreign country respectively ω and ω∗, the fractions of rule of
thumb firms for each country ζ and ζ∗, the fractions of rule of thumb consumers 1−ψ and 1−ψ∗,
the home bias parameters δ and δ∗ and the coefficients on the home country interest rate rule
φpi, φx and ρi. The values of the parameters are chosen according to the existing empirical and
theoretical literature in models similar to mine. They are summarized at table 5.
27Note that the results presented in this section hold also for ρ1 = ρ2 = 0
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Table 5: Parameter Values
Structural Parameters
β 0.99
σ 1.5
θ 10 (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 2000)
ρ 3 (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 2000)
γ 3 (Pappa, 2004)
ω = ω∗ 0.75 (Adjemian, Paries & Smets, 2008)
δ = δ∗ 0.67
ζ = ζ∗ 0.5 (Adjemian, Paries & Smets, 2008)
ψ = ψ∗ 0.4 (Adjemian, Paries & Smets, 2008)
Policy Rule Coefficients
Home
φpi = 1.5 φy = 0.5 ρ = 0.75
Foreign
Regime 1: φ∗pi∗,1 = 1.1621 φ∗y∗,1 = 1.5640 ρ∗1 = 0.6
Regime 2: φ∗pi∗,2 = 0.3298 φ∗y∗,2 = 0.9499 ρ∗2 = 0.6
Probabilities
p11 = 0.99 p22 = 0.99
7.1 Impulse responses
To gauge how the possibility of a future switch in foreign monetary affects the dynamics of the
macroeconomic variables in the home country, I compute the impulse responses in the Markov-
switching model following a one standard deviation monetary policy shock in both countries.28 In
order to emphasize the importance of expectation effects, the impulse responses from the regime
switching model (red dashed line) are compared to those from the constant parameter model (blue
solid line).29
28The results reported in this section hold for demand and productivity shocks in either country as well. I do not report them in
order to save space.
29As already mentioned, by constant parameter, I mean the absorbing state, i.e. when there is a zero probability of switching to
another regime.
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Figure 4: Home and Foreign inflation responses to a MP shock
(a) Home CPI
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(b) Foreign CPI
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Notes: The red dashed line impulse responses are from the Markov switching model. The blue solid line responses
are from the constant parameter model. Impulse responses in the hawkish regime are illustrated on the left panel
in each graph. Impulse responses in the dovish regime are illustrated on the right panel in each graph.
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In figure 4 the impulse responses of the CPI rate are plotted for each of the two regimes. As it
is evident, inflation responses, in both countries are dampened30 in the dovish regime when the
probability of a switch to the hawkish regime becomes non zero (red dashed line) after both a
home and a foreign monetary policy shock. Inflation fluctuates at considerably lower levels than in
the absorbing state (blue line). This change in the behavior of inflation is due to the expectations
formation effect. Agents in both countries assign a positive probability on the foreign monetary
policy becoming hawkish, affecting, the behavior of inflation in the home (and the foreign) country.
Home and foreign inflation are better controlled. As far as home inflation is concerned, this result
is brought about solely, by home agents expectations, without any change in the policy of the
home central bank. This is one of the key results in this paper.
Result 1: In the dovish regime, the response of home inflation to monetary policy shocks
is dampened. This result is purely expectations driven and independent of monetary policy
in the home country. It is enough, that agents in the home country assign a positive
probability on the foreign monetary policy becoming hawkish in the future, while it being
currently dovish.
On the other hand, there is an amplifying effect on inflation in the hawkish regime. Inflation
responses in both countries seem to be slightly amplified. It is evident that the stabilizing effect,
generated in the dovish regime, is stronger than the amplifying effect. This can be observed by
looking at the distance between the red dashed and the blue solid impulse responses in the hawkish
and the dovish regime, respectively. However, as I am showing later, this does not imply that the
overall stabilizing effect on either home or foreign inflation is stronger than the amplifying effect.
Note also, the asymmetry in the responses of inflation in each regime, for both countries. This
is because of the asymmetry in expectation effects which arises because of the existence of the
hawkish regime. The latter is strong enough, so that to make the stabilizing effect stronger than
the amplifying. Additionally, the possibility of a future switch to hawkish regime helps anchor
agent’s expectations (Liu et al., 2009).
30From now on, I will use the term “stabilizing effect” for the case where the effects of a shock, as measured by the impulse responses,
are dampened, and the term “amplifying effect” when the effects of a shock are amplified.
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Figure 5: Home and Foreign output responses to a MP shock
(a) Home output
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(b) Foreign output
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Notes: The red dashed line impulse responses are from the Markov switching model. The blue solid line responses
are from the constant parameter model. Impulse responses in the hawkish regime are illustrated on the left panel
in each graph. Impulse responses in the dovish regime are illustrated on the right panel in each graph.
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The same reasoning applies to output responses, illustrated in figure 5. Output impulse re-
sponses in both countries exhibit a pattern similar to those of inflation. Following a home or
foreign monetary policy shock Output in either country is clearly less volatile in the dovish regime
for a positive probability of moving to the hawkish regime (red dashed line). Home and foreign
output responses, in the dovish regime, are dampened, while they are amplified in the hawkish
regime compared to the constant parameter case (blue solid lines). The stabilizing effect is clearly
stronger. Home output fluctuations are controlled better when home agents attach a positive
probability to the foreign monetary policy becoming hawkish in the future, while being currently
dovish.
The conclusion drawn until here concerns the two monetary policy shocks only. The dynamics
of the model are rich enough and one cannot derive any inference by focusing only on one shock.
In order to make this point clearer, I compute the changes in volatilities on inflation and output
relative to the absorbing state, at table 6 below.
Table 6: Inflation and Output relative volatilities
Inflation Output Losses
Home Foreign Home Foreign Home Foreign
Hawkish 1.1714 1.7205 1.2709 1.3255 1.6289 1.4633
Dovish 0.7078 0.4495 0.7456 0.7455 0.5610 0.4942
Table 6 shows that there are significant decreases in inflation and output volatility, relative to
the absorbing state (i.e. no regime switching case), when foreign monetary policy is dovish. In
particular, home country’s inflation is 0.7078 times or approximately 30% lower than in the case
where the probability of staying in the dovish regime is one. This fall is larger for the foreign
country, 0.45 times or 55% lower. On the other hand, a positive probability of a switch to the
dovish regime increases home inflation relative to the absorbing state by 17%, while foreign inflation
is increased by 72%. The stabilizing effect, thus, on home inflation is much stronger than the
amplifying effect. The opposite hods for foreign inflation, where the amplifying effect is much
stronger than the stabilizing.
The overall amplifying effect seems to dominate in output fluctuations, as well. In particular,
93
home output is 27% more volatile in the hawkish regime relative to the absorbing state, while it is
25% less volatile in the dovish regime. Foreign output is 33% more volatile in the hawkish regime
and 25% less volatile in the dovish regime.
Markov-switching closed economy models examine the effectiveness of regime switching mone-
tary policy by looking at the change in volatilities of inflation and output only. Given the structure
of those models, judging such a policy relying on changes in volatility, or on changes in a welfare
measure leads to the same conclusions. In an open economy model, as the one in this paper, judg-
ing Markov-switching monetary policy by simply looking at the changes in volatilies of inflation
and output could lead to the wrong conclusions. As the welfare measure (42) shows the dynamics
in the model are far more rich than those in a closed economy model. Therefore, alternative poli-
cies would be better compared based on an appropriate welfare measure, rather than by observing
changes in volatilities of some variables. I use the relative changes in the welfare measure (42) as a
guide, in order to figure out whether Markov-switching monetary policy generates strong enough
stabilizing effects31 for both economies. As is clear in table 6, the relative fall in home welfare loss
in the dovish regime is smaller, in absolute terms, than its relative increase in the hawkish regime.
In particular, in the dovish regime, a non-zero probability of a switch to the hawkish regime causes
home welfare loss to be 0.5610 times or approximately 44% lower relative to the absorbing state.
On the other hand, it is 1.6289 times or 63% higher relative to the absorbing state, in the hawkish
regime. Foreign welfare loss rises by 46% in the hawkish regime, and falls by approximately 50%
in the dovish regime, relative to the absorbing state. The above results can be summarized as
follows.
Result 2: Markov switching monetary policy in the foreign country generates a stabiliz-
ing (dovish regime) and an amplifying (hawkish regime) effect on output and inflation.
The stabilizing effect is stronger than the amplifying effect for home inflation. As regards
home output and foreign inflation and output, the amplifying effect is stronger
31By strong enough stabilizing effects, I mean that the latter is much stronger than the amplifying effects, that is effects caused by
the increase in volatility relative to the absorbing state in the hawkish regime.
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Result 3: The overall stabilizing effects are stronger in the foreign country and weaker
in the home, in terms of the welfare measure (44).
So far I have shown that changes in the volatilities and the impulse responses of key macroeconomic
variables of the home country may be caused by changes in the way monetary policy is conducted
in the foreign country only. In figures 6 and 7 below I show the simulated paths of inflation in each
country. The model was simulated for 140 periods allowing for a random date of regime switching
in foreign monetary policy. I assume that the initial regime is the hawkish. The regime changing
date is 60 (switch to the dovish regime). For convenience a green dotted vertical line is drawn on
the regime changing date. In the upper panel in both figures, along with inflation in the MSDSGE
model (red line) I plot home (foreign) inflation, had foreign monetary policy stayed in the hawkish
regime forever (blue solid line). In the bottom panel inflation in the MSDGE model (red dashed
line) is compared to inflation, had foreign monetary policy been always dovish (blue solid line).
As the upper panel in figure 5 illustrates, inflation in the home country appears to be fluctuating
within a wider band while still being in regime 1. On the regime change date (period 60) home
inflation jumps well above the blue solid line. It keeps fluctuating at higher levels compared to its
behaviour in the constant parameter case, the only exception being from period 80 until 110 where
its behaviour resembles that in the no regime switching case. The higher volatility of home inflation
is due the expectations formation effect. As the probability of a switch in foreign monetary policy
rises, inflation in the hawkish regime starts to fluctuate more. This implies that the home Central
Bank should change its policy as well, in order to eliminate as much as possible the additional
volatility on domestic inflation.
At the lower panel in figure 6, inflation in the MSDGE model (red dashed line) is illustrated
along with inflation when the dovish regime is the absorbing state (blue solid line). Home inflation
in the regime switching case resembles that in the constant parameter. From the regime change
date, its behaviour changes. It fluctuates at slightly higher levels than the absorbing state until
period 90, but from that period onwards it fluctuates at consistently lower levels. This is because
home agents incorporate in their expectations the probability of a switch to the hawkish regime
in foreign monetary policy.
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Figure 6: Home inflation
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Notes: Top panel: Blue solid line: home inflation when the foreign central bank is hawkish forever. Red dashed
line: home inflation in the Markov switching model. Bottom panel: Blue solid line: home inflation when the foreign
central bank is dovish forever. Red dashed line: home inflation in the Markov switching model.
The path of foreign inflation is shown in figure 7. At the top panel, foreign inflation fluctuates
within a slightly wider region for most of the period in regime 1 (i.e. until date 60). As already
mentioned, the reason for this effect is the expectation formation effect becoming stronger as the
probability of a regime switch increases and as the regime change date approaches. From date 60
onwards (Regime 2), foreign inflation keeps fluctuating at a constatly wider region than otherwise.
Again the blue solid line shows how inflation fluctuates when the foreign central bank stays in the
hawkish regime forever. The red dashed line shows how inflation behaves when the foreign central
bank switches from being hawkish to dovish. Notice in regime 1 (hawkish) the effect on foreign
inflation dynamics of the positive probability of a switch to the dovish regime. Inflation falls until
period 30. But after that period it is constantly higher than in the constant parameter case. When
foreign monetary policy switches to the dovish regime, foreign inflation is more volatile than in
the absorbing state.
On the other hand, foreign inflation is considerably stabilized relative to the case where the
foreign Central Bank is always dovish, as is shown in the bottom panel of figure 6. The red dashed
line fluctuates at a narrower band than the blue line.
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Figure 7: Foreign inflation
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Notes: Top panel: Blue solid line: foreign inflation when the foreign central bank is hawkish forever. Red dashed
line: foreign inflation in the Markov switching model. Bottom panel: Blue solid line: foreign inflation when the
foreign central bank is dovish forever. Red dashed line: foreign inflation in the Markov switching model.
7.2 Alternative interest rate rules.
Having analyzed the effects of foreign policy regime switching under standard Taylor rules, I turn
now the focus to alternative rules. I allow for different or additional targets in the home country’s
interest rate rule. In particular, I first look at what PPI instead of CPI inflation targeting implies
for the home country. Second, I examine the importance of having a real exchange rate target
in the home interest rate rule. Third, I introduce foreign variables in the rule. Throughout this
section I assume that the interest rate rule of the foreign country is exactly the same as it was in
the previous section. That is, the foreign Central Bank keeps targeting foreign CPI and output
gap.
Targeting PPI inflation.
When a CPI target is replaced by a target for PPI the interest rate rule of the home central bank
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is specified as
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) (φpiHpiH,t + φyy˜t) (48)
As a first exercise, I compare the performance of rule (48) to the benchmark rule in which the
home central bank targets CPI inflation and the output gap.
Table 7: Inflation and Output relative volatilities (Rule (48) vs Benchmark)
Inflation (CPI) Output Losses
Home Foreign Home Foreign Home Foreign
Hawkish 0.9532 0.7746 0.9610 0.9282 0.9212 0.9588
Dovish 0.9887 0.9101 0.9431 0.9225 0.8830 1.0067
The result from table 7 show that it is better for the home country to target PPI rather than CPI
inflation.32 Home loss is lower by 8% in the hawkish regime and 12% in the dovish. Foreign loss
in the hawkish regime is lower compared to that under the benchmark rule where CPI inflation
is targeted by the home Central Bank. On the other hand foreign loss is almost unchanged in
the dovish regime. Home output and CPI inflation are marginally less volatile in both regimes.
The foreign country has considerable benefits regarding CPI inflation volatility in the hawkish
regime. Foreign inflation volatility is 0.7746 times lower in the hawkish and 0.9101 times lower in
the dovish regime.
The intuition behind the results above is that, by targeting home PPI inflation, the home
central bank isolates the latter from the effects of additional volatility in CPI inflation resulting
from higher volatility in imported goods inflation (piF,t). Imported goods inflation is more volatile
in both regimes, by 1.0378 in the hawkish and by 1.0192 in the dovish. Which effect will dominate
depends also on the degree of openness of the home country. Not surprisingly, with a degree
of home bias in consumption equal to 0.67, the stabilizing effect on home PPI in both regime
dominates, leading to lower volatility in CPI inflation.
Lower home output volatility is justified by the lower volatility in the home real interest rate in
both regimes. In particular, it is 0.9203 times less volatile in the hawkish regime and 0.9165 less
volatile in the dovish regime.
32The coefficients in rule (46) are exactly the same as in the baseline calibration, that is φpiH = 1.5, φy = 0.5 and ρ = 0.6.
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Targeting the Real Exchange Rate.
I now extend the benchmark interest rate rule of the home Central Bank by adding a real exchange
rate target. The rule has the following form
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) (φpipiH,t + φyy˜t + φqqt) (49)
As above, I compare the performance of rule (49) to that used in the baseline calibration.33 Note,
though, the substantial differences between rule (49) and the Taylor rule in the baseline calibration.
In the former, the home Central Bank targets the home PPI inflation and the real exchange rate.34
The only common feature is the output gap target.
Table 8: Inflation and Output relative volatilities (Rule (49) vs Benchmark)
Inflation (CPI) Output Losses
Home Foreign Home Foreign Home Foreign
Hawkish 0.9097 0.6770 0.9244 0.8915 0.8518 0.8904
Dovish 0.9978 0.8586 0.9421 0.9060 0.8743 1.1126
When the home central bank targets the home PPI inflation along with a target for the real ex-
change rate the benefits in terms of welfare losses, compared to the benchmark case, are significant.
Home loss is almost 15% lower in the hawkish regime and approximately 13% lower in the dovish
regime relative to the Taylor rule. The main driving force for the lower volatility in both regimes
seems to be the real exchange rate. The latter is almost 7% less volatile in the hawkish regime, and
43% less volatile in the dovish. The most crucial conclusion from rule (49) is that the amplifying
effects of a possibility of a switch to the dovish regime in the future are considerably decreased.
Targeting foreign variables.
One of the important questions in open economy monetary economics has been that of whether
central banks should target foreign variables or not. Empirically, it seems that such targets can
provide the central banks some information in order to control better the overall volatility in the
domestic economy (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998). One may question the implementability
of such rules. Targeting foreign variables implies that the home Central Bank has sufficient in-
33The coefficient on the real exchange rate is φq = 0.1.
34The performance of rule (47) with a CPI inflation target, instead, was also checked. The accrued benefits, however, were negligible.
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formation about those, so that to be sure about which direction should it move its instrument.
Additionally, in practice, it is not even certain the size and the sign of the effect such variables have
on domestic economy. I, however, abstract from this criticism by sticking to the initial assumptions
of the model. The class of such rules considered receive the following form35
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) (φpipit + φyy˜t + φy∗ y˜∗t ) (50)
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) (φpipit + φyy˜t + φpi∗pi∗t ) (51)
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) (φpipit + φyy˜t +
p∑
s=0
φi∗,pi
∗
t−s) (52)
The results for the performance of each of the above interest rate rules above are summarized at
table 9 below
Table 9: Inflation and Output relative volatilities (vs Benchmark)
Inflation (CPI) Output Losses
Home Foreign Home Foreign Home Foreign
Rule 50 φy∗ = −0.1
Hawkish 0.8508 0.3928 0.7775 0.6716 0.6033 0.6407
Dovish 0.9879 0.7395 0.8269 0.7264 0.6578 1.1251
Rule 51 φpi∗ = 0.5
Hawkish 0.9371 0.9726 0.9471 0.8988 0.8922 0.9549
Dovish 0.9537 0.8427 0.9737 0.9496 0.9393 1.0918
Rule 52 φi∗,p = −0.1
Hawkish 0.7699 0.3683 0.6045 0.4366 0.3735 0.3037
Dovish 0.9335 0.6651 0.7083 0.5441 0.4846 0.8195
The results at table 9 suggest that rule (52) performs much better than any other alternative rule
considered in this section. Home country’s welfare loss is considerably lower compared to that in
the baseline calibration, in both regimes. Welfare loss of the foreign country is dramatically lower
than under the benchmark interest rate rule in both regimes.
As for output relative volatilities, they are much lower compared to the benchmark case for both
35The coefficients on inflation, the output gap and smoothing are φpi = 1.5, φy = 0.5 and ρ = 0.75.
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countries in both regimes. As regards home inflation it is 7% less volatile in the dovish regime and
23% less volatile in the hawkish. The effects on foreign inflation are more pronounced. The latter
is approximately 63% less volatile in the hawkish regime and 34% less volatile in the dovish.
But the main criterion to judge the overall effects in each country is welfare loss. Since the
latter is considerably lower for both countries, it follows that both benefit when the home Central
Bank adopts rule (52) instead of the standard Taylor rule.
A direct reaction of the home Central Bank to foreign interest rate fluctuations implies higher
weights on both home inflation and output. In fact, by using the UIP condition in rule (52) where
the home Central Bank reacts only contemporaneously to the foreign interest rate, I receive the
following
it = (
ρ
1 + φi∗,0
)it−1 + (1− ρ)
[
φpi
1 + φi∗,0
pit +
φy
1 + φi∗,0
y˜t +
φi∗,0
1 + φi∗,0
∆zˆt+1
]
A negative φi∗,0 implies higher weights on output and inflation, hence a more aggressive reaction
against their fluctuations. As I am showing in the next section, it is optimal for the home central
bank to raise the coefficients on inflation and output as the probability of shifting to the dovish
regime in the future increases.
8 Optimal policy with regime switches
So far in the analysis, the parameters in the interest rate rule of the home country have been
assumed to be constant over time, independently of what the foreign monetary policy is and have
been set arbitrarily, corresponding to the standard Taylor rule suggested by Taylor (1993). In this
section I am looking for the optimal policy conditional on the coefficients in the interest rate rule
of the foreign country. I am not interested in the cooperative allocation.36 In this paper I focus
on the optimal discretionary policy for the home central bank conditional on regime switches in
foreign monetary policy. For this reason, I will make use of dynamic programming techniques.
The algorithm I use is that of Soderlind (1998), but extended to a Markov-switching framework.
36For an example about the cooperative solution in a two-country model see Benigno and Benigno (2006).
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8.1 Formulation
The procedure followed in this section is similar to that in Zampolli (2006). The policy maker
chooses the control it (i.e. the interest rate rule) which minimizes the expected value of the
intertemporal loss function, stated in the previous section and summarized as
∞∑
t=0
βtW (ht, it) (53)
subject to h0, s0 given, and the model describing the economy
ht+1 = A(st+1)ht +B(st+1)it + Cεt+1 t ≥ 0 (54)
where L(ht, it) is the period loss function, β is the discount factor, ht is a 24 × 1 vector of state
variables, it is the control variable (i.e. the interest rate) and εt is a 6 × 1 vector of white noise
shocks with variance covariance matrix Σε and C is a 24× 6
The loss function (42) epxanded by a weight on interest rate stabilization can be conveniently
expressed as follows
W (ht, it) = h
′
tRht + itQit (55)
where R is a 24× 24 positive definite matrix and Q is a scalar. The matrices A and B, as already
mentioned, are stochastic and take on different values depending on the regime st, t = 1, 2.
8.2 The Bellman equation
The policy maker in a markov-switching environment needs to find the interest rate rule that is
state-contigent. This rule describes the way that the control variable, the interest rate, should
be set as a function of both the state variables and the regime occurring at date t. Therefore,
as in Zampolli (2006) a Bellman equation is associated with each regime. In other words, the
policy maker solves her minimization problem conditional on the regime. The regime j dependent
Bellman equation is specified, thus, as follows
V (ht, j) = maxit
{
W (ht, it) + βΣ2i=1pjiEt [V (ht+1, i)]
}
(56)
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where V (ht, j) is a function of the state variables ht, the regime prevailing at date t and represents
the continuation value of the optimal dynamic programming problem at t.
The value function for this problem is
V (ht, j) = h
′
tPjht + dj, j = 1, 2 (57)
where Pj is a 24 × 24 symmetric positive semi-definite matrix, while di is a scalar. The optimal
policy is given by
i(ht, j) = −Fjht, j = 1, 2 (58)
where Fj is a 24 × 1 matrix, depending on Pj. That is, matrix Fj specifies the coefficients in
the policy rule of the central bank. Those coefficients are regime specific. Maximizing, thus, the
Bellman subject to the constraints, the matrix Fj is specified as
Fj =
(
Q+ βpj1B
′
1PiB1 + βpj2B
′
2PiB2
)−1
β
(
pj1A
′
1PiB1 + pj2A
′
2PiB2
)
(59)
where matrix Pi has been already determined by a set of interrelated Riccati equations, which
specify a system with the following form
Pj = R + βpj1A
′
1PiA1 + βpj2A
′
2PiA2 − . . .
−β2
(
pj1A
′
1PiB1 + pj2A
′
2PiB2
)(
Q+ βpj1B
′
1PiB1 + βpj2B
′
2PiB2
)−1 (
pj1B
′
1PiA1 + pj2B
′
2PiA2
)
(60)
8.3 How should home central bank react?
Having specified the formulation of the policy problem of the home central bank, in this section,
I find the optimal rule conditional on regime shifts in foreign monetary policy. Figures 8 and 9
summarize the key results.
The first result from the two figures above is that the home central bank must change the
coefficients in its interest rate rule as foreign monetary policy changes over time. Therefore, it is
not optimal fro the home country to adopt a regime invariant interest rate rule. The second is that,
the weight on PPI inflation must increase as the probability of foreign monetary policy switching
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to the dovish regime increases.37 The opposite holds as the probability of foreign monetary policy
switching to the hawkish regime increases. In this case the weight on PPI inflation falls. The
weight on the output gap changes similarly. That is, it rises as the probability of switching to the
dovish regime increases, and falls as the probability of moving to the hawkish regime increases.
Figure 8: Coefficients when the foreign central bank is hawkish
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Figure 9: Coefficients when the foreign central bank is dovish
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37As in Svensson (1998), CPI inflation pit is not included in the optimal reaction function of the home Central Bank. This is due to
the fact that it is not an independent state variable, but, rather, a linear combination of other state variables, i.e. piH,t and piF,t.
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From the computation of optimal policy of the home central bank I end up to the following two
results:
Result 4: As the probability of the foreign monetary policy switching to the dovish
regime increases, the home central bank should become more aggressive to home PPI
inflation fluctuations. As the probability of the foreign monetary policy switching to the
hawkish regime increases, the home central bank should become less aggressive to home
PPI inflation fluctuations.
Result 5: The home central bank must attach a weight on home PPI inflation that is
always greater than one. That is, it must be always hawkish. Moreover, it must be even
more aggressive to PPI inflation fluctuations, as the foreign central bank becomes dovish.
8.4 The importance of always reacting optimally.
In this section I focus on the importance, in terms of welfare, of an optimal reaction of the home
central bank to changes in foreign monetary policy. I assume that the home Central Bank always
reacts optimally conditional on foreign monetary policy. Again, I compute the relative welfare
losses. That is, the losses in each regime are expressed relative to those when each corresponding
regime is an absorbing state.
Table 10: Relative Losses
Losses
Home Foreign
Hawkish 1.0003 1.0023
Dovish 1.0000 0.9990
The results at table 10 show that when the home central bank reacts always optimally to foreign
monetary policy, the home country is entirely unaffected by regime shifts in foreign monetary policy.
Home welfare loss remains unchanged in the dovish regime relative to the constant parameter case.
In the hawkish regime the increase in home loss is tiny. More importantly, the foreign country
benefits when the home central bank reacts optimally to changes in its policy. Foreign welfare loss
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is only 0.2% higher in the hawkish regime and 0.1% lower in the dovish regime, compared to the
absorbing state. Therefore, optimal reaction in the home country is enough to eliminate the large
fluctuations in overall volatility in both countries.
Finally, as a last exercise, I compare rule (52) with the case where the home central bank reacts
optimally. Given that this rule yields the lowest home welfare losses (relative to the Taylor rule
considered in the baseline calibration) than any other of the alternative rules considered in this
paper, the comparison of its performance relative to the optimal reaction of the home central bank
is enough to show how much simple rules are away from the optimal case.
Table 11: Rule (52) vs Optimal
Losses
Home Foreign
Hawkish 3.4663 2.0603
Dovish 3.6832 5.2785
As table 11 shows rule (52) yields losses that are 3.5 times higher in the home country and 2 times
higher in the foreign, in the hawkish regime. As regards losses in the dovish regime, they are 3.7
and 5 times higher in the home and the foreign country respectively, relative to the losses accruing
under the optimal reaction function.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, I show that regime shifts in the monetary policy of one country have important
effects on other economies. My new empirical evidence shows that the monetary policy of the Fed
has changed since the start of the Euro and is found to be the main reason for the changes in
the dynamics of inflation and output gap in the Eurozone. Furthermore, changes in the monetary
policy of the Fed are well captured by a Taylor rule whose coefficients change according a two-state
Markov-switching process. The monetary policy of the ECB, though, is found to be fairly stable.
Taking into account the empirical findings, I examine the international effects of changes in
monetary policy theoretically. I construct a two country DSGE model in which foreign monetary
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policy switches regimes over time. I give further insight regarding the effects of regime switching
in monetary policy both domestically and abroad. Home monetary policy was initially assumed
to be time invariant and follow the Taylor rule with some interest rate smoothing. Home inflation
is found to be affected both in terms of volatility and in terms of its response to alternative
shocks, by regime shifts in foreign monetary policy (and, consequently, by the change in inflation
expectations). Foreign monetary policy regime shifts generate a stabilization and an amplifying
effect on output and inflation, both in the foreign and the home country. Which effect arises
depends on which regime the foreign monetary policy lies in. When the latter is dovish there
is a stabilization effect. That is, impulse responses of inflation and output are dampened, given
a positive probability of the foreign monetary policy becoming hawkish. On the contrary, when
foreign monetary policy is hawkish there is an amplifying effect in both countries, given a positive
probability of the foreign monetary policy becoming dovish. That is, the impulse responses are
more volatile. Moreover, there is an asymmetry on the size of each effect. In particular, I show
that the stabilization effect is stronger in the foreign, but weaker in the home country, based on a
welfare measure, derived by a second order approximation of the agents utility function.
Finally, through the solution of the optimal policy problem of the home central banker, condi-
tional on foreign monetary policy switching regimes over time, I show that it is optimal to follow a
time varying interest rate rule. When the home central bank reacts optimally, the effects of regime
switches in foreign monetary policy on the home country are completely eliminated. Moreover,
the foreign country seems to benefit a lot, in terms of its welfare measure, when the home country
reacts optimally to changes in its policy.
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CONCLUSION
The thesis consists of three self-contained empirical and theoretical studies. These are (i) Asym-
metries, productivity and capital account effects in the determination of the Real Exchange rate:
The case of Transition Economies, (ii) Rule-of-thumb behavior and Real Exchange Rate targeting
and (iii) Markov Switching Monetary Policy in a two-country DSGE Model.
In Chapter 1, I show that the Balassa-Samuelson effect cannot describe the behaviour of the
real exchange rate for all economies in transition. Using an appropriate proxy for productivity I
show that its effect on the real exchange rate is negative (i.e. causes appreciation) for only three
countries, namely, the Czech Republic, Poland and Latvia. However, the effect of the capital
account is negative (i.e. causes appreciation) for all countries but Slovenia. I show that this is
mainly caused by the composition of the capital account. When foreign direct investment exceeds
portfolio investment, for a long period of time, the effect of the capital account is negative. The
opposite holds when portfolio investment exceeds foreign direct investment, as was the case for
Slovenia. Therefore, long-run investment seems to have caused the appreciation of those currencies,
rather than the Balassa-Samuelson effect itself.
I test for cointegration among the real exchange rate, the real interest rate differential, the
proxy for productivity and the capital account. I show that they cointegrate in a nonlinear fashion.
This implies that a linear vector error correction model is no longer valid, as it implies a linear
adjustment for each variable following deviation from the long-run equilibrium. For this reason I
use a nonlinear multivariate error correction model, whose nonlinearity is determined by that found
for the cointegrated residuals. For simplicity, I assume that the four variables under consideration
share a common nonlinearity. The threshold variable is the cointegrated residuals. Adjustment
towards the long-run equilibrium happens in both a linear and a nonlinear fashion.
Finally, specification tests in the multivariate error correction model show that this is a correct
specification to capture the dynamics of the variables considered.
In chapter 2, I examine the importance of real exchange rate targeting in monetary policy. I
estimate a structural VAR for the nominal interest rate, CPI inflation, the output gap and the
real exchange rate. From the impulse response analysis and I find that the ECB achieves a better
control of CPI inflation when it allows its policy rate to react contemporaneously to exchange rate
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movements.
Relying on the above finding I constructed a two country DSGE model for the Eurozone and
the US. I modelled the foreign monetary policy using the estimates of Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1998) for the coefficients in the output gap and CPI inflation in the interest rate rule for the US.
Taking this policy as given and contrary to past papers, I compute the optimized coefficients in
the interest rate rule of the home central bank. Adding the real exchange rate into the interest
rate rule leads to robustly lower welfare losses. The gap in losses between the Taylor rule and the
real exchange rate targeting rule is wider, the higher the degree of persistence on inflation and
output.
Therefore both empirical and theoretical evidence in this paper suggest that an interest rate
rule with a real exchange rate target is Pareto superior to the Taylor rule in a model.
In chapter 3, I show that regime shifts in the monetary policy of one country have important
effects on other economies. My new empirical evidence shows that the monetary policy of the Fed
has changed since the start of the Euro and is found to be the main reason for the changes in
the dynamics of inflation and output gap in the Eurozone. Furthermore, changes in the monetary
policy of the Fed are well captured by a Taylor rule whose coefficients change according a two-state
Markov-switching process. The monetary policy of the ECB, though, is found to be fairly stable.
Taking into account the empirical findings, I examine the international effects of changes in
monetary policy theoretically. I construct a two country DSGE model in which foreign monetary
policy switches regimes over time. I give further insight regarding the effects of regime switching
in monetary policy both domestically and abroad. Home monetary policy was initially assumed
to be time invariant and follow the Taylor rule with some interest rate smoothing. Home inflation
is found to be affected both in terms of volatility and in terms of its response to alternative
shocks, by regime shifts in foreign monetary policy (and, consequently, by the change in inflation
expectations). Foreign monetary policy regime shifts generate a stabilization and an amplifying
effect on output and inflation, both in the foreign and the home country. Which effect arises
depends on which regime the foreign monetary policy lies in. When the latter is dovish there
is a stabilization effect. That is, impulse responses of inflation and output are dampened, given
a positive probability of the foreign monetary policy becoming hawkish. On the contrary, when
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foreign monetary policy is hawkish there is an amplifying effect in both countries, given a positive
probability of the foreign monetary policy becoming dovish. That is, the impulse responses are
more volatile. Moreover, there is an asymmetry on the size of each effect. In particular, I show
that the stabilization effect is stronger in the foreign, but weaker in the home country, based on a
welfare measure, derived by a second order approximation of the agents utility function.
Finally, through the solution of the optimal policy problem of the home central banker, condi-
tional on foreign monetary policy switching regimes over time, I show that it is optimal to follow a
time varying interest rate rule. When the home central bank reacts optimally, the effects of regime
switches in foreign monetary policy on the home country are completely eliminated. Moreover,
the foreign country seems to benefit a lot, in terms of its welfare measure, when the home country
reacts optimally to changes in its policy.
110
Appendix for Chapter 1
Appendix A : Real Exchange Rates
Figure 2: Real Exchange Rates relative to the German Mark
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Appendix B
Dickey-Fuller Tests (Levels)
Czech Lithuania Slovak Re. Slovenia Poland Hungary Latvia
qt -0.4620 -1.8075 -1.4961 -2.6760 -1.7270 -0.9625 -2.4863
yt -0.4552 -1.9775 -0.70707 -2.5186 -0.9661 -0.9826 0.0671
rt − r∗t -1.4860 -3.44464* -0.8555 -1.7353 -1.0174 -1.3586 -3.27506*
CAt -1.7495 -1.1004 -1.4880 -2.7234 -2.0284 -0.0961 -2.3836
Notes: ** Significant at 1% significance level. * Significant at 5% significance level.
Dickey-Fuller Tests (First Differences)
Czech Lithuania Slovak Re. Slovenia Poland Hungary Latvia
qt -5.61150** -5.51958** -6.61717** -6.15045** -9.59054** -7.39139** -5.39095**
yt -11.4443** -6.14024** -9.43722** -7.63840** -11.8253** -11.0622** -6.72186**
rt − r∗t -4.19793** -4.31926** -5.72474** -6.73867** -4.66228** -6.05173** -5.35520**
CAt -4.75613** -4.60758** -6.14546** -5.35863** -5.70488** -8.24773** -3.92114**
Notes: ** Significant at 1% significance level. * Significant at 5% significance level.
The KSS Test for Global Stationarity.
The LSTAR model given in (5) describes a series that is globally stationary under the assump-
tion that c1 + c
′
1 < 138. Although c1 can receive values greater than one, c
′
1 must be less than zero.
Consequently, at the reparameterized model (6) we must have b0 +b
′
1 < 0. This means that we may
allow the autoregressive paramter in the linear part of the model to be equal to one, representing,
thus, the random walk behaviour of the series in the middle regime (locally nonstationary), but
it must be that whenver the series is outside the thresholds (or for large deviations), it exhibits a
strong mean reverting behaviour.
Kapetanios, Shin and Snell (2003) suggested a t-test for global stationarity. In particular, they
suggested a test where at the ESTAR model (4), the null of kE = 0 (given that c1 = 1) was tested
against the alternative of kE 6= 0 (given that c1 = 1). However, as already mentioned, a problem
in the ESTAR or the LSTAR model is that one cannot perform a test where the null as that just
38In fact, this is a necessary assumption for geometric ergodicity. In particular, in our case the Markov chain ut is geometrically
ergodic if there are constants ϕ < 1, µ, ζ <∞ and a set K such that:
E[‖ut‖ | ut−1 = u] < ϕ‖ut‖+ ζ ∀u /∈ K,
E[‖ut‖ | ut−1 = u] ≤ µ ∀u ∈ K.
The set K denotes the case where the Markov Chain lies within the thresholds, or the case where it is either on or fluctauates very
closely to the long run equilibrium level. If u /∈ K , this corresponds to the case where the Chain is outside the bands (or thresholds),
or the case where large shocks have occured and the series is described by mean reverting behaviour (since ϕ < 1).
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described can be tested, since under the null parameter c′1 is not identified. Therefore, Kapetanios
et al. (2003) used a first order Taylor approximation of the transition function, having imposed
the resriction that c1 = 1. This yielded the following auxilliary regression39:
∆ut = δu3t−1 + error
where the null of no stationarity (δ = 0) is tested against the alternative of global stationarity
(δ < 0). The test is conducted as a t-test40. We performed the same procedure, in order to test
for global stationarity in the LSTAR model. Instead of taking the first order approximation, we
took the thrid order, for the same reasons explained at section 4. The power of the test was then
computed. As far as the properties of the statistic are concerned, we tend to believe that they
should be exactly the same, as a Taylor expansion is used leading to a functional form similar to
that used in Kapetanios et al. (2003). The only variation made, compared to the original test, was
that in the auxilliary regression where the test was applied, only the statistically significant terms
were used, based on the Terasvirta procedure applied at section 4, for the choice of the appropriate
model. Kapetanios et al. derived critical values for their statistic using Monte-Carlo simualtion.
However, these critical values do not apply in our case as we used a higher order Taylor expansion.
Therefore, for each country new critical values were computed using Monte-Carlo techniques. In
all countries the null of no stationarity was rejected, suggesting global stationarity (cointegration).
Consequently, the variables in equation (2) are linearly cointegrated, but the adjustment, when
deviations arise, is nonlinear. The estimated auxilliary regressions are shown at table 16 in the
appendix. As expected the coefficients were negative41.
39Having reparameterized the ESTAR model as we did for the LSTAR, given at (6)
40Kapetanios et al. (2003) derived the properties of the statistic.
41A variant of the test could be used here, instead of using the statistically significant terms from the auxilliary regression, based on
the Terasvirta Rule. Hence, one could derive an F-test. The properties of the statistic could be derived in the same fashion as for the
t-ratio. However, what is more important, one should be cuatious as far as what the alternative hypothesis is. In Kapetanios et al.
(2003) the alternative is that δ < 0. One suggestion, if one carries out the joint F-test version of the KSS test, is to construct hypotheses
conditional upon the coefficients to be negative.
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Estimated Auxilliary Regressions for the KSS test.
Czech Republic
∆ut = −49.5512ut−1u3t−2
(0.0243)
Lithuania
∆ut = −2.315ut−1ut−10
(0.0006)
Slovak Republic
∆ut = −3.358u2t−1
(0.0005)
Slovenia
∆ut = −2.315u2t−1
(0.0003)
Hungary
∆ut = −5185.15u2t−1
(0.03173)
Poland
∆ut = −5.4734u2t−1
(0.00002)
Latvia
∆ut = −233.43u2t−1
(0.0096)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, estimated through
Monte-Carlo simulation, where 10000 samples of 100 + T
observations were generated. The first 100 observations
were discarded.
The power of the test was then computed. As in the previous cases, 10000 samples of 100 + T
observations were generated, where the first 100 observations were dropped. The test appears to
have strong power towards rejecting the false null of δ = 0 for all countries, but Lithuania and
Slovenia. Apart from the fact that the test indicates global stationarity, it also provides evidence
in favour of nonlinear mean reversion42. The results are shown at the table below.
Power of the KSS test
KSS
Czech 87.75
Lithuania 77.08
Slovak 100.00
Slovenia 75.83
Hungary 66.21
Poland 94.20
Latvia 100.00
Appendix C
Estimation Results for the Multivariate Smooth Transition Error Correction Model
42In the Monte-Carlo experiments the values of the coefficients were set to be equal to those found by the Gauss-Newton estimation.
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Czech Republic: MSTeqC model estimation results
Coefficients
dep variable B1 B2 B3 B4 Γ1 Γ2 Γ3 Γ4 pi1,1 pi2,1 kE , kL cE , cL
∆qt -0.431 - - 0.164 0.456 -0.076 0.072 6.761 0.023
(0.031) (0.045) (0.052) (0.029) (0.052) (0.082) (0.111)
∆yt 1.870 -0.247 - - -2.910 - - - - 0.341 6.761 0.023
(0.031) (0.006) (0.005) (0.054) (0.082) (0.111)
∆(rt − r∗t ) 1.379 -0.183 0.330 - - - - - 0.235 - 6.761 0.023
(0.044) (0.009) (0.000) (0.062) (0.082) (0.111)
∆CAt - - - -0.576 0.271 0.2672 6.761 0.023
(0.018) (0.021) (0.035) (0.082) (0.111)
Lithuania: MSTeqC model estimation results
Coefficients
dep variable B1 B2 B3 B4 Γ1 Γ2 Γ3 Γ4 pi1,1 pi2,1 kE , kL cE , cL
∆qt -1.774 - 1.267 - 1.664 - -1.254 - 0.960 -1.000 1.000 -
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆yt - - - - - - - - 1.252 -1.000 1.000 -
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆(rt − r∗t ) 1.828 -0.183 0.330 - 2.179 - -1.062 - 1.029 -1.000 1.000 -
(0.008) (0.009) (0.000) (0.002) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆CAt - - - 0.271 - - - 0.763 0.271 -1.000 1.000 -
(0.012) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000)
Slovak Republic: MSTeqC model estimation results
Coefficients
dep variable B1 B2 B3 B4 Γ1 Γ2 Γ3 Γ4 pi1,1 pi2,1 kE , kL cE , cL
∆qt - - - - - - - - - -1.000 1.359 -0.039
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆yt - - - - 0.4012 - - 0.804 0.518 -1.000 1.359 -0.039
(0.007) (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆(rt − r∗t ) - - -0.506 - 0.582 - -1.062 - 0.532 -1.000 1.359 -0.039
(0.001) (0.005) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆CAt -0.270 - - -0.517 0.623 - - 1.011 0.400 -1.000 1.359 -0.039
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Poland: MSTeqC model estimation results
Coefficients
dep variable B1 B2 B3 B4 Γ0 Γ1 Γ2 Γ3 Γ4 pi1,1 pi2,1 kE , kL cE , cL
∆qt -0.367 - - - - - - - - 0.637 -1.000 0.106 -16.169
(0.000) - - (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆yt - -0.253 - - - - - - - 0.987 -1.000 0.106 -16.169
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆(rt − r∗t ) - - -0.215 - - - - - - 1.023 -1.000 0.106 -16.169
- (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆CAt - - - - - - - - - 0.987 -1.000 0.106 -16.169
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Hangury: MSTeqC model estimation results
Coefficients
dep variable B1 B2 B3 B4 Γ0 Γ1 Γ2 Γ3 Γ4 pi1,1 pi2,1 kE , kL cE , cL
∆qt -0.234 - - -0.127 - - - - - - -0.290 9.471 0.001
(0.005) - (0.049) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
∆yt - -0.258 - - - - - - - - - 9.471 0.001
(0.001) (0.407) (0.000) (0.000)
∆(rt − r∗t ) - 0.124 0.166 - -0.009 - - - - - -0.010 9.471 0.001
- (0.043) (0.047) (0.085) (0.036) (0.000) (0.000)
∆CAt - - - - - - - - - - -0.320 9.471 0.001
(0.021) (0.000) (0.000)
Latvia: MSTeqC model estimation results
Coefficients
dep variable B1 B2 B3 B4 Γ0 Γ1 Γ2 Γ3 Γ4 pi1,1 pi2,1 kE , kL cE , cL
∆qt -0.325 - 0.036 - - - - - - 0.981 -1.000 1.439 -0.156
(0.005) - (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆yt - -0.199 - - - - - - - 0.550 -1.000 1.439 -0.156
(0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆(rt − r∗t ) - - 0.202 - - - - - - 0.946 -1.000 1.439 -0.156
(0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆CAt - - - - - - - - - 0.822 -1.000 1.439 -0.156
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Slovenia: MSTeqC model estimation results
Coefficients
dep variable B1 B2 B3 B4 Γ0 Γ1 Γ2 Γ3 Γ4 pi1,1 pi2,1 kE , kL cE , cL
∆qt - - - -0.185 - - - - - - -1.000 1.017 -0.529
(0.091) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
∆yt - -0.269 - - - - - - - - -1.000 1.017 -0.529
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
∆(rt − r∗t ) - - -0.190 - - - - - -1.006 - -1.000 1.017 -0.529
(0.022) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
∆CAt - - - - 0.005 - - - - - -1.000 1.017 -0.529
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Appendix D
Specification tests in the Multivariate Smooth Transition Error Correction Model
Table5 : Heteroskedasticity tests in the MSTeqC model
FARCH1 F
ARCH
2 F
ARCH
3 F
ARCH
4
Czech Republic 0.653 0.915 0.021 0.854
Lithuania 0.031 0.713 0.579 0.107
Slovak Republic 0.105 0.925 0.088 0.904
Slovenia 0.657 0.732 0.035 0.936
Hungary 0.890 0.478 0.025 0.000
Poland 0.576 0.034 0.799 0.999
Latvia 0.555 0.021 0.791 0.079
Notes:Numbers reported are p− values. FARCH1 is the test for the regression
for ∆ft, FARCH2 is the test for the regression for ∆yt, FARCH3 is the test for
the regression for ∆(i− i∗)t, FARCH3 is the test for the regression for ∆CAt
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Table 6 : Residual autocorrelation tests in the MSTeqC model
FCOR1 F
COR
2 F
COR
3 F
COR
4
Czech Republic 0.101 0.000 0.222 0.774
Lithuania 0.594 0.003 0.917 0.174
Slovak Republic 0.034 0.000 0.347 0.704
Slovenia 0.777 0.260 0.011 0.139
Hungary 0.476 0.000 0.686 0.007
Poland 0.313 0.000 0.727 0.999
Latvia 0.938 0.000 0.945 0.082
Notes:Numbers reported are p− values. FCOR1 is the test for the regression
for ∆ft, FCOR2 is the test for the regression for ∆yt, FCOR3 is the test for
the regression for ∆(i− i∗)t, FCOR3 is the test for the regression for ∆CAt
Table 7 : Neglected Nonlinearities tests in the MSTeqC model
FNNL1 F
NNL
2 F
NNL
3 F
NNL
4
Czech Republic 0.281 0.029 0.908 0.999
Lithuania 0.617 0.079 0.962 0.090
Slovak Republic 0.042 0.265 0.189 0.397
Slovenia 0.126 0.733 0.020 0.092
Hungary 0.256 0.175 0.010 0.152
Poland 0.027 0.571 0.429 0.508
Latvia 0.424 0.432 0.066 0.571
Notes:Numbers reported are p− values. FNNL1 is the test for the regression
for ∆ft,FNNL2 is the test for the regression for ∆yt,FNNL3 is the test for the
regression for ∆(i− i∗)t, FNNL3 is the test for the regression for ∆CAt
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Appendix for Chapters 2 and 3 (Joint)
Appendix E: The steady State
In this section I compute the steady state of the the real variables, first and then through the proof
of proposition 1, the steady state of the nominal variables.
Given that in the steady state each firm will change the same price in both countries, the law of
one price holds and, hence, PPP holds as well. Therefore the real exchange rate is pegged to one.
Q = 1
Given an international risk sharing condition, PPP implies that at the steady state consumption
levels will be equalized across the two countries. Hence
C = C∗
From the representative household’s labor supply decision, I have for each country that
Lγ = C−σW
P
L∗γ = C∗−σW
∗
P ∗
while from the firms production function in each country, I have that
Y = L and Y ∗ = L∗
As already mentioned, firms will set the same price in each country. From their maximization
problem it follows that prices at the steady state will be specified as follows
pH = Sp∗H = PH =
θ
θ − 1
W
A
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p∗F
S
= pF = P ∗F =
θ
θ − 1
W ∗
A∗
and since the law of one price holds, the demand for the home and foreign produced good respec-
tively will be specified as
YH =
(
PH
P
)−ρ
C
YF =
(
P ∗F
P ∗
)−ρ
C
Combining, thus, the above equations, along with the household’s optimal labor decision I end up
to the following expressions for the consumption levels in the steady state
C =
[
θ − 1
θ
(
PH
P
)1+ργ
A
] 1
γ+σ
C∗ =
[
θ − 1
θ
(
P ∗F
P ∗
)1+ργ
A∗
] 1
γ+σ
As in Benigno (2004), note that both PH
P
andPF
P
are both functions of T ≡ PF
PH
, so that the
two equations above uniquely determine C and T . Having specified the steady state values of
consumption output and relative prices, I can proceed to the proof of proposition in section 5.
Proof of Proposition in section 5
The foreign households intertemporal decision (14) implies that in the steady state the following
will be true for the nominal interest rate
i∗ = pi
∗
β
Additionally, the assumed interest rate rule of the foreign country (31) receives the following form
in the steady state
i = ξs
(
pi∗
p˜i∗
)φ∗
pi∗
y∗φ
∗
y∗,s
Combining the above two equations for the foreign interest rate, solving for ξs and recalling that
the interest rate in the steady state is such that foreign inflation pi∗ hits its target p˜i∗, I receive the
following
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ξs =
1
β
pi∗y∗φ
∗
y∗,s
Therefore the steady state interest rate is
i∗ = p˜i
∗
β
and, as already mentioned, inflation at the steady state is pi∗ = p˜i∗. Nominal variables, thus, are
independent of policy regime in the steady state. Moreover, as already shown above, the real
variables (i.e. consumption, output, labor) are independent of policy regime, as well, in the steady
state.
Appendix F: Aggregate Supply and Aggregate Demand
In this section I derive the PPI inflation rates (33) and (34) and the aggregate demand equation
(38) reported in the text.
Aggregate Supply
Forward looking producers in the home country maximize their profits in the home market by
choosing the optimal price specified as
pFort (h) =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+sMCt+sy
h
t+s(pt(h))
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+syht+s(pt(h))
where yht+s(pt(h)) is specified in (24) in the text. The optimal price above rearranged can be written
in the following form
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ωβ)sC
−σ
t+sPH,t+s
Pt+s
[{
pFort (h)
PH,t+s
−
(
θ
θ − 1
)
Wt+s
At+sPH,t+s
}
yht+s(pt(h))
]
= 0
and its loglinear approximation is summarized as follows
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ωβ)s
 ˆˆpFort,t+s(h)−
 Ŵt+s
At+sPH,t+s
 = 0 (61)
where ˆˆpFort (h) = ln
(
pFort (h)
PH,t+s
)
. Using the household’s optimality condition (13) I can expand the
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marginal cost term in the above relationship as follows
Ŵt+s
At+sPH,t+s
= γ (yˆt+s(h)− at) + σ
ψ
Cˆt+s +
(1− ψ)σ
ψ
Cˆt+s−1 + at+s + (1− δ) Tˆt+s
where I have used the fact that CˆOt = 1ψ Cˆt − 1−ψψ Cˆt−1 . Furthermore, by suing the demand for the
home good yˆt+s(h) can be expanded as follows
yˆt+s(h) = −ρδ ˆ˜pt,t+s(h) + ρδ (1− δ) Tˆt+s + Cˆt+s − ρ (1− δ∗) ˆ˜p∗t,t+s(h) . . .
−ρδ∗ (1− δ∗) Tˆ ∗t+s −
(1− δ∗)
σ
qˆt+s
But ˆ˜pt+s(h) and ˆ˜p∗t,t+s(h) are specified as
ˆ˜pt+s(h) = ζpˆFort+s (h) + (1− ζ) pˆBt+s(h)
ˆ˜p∗t,t+s(h) = ζpˆ∗Fort+s (h) + (1− ζ) pˆ∗Bt+s(h)
for the home good in the home and the foreign market respectively. From (19) ˆ˜pt(h) and ˆ˜p∗t (h)
can be expressed as follows
ˆ˜pt,t+s(h) =
ω
1− ωpiH,t −
s∑
i=1
piH,t+i
ˆ˜p∗t,t+s(h) =
ω∗
1− ω∗pi
∗
H,t −
s∑
i=1
pi∗H,t+i
Combining the above relationships for the prices set at date t , I can express the price set by the
forward looking firms as follows
pˆFort (h)− PH,t−1 =
1
(1− ω)(1− ζ)piH,t −
ζ
(1− ω)(1− ζ)piH,t−1
Solving for ˆˆpFort,t+s(h) in (61) and combining all the above relationships I end to the following
relationship for PPI inflation
piH,t =
ζ
(ζ + ω (1− ζ) + θγδω (1− ζ))piH,t−1 +
(ω − ω∗) (γθ (1− δ∗) (1− ζ) (1− ω))
(1− ω∗) (ζ + ω (1− ζ) + θγδω (1− ζ))pi
∗
H,t + . . .
(1− ωβ) (1− ζ) (1− ω)
(ζ + ω (1− ζ) + θγδω (1− ζ))Rˆt +
ωγθ (1− δ∗) (1− ζ) (1− ω)
(1− ω∗) (ζ + ω (1− ζ) + θγδω (1− ζ))
(
βEtpi
∗
H,t+1 − pi∗H,t
)
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where Rˆt is specified as
Rˆt = (1 + γρδ) (1− δ) Tˆt+
(
γ + σ
ψ
)
Cˆt−γρδ∗ (1− δ∗) Tˆ ∗t −
γ (1− δ∗)
σ
qˆt− (1− ψ)σ
ψ
Cˆt−1−(γ + 1) at
and from the resource constraint
Cˆt = Yˆt − ρδ (1− δ) Tˆt + ρ (1− δ∗) δ∗Tˆ ∗t +
(
1− δ∗
σ
)
qˆt
The supply of home produced goods in the foreign country is derived by following similar steps.
Home producers set their price in foreign country according to the following maximization rule
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ω∗β)s
C−σt+sPH,t+s
Pt+s
[{
p∗Fort (h)
P ∗H,t+s
Zt+sP
∗
H,t+s
PH,t+s
−
(
θ
θ − 1
)
Wt+s
At+sPH,t+s
}
yft+s(pt(h))
]
= 0
and its loglinear approximation is summarized as follows
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ωβ)s
pˆ∗Fort,t+s(h) + ẑht −
 Ŵt+s
At+sPH,t+s
 = 0 (62)
where zht =
ZtP ∗H,t
PH,t
. And after following similar steps as in the derivation of the supply in the home
country I conclude to the following for the supply of home goods in the foreign country
pi∗H,t =
ζ
(ζ + ω∗ (1− ζ) + θγδω∗ (1− ζ))pi
∗
H,t−1 +
(ω∗ − ω) (γθδ (1− ζ) (1− ω∗))
(1− ω) (ζ + ω∗ (1− ζ) + θγδω∗ (1− ζ))piH,t + . . .
(1− ω∗β) (1− ζ) (1− ω∗)
(ζ + ω∗ (1− ζ) + θγδω∗ (1− ζ))Rˆ
∗
t +
ω∗γθδ (1− ζ) (1− ω∗)
(1− ω) (ζ + ω∗ (1− ζ) + θγδω∗ (1− ζ)) (βEtpiH,t+1 − piH,t)
Having used ẑht = qˆt − δ∗Tˆ ∗t + (1− δ)Tˆt, Rˆ∗t is specified as
Rˆ∗t = (γρδ − 1) (1− δ) Tˆt+
(
γ + σ
ψ
)
Cˆt−δ∗(γρ(1−δ∗)−1)Tˆ ∗t −(
γ (1− δ∗)
σ
+1)qˆt−(1− ψ)σ
ψ
Cˆt−1−(γ + 1) at+s
Aggregate Demand
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The market clearing condition for home goods market satisfies the following
Yt = CH,t + C∗H,t
or
Yt =
(
PH,t
Pt
)−ρ
δCH,t +
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−ρ
(1− δ∗)C∗H,t
and after loglinearizing and solving for Cˆt , I receive the following
Cˆt = Yˆt − ρδ (1− δ) Tˆt + ρ (1− δ∗) δ∗Tˆ ∗t +
(
1− δ∗
σ
)
qˆt
Using the Euler equation accruing from the optimizing households loglinearized first order condition
(12) and the fact that CˆOt = 1ψ Cˆt − 1−ψψ Cˆt−1, I end up to the aggregate demand equation for the
home country
Yˆt = − ψ(2− ψ)σ (it − Etpit+1)+
1
2− ψEtYˆt+1+
1− ψ
2− ψYˆt−1−
ρδ (1− δ)
2− ψ EtTˆt+1+
ρδ∗ (1− δ∗)
2− ψ EtTˆ
∗
t+1+. . .
(1− δ∗)
(2− ψ)σEtqˆt+1 + ρδ (1− δ) Tˆt − ρδ
∗ (1− δ∗) Tˆ ∗t −
1− δ∗
σ
qˆt − ρδ (1− ψ) (1− δ)2− ψ Tˆt−1 + . . .
ρδ∗ (1− ψ) (1− δ∗)
2− ψ Tˆ
∗
t−1 +
(1− ψ) (1− δ∗)
(2− ψ)σ qˆt−1
and similarly for the foreign country
Yˆ ∗t = −
ψ∗
(2− ψ∗)σ
(
i∗t − Etpi∗t+1
)
+ 12− ψ∗EtYˆ
∗
t+1+
1− ψ∗
2− ψ∗ Yˆ
∗
t−1−
ρδ∗ (1− δ∗)
2− ψ∗ EtTˆ
∗
t+1+
ρδ (1− δ)
2− ψ∗ EtTˆt+1−. . .
− (1− δ)(2− ψ∗)σEtqˆt+1 + ρδ
∗ (1− δ∗) Tˆ ∗t − ρδ (1− δ) Tˆt +
1− δ
σ
qˆt − ρδ
∗ (1− ψ∗) (1− δ∗)
2− ψ∗ Tˆ
∗
t−1 + . . .
ρδ (1− ψ∗) (1− δ)
2− ψ∗ Tˆt−1 −
(1− ψ∗) (1− δ∗)
(2− ψ∗)σ qˆt−1
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Appendix G: The welfare criterion
In this section I derive the second order approximation (44) to the representative household’s
utility function (6) in the home country. The steps for the derivation of the welfare measure for
the foreign country are exactly the same. I assume that there is a subsidy to labor. This implies
that the steady state is efficient, given that the distortions form monopolistic competition are
exhausted. Therefore, I derive the welfare criterion for each country using a second-order Taylor
series expansion of (6) around the efficient steady state. Moreover, the welfare measure is expressed
as deviations from the flexible price equilibrium, which is efficient as well, given the labor subsidy.
The second order approximation of the welfare of the representative optimizing household re-
ceives the following form
Wt = U + UC(CˆOt +
1
2(1 +
UCCC
UC
)CˆOt
2
)− UL(Lˆt + 12(1 +
ULLL
UL
)Lˆ2t (63)
where UC = C−σ, UCC = C−σ−1, UL = Lγ and ULL = Lγ−1. Using the fact that yˆt(h) = at + Lˆt
and approximating it up to a second order I receive the following expression for labor
Lˆt = 1 +
y(h)
L
Et(yˆt(h)) + at +
y(h)
2L var(yˆt(h)) + a
2
t −
1
2 Lˆ
2
t (64)
Moreover by Woodford (Ch. 6) I have that
var(yˆ(i)) = δθ2var(p˜t(h)) + (1− δ)θ2var(p˜∗t (h)) (65)
But p˜t(h) and p˜t(h) are determined according to (18) in the main text. Let P¯H,t ≡ Et [log(p˜t(h))]
and ∆t ≡ var(log(p˜t(h)). Then,
∆t ≡ var(log(p˜t(h)− PH,t−1)
= Et
[
(log(p˜t(h)− PH,t−1)2 − (Et [log(p˜t(h)− PH,t−1])2
]
= ω∆t−1 + (1− ω)ζ(log(pBt (h)− P¯H,t−1)2 + (1− ω)(1− ζ)(log(pFort (h)− P¯H,t−1)2
−(P¯H,t − P¯H,t−1) (66)
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where pBt (h) and pFt (h) are the prices set by the backward and forward looking firms respectively.
The same expression holds for p˜∗t (h). Before substituting the above expression in (62) and then in
(61), note that P¯H,t = log(P¯H,t) + O(||ξ||2), so that P¯H,t − P¯H,t−1 = piH,t + O(||ξ||2). Additionally,
the following relationships hold
p˜t(h) = ζpBt (h) + (1− ζ) pFort (h)
p˜t(h) =
ω
1− ωpiH,t + PH,t
Using the above expressions for p˜t(h) I end up to the following expression for the price that is set
by the forward looking firms
pˆFort (h)− PH,t−1 =
1
(1− ω)(1− ζ)piH,t −
ζ
(1− ω)(1− ζ)piH,t−1
Substituting the above expression into (64), I receive the following for ∆t
∞∑
t=0
βt∆t =
1
(1− ωβ)
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ω
1− ωpi
2
H,t +
1− ζ
ζ(1− ω) (piH,t − piH,t−1)
2
]
+ t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3) (67)
Similarly for the price set in the foreign country for the home good I receive the following
∞∑
t=0
βt∆∗t =
1
(1− ω∗β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ω∗
1− ω∗pi
∗2
H,t +
1− ζ
ζ(1− ω∗)
(
pi∗H,t − pi∗H,t−1
)2]
+ t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3) (68)
where t.i.p. represents terms independent of policy and O(||ξ||3) stands for terms of order higher
than two.
Additionally, note that for the home output the following relationship holds (and similarly for
foreign output)
Yˆt = Et(yˆt(h)) +
1
2
(
θ − 1
θ
)
var(yˆt(h)) +O(||ξ||3)
Using the above expression to substitute for Et(yˆt(i)) in equation (2), I receive the following
expression for Lˆt
Lˆt ≈ 1 +
Y
L
Yˆt − 12θ
Y
L
var(yˆt(h))− 12 Lˆ
2
t + t.i.p. (69)
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Finally, a second order approximation of the resource constraint of the model yields the following
Cˆt ≈
1
2 Yˆt +
1
4 Yˆ
2
t +
1
2 Yˆ
∗
t +
1
4 Yˆ
∗2
t +
1
2σ qˆt +
1
4σ2 qˆ
2
t −
1
2σ qˆtCˆt (70)
Recalling that
Ct = ψCOt + (1− ψ)CRt
and
CRt = Ct−1
so that
CˆOt =
1
ψ
Cˆt − 1− ψ
ψ
Cˆt−1 (71)
Substituting, (69) into (61), I receive the following form for welfare
Wt = U + UC(
1
ψ
Cˆt − 1− ψ
ψ
Cˆt−1 +
1
2(1 +
UCCC
UC
)( 1
ψ
Cˆ2t +
1− ψ
ψ
Cˆ2t−1 +
1− ψ
ψ2
CˆtCˆt−1))
−UL(Lˆt + 12(1 +
ULLL
UL
)Lˆ2t + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3) (72)
Substituting (67), (68), (69) and (70) into (72), I receive the following form for the welfare measure
Wt = −12ucCΞ{λ1(Yˆt − ynt )2 + λ2(Yˆ ∗t − y∗nt )2 + λ3(qˆt − qnt )2 + λ4∆qˆ2t + λ5∆Yˆ ∗t 2 + λ6∆Yˆt2 + . . .
+pi2H,t+λ7(piH,t−piH,t−1)2 +λ8(pi∗H,t)2 +λ9(pi∗H,t−pi∗H,t−1)2 +λ10(qˆt+ Yˆt)2 +λ11(qˆt+ Yˆ ∗t )2 +λ12(qˆt−1 +
Yˆt)2 +λ13(qˆt−1 + Yˆ ∗t )2 . . .λ12(qˆt−1 + Yˆt)2 +λ13(qˆt−1 + Yˆ ∗t )2 +λ14(Yˆ ∗t−1−y∗nt−1)(qˆt−1− qnt−1)+λ15(yt−1−
ynt−1)(y∗t−1 − y∗nt−1) + λ16(Cˆt − cnt )(qˆt − qnt )+
+λ17(Yˆt + Yˆ ∗t−1)2 + λ18(Yˆt−1 + Yˆ ∗t )2 + λ19(Yˆt−1 − ynt−1)(qt−1 − qnt−1) + λ20(Yˆ ∗t − Yˆ ∗nt )(Yˆ ∗t−1 − Yˆ ∗nt−1) +
λ21(Yˆ ∗t−1 + qˆt)2 + λ22(Yˆt−1 + qˆt)2+λ23(Yˆt−1 − ynt−1)(qˆt−1 − qnt−1) + λ24(Cˆ∗t−1 − c∗nt−1)(qˆt−1 − qnt−1) +
λ25(qˆt − qnt )(qˆt−1 − qnt−1) + λ26(Yˆt−1 − ynt−1)(Yˆt − ynt ) + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3)
where
Ξ = (θω)(σ/(−1 + σ))−ρC−σ(1−ρ)Lγ(1+ρ))/(1− ω)(1− ωβ)
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λ1 = Ξ(((3(−1 + σ − 2ψ) + 16(C − 1))(Lγ + 1))γ(ψ2))/(16(ψ))) + ((3 + 3σ(−1 + ψ)− ψ)(−1 + ψ)/(16(ψ2)))−
−(σ − 1)(1− ψ)/(2σ(ψ2))− (1− ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2)−−(1− ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2))
λ2 = −Ξ((3(1− σ + 2ψ)/(16(ψ2)))− ((3 + 3σ(−1 + ψ)− ψ)(1− ψ)/(16ψ2))− (1− ψ) ∗ (−2 + 2σ + ψ)/(8σ(ψ2))−
−(1− ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2)− (1− ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4σψ2)−−(1− ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2))
λ3 = Ξ(((5−5σ+2ψ)/(16((σψ)2)))+(−1+σ)(1−ψ)/(2σψ2)+(1−ψ)(−2+2σ+ψ)/(8σψ2)+(1−ψ)∗(−1+σ)/(4σψ2))
λ4 = −Ξ(−((σ − 1)(1 − ψ)/(2σψ2)) + ((−1 + ψ)(5 + 15ψ + σ(−5 + 13ψ))/(16(σψ)2)) − (1 − ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4σψ2))
λ5 = −Ξ((3 + 3σ(−1 + ψ)− ψ) ∗ (1− ψ)/(16ψ2)− (1− ψ)(−2 + 2σ + ψ)/(8σψ2)− (1− ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2))
λ6 = −Ξ(((3 + 3σ(−1 + ψ) − ψ)(−1 + ψ)/(16(ψ2))) − ((−1 + σ)(1 − ψ)/(4σ(ψ2))) − (1 − ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2))
λ7 = υζ/(ω(1 − ζ)),λ8 = υω∗(1 − ω)(1 − ωβ)/(ω(1 − ω∗)(1 − ω∗β)), λ9 = υζ(1 − ω)(1 − ωβ)/(ω(1 − ω∗)(1 −
ζ)(1− ω∗β)) λ10 = −Ξ(−1 + σ + 2ψ)/(8σψ2), λ11 = −Ξ(−1 + σ + 2ψ)/(8σψ2), λ12 = −Ξ((σ − 1)(1− ψ)/(2σψ2))
λ13 = −Ξ(1 − ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4σψ2) λ14 = −Ξ(−1 + ψ)(1 − ψ + σ(−1 + 5ψ))/(8σψ2), λ15 = Ξ(1 + σ(−1 + ψ) −
3ψ)(−1 + ψ)/(8(ψ2)) λ16 = −Ξ(−1 + σ)/(2σψ2) λ17 = −Ξ(−1 + σ)(1 − ψ)/(4ψ2), λ18 = −Ξ(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2),
λ19 = −Ξ(−1 + ψ)(1− 3ψ + σ(−1 + 5ψ))/(8σψ2)
λ20 = −Ξ(((−1 + σ)(1− ψ)/(4ψ2)) + ((3 + 3σ(−1 + ψ)− ψ)(1− ψ)/(8ψ2))− (1− ψ)(−2 + 2σ + ψ)/(8σψ2) + (1−
ψ)(−1 + σ)/(2ψ2)) λ21 = −Ξ(1− ψ)(−2 + 2σ + ψ)/(8σψ2), λ22 = Ξ(1− ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2)
λ23 = −Ξ(−1 + ψ)(1− 3ψ + σ(−1 + 5ψ))/(8σψ2), λ24 = Ξ(−1 + σ)((−1 + ψ)2)/(2σψ2) λ25 = −Ξ(((−1 + σ)(1−
ψ)/(4(σψ)2))−((σ−1)(1−ψ)/(σψ2))+((−1+ψ)(5+15ψ+σ(−5+13ψ))/(8(σψ)2))−(1−ψ)(−1+σ)/(4σψ2)) λ26 =
−Ξ(((−1+σ)(1−ψ)/(2ψ2))+((3+3σ(−1+ψ)−ψ)(−1+ψ)/(8ψ2))−((−1+σ)(1−ψ)/(4σψ2))+(1−ψ)(−1+σ)/(2ψ2))
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